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ABSTRACT 
THROUGH HIGHWAYS: CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXPRESSWAY SYSTEM IN 
MILWAUKEE COUNTY, 1946-1977 
 
by  
Gregory Dickenson 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor Amanda Seligman 
 
 
 
This thesis traces the route selection and planning of the Interstate Highway 
System in Milwaukee County and places it within a larger national context. It asks 
why Milwaukee's expressways were built along their eventual routes and why certain 
routes were cancelled. The thesis finds that a combination of transportation studies, 
compromise between units of government, and the availability of funding—especially 
federal funding—most contributed to route selection, while decisions at the county 
and state level to cancel specific expressway segments came after citizen opposition 
and political pressure. 
The need for a major system of express highways, wide boulevards or 
avenues, or similar major roads in Milwaukee dated to the 1920s. Immediately after 
World War II, demand for a solution to growing traffic congestion in the downtown 
area and surrounding neighborhoods mounted. Mayors John Bohn and Frank Zeidler, 
Land Commissioner Elmer Krieger, and other officials to begin planning for a city-
wide system of controlled access, divided express highways to move traffic across the 
city and into and out of the downtown area more effectively.  
Within a few years, overwhelming costs and limited intergovernmental 
cooperation compelled Milwaukee to agree to shift oversight to Milwaukee County. 
Under the new organizational structure, an appointed Milwaukee County Expressway 
Commission planned the expressway system and worked out details regarding route 
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selection and highway construction, but the Milwaukee County Board retained fiscal 
control. Municipal governments were also allowed to formally object to route 
proposals, with the State Highway Commission serving as an intermediary in the 
event of disagreements between municipal governments and the Expressway 
Commission. After the passage of the Interstate Highway Act in 1956, additional 
federal funds became available for highway construction, prompting County officials 
to ask the federal government to designate several highway routes in Milwaukee 
County as interstate highways. 
Public opinion generally favored the expressways in the 1940s and throughout 
the 1950s, but by the mid-1960s, support diminished. Expressway construction in 
older, densely populated neighborhoods brought the demolition of homes, businesses, 
and churches, and displaced thousands. Little or no relocation assistance was 
available before 1968.  An anti-freeway movement opposed to additional construction 
began in 1967 and within a few years, won several political and public relations 
victories. A court ruling in 1972 halted a proposal to construct an expressway parallel 
to Lincoln Memorial Drive near the shore of Lake Michigan. The Milwaukee County 
Expressway Commission cancelled other routes in the 1970s. Afterward, expressway 
construction largely ended until 1999. 
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Introduction 
Prior to the late 18th century, the wild rice, fish, birds, beaver, and muskrat 
found along the Menomonee River and its tributaries provided Native Americans in 
the region with a natural source of food, clothing, and material with which to barter 
with the white traders who periodically visited the area. By the early 19th century, the 
Potawatomi established settlements on both sides of the Menomonee River Valley. 
Those settlements included permanent villages on what is now Jones Island and near 
the modern intersection of Forest Home and Muskego Avenues. They also included a 
cemetery along the lake bluffs not far from what became East Clybourn Street, a 
summer village shared with the Sac and Winnebago tribes at 11th & National, another 
summer village near modern East Michigan Street, and a community of 250 lodges 
with extensive gardens and corn fields in the area around what became West Clybourn 
Street between North 20th and 24th Streets.1 Around 1795, French Canadian fur trader 
Jacques Vieau built a log home and warehouse on a bluff above the Menomonee 
Valley at the current site of Mitchell Park. It was conveniently located near the 
Potawatomi settlements and close to two important canoe routes: the Menomonee 
River watershed and Lake Michigan's western shoreline. 
His clerk and future son-in-law, Solomon Juneau, arrived in 1818. By 1820 he 
worked alongside Vieau and later replaced him as the Milwaukee agent for the 
American Fur Company. The settlement Juneau established in the early 1820s near the 
present corner of Water Street and Wisconsin Avenue included his family home, a 
warehouse, and a trading store.2 Within a decade, merchant George Walker and 
engineer Byron Kilbourn arrived in the area and established settlements south of the 
                                               
1 Harry H. Anderson and Frederick I. Olson, Milwaukee: At the Gathering of the Waters (Tulsa, OK: 
Continental Hertitage Press, 1981), 11-13. 
2 Anderson and Olson, 14. 
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Menomonee River and west of the Milwaukee River, respectively. Land speculation 
beginning in 1835 around the mouth of the Milwaukee River and along the lakeshore 
drew investors and settlers to the region.3 By then, the U.S. government signed 
treaties with the native tribes in the area, moving the Menomonee, Chippewa, Ottawa, 
and Potawatomi to land west of the Mississippi River.4 
From the era in which Solomon Juneau established his trading post, the region 
near the confluence of the Milwaukee, Menomonee, and Kinnickinnic Rivers has 
served as the economic and commercial center of the Milwaukee area. Waterways 
continued to serve as the primary routes of transportation for nearly another 
generation. Deep rivers and a six-mile wide bay made Milwaukee's harbor ideal and 
gave Milwaukee a competitive advantage over Port Washington, Racine, Kenosha, 
and even Chicago.5  
After the Erie Canal opened in 1825, an increasing number of Yankee farmers, 
merchants, and professionals began to settle in the area.6 They were followed by the 
ethnic Irish farmers migrating from the eastern United States and Canada, who settled 
the Town of Greenfield in the late 1830s. Irish immigrant laborers arrived in the 1840s 
and concentrated initially in the Third Ward. A small number of Norwegians settled in 
the Walker's Point area and around Muskego Lake after 1839. A larger number of 
Germans began to arrive at about the same time. The German immigrants settled in 
the Kilbourntown area and established a more rural settlement called Freistadt 
northwest of the city.7  
Juneau and Kilbourn incorporated their villages separately from one another in 
                                               
3 Anderson and Olson, 17. 
4 Anderson and Olson, 13. 
5 John Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee (Milwaukee: Milwaukee County Historical Society, 1999), 25. 
6 Anderson and Olson, 21. 
7 Anderson and Olson, 22. 
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1837. They merged with the Walker settlement in January 1846 to form the City of 
Milwaukee. Its initial borders extended from the lakeshore west to modern 27th Street, 
south to Greenfield Avenue, and north to North Avenue, 15th Street, and Walnut Street. 
The new city had approximately 9,500 residents. During negotiations in the territorial 
legislature, representatives from some of the rural townships in the western part of the 
county withheld their support for a new city charter and demanded a separate 
government. Thus, the county was partitioned; Milwaukee County's borders were set 
at their current locations, and Waukesha County formed separately.8  
Within a few decades, traders, merchants, and farmers increasingly shipped 
their goods by land rather than by water. Plank roads began to replace dirt roads by 
the midpoint of the 19th century. The 58-mile Watertown Plank Road between 
Milwaukee and Watertown opened in 1853, and the Wisconsin Legislature eventually 
chartered 132 privately-owned turnpikes and plank roads statewide. Some of those 
roads linked Milwaukee to Waukesha, Appleton, Fond du Lac, Janesville, and Lisbon. 
Historian John Gurda notes that many of the original plank road corridors are still in 
use and bear their original names.9  
Just as plank roads grew in popularity, one of Milwaukee's founding fathers 
launched separate business enterprises to connect Milwaukee to neighboring cities. 
Byron Kilbourn's initiative to build a canal to the Rock River proved fruitless, but his 
two railroad companies were far more successful. The Milwaukee and Waukesha 
Railroad, later the Milwaukee & Mississippi Railroad Company, organized in 1847 
and had its original terminal on St. Paul Avenue at North 2nd Street. It first ran to 
Wauwatosa as early as 1850, carrying passengers there in 12 minutes at what was then 
                                               
8 Anderson and Olson, 29. 
9 Gurda, 80. 
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a high speed, 30 miles per hour.10 Kilbourn was removed as the company's president 
in 1852, but the line reached Waukesha by then and extended to Madison in 1854. It 
became Wisconsin's first train line to reach the Mississippi River when it expanded to 
Prairie du Chien in 1857. Kilbourn's other rail company, the La Crosse and 
Milwaukee Rail Road, reached the Mississippi River at La Crosse the same year.11 
Along the way, it connected Milwaukee to Hartford, Horicon, Beaver Dam, Portage, 
and Wisconsin Dells, while the Milwaukee & Mississippi passed through Eagle, 
Palmyra, Whitewater, and Milton. In 1863, the La Crosse and Milwaukee Rail Road 
came under the leadership of banker Alexander Mitchell, who purchased several other 
railroads including the Milwaukee & Mississippi. By then it was known as the 
Milwaukee & Prairie du Chien.12 When Mitchell added a line to Chicago in 1874, he 
established the main network of what became the Chicago, Milwaukee, and Saint Paul 
Railroad Company, or the Milwaukee Road. Its main competition was the Chicago & 
Northwestern Railroad, although Mitchell actually served as president of both lines 
from 1869-1870.13 The growing railroads shipped wheat, whisky, pork, beef, and, due 
to the Civil War, leather for harnesses and army boots.14 
As the Milwaukee area expanded, workers used streetcars to commute from 
their homes in residential neighborhoods and early suburbs to employers in the 
downtown area, the industrialized Menomonee River Valley, and elsewhere. Residents 
relied upon the electric streetcar during the first two decades of the 20th century. By 
the 1920s, ridership began to decrease as a growing percentage of the population 
preferred the personal automobile over public transportation. During the Great 
                                               
10 Gurda, 81. 
11 Anderson and Olson, 35. 
12 Gurda, 100. 
13 Anderson and Olson, 67. 
14 Gurda, 101. 
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Depression and World War II, streetcar usage again increased due to wartime 
shortages of gasoline and rubber for tires. Mass transit ridership in Milwaukee, 
including both buses and streetcars, peaked in 1944.15 In the decade and a half after 
World War II, when private autos again became the primary means of transportation, 
use of mass transit declined once more. As automobiles again became dominant, 
traffic congestion created parking problems downtown and gridlock throughout the 
city, prompting officials to address the problem. 
 By the late 1940s, workers faced long commutes from the city center to their 
homes in the North Shore suburbs, western Milwaukee County, and near Mitchell 
Airport.16  To reduce congestion, Mayor Frank Zeidler supported constructing a series 
of express highways, or freeways, throughout the city.  Early proposals included 
major north-south and east-west routes, as well as belt freeways at the edge of the 
city, a north-south “Stadium Freeway” route along the 43rd Street corridor, an east-
west route extending from the lakefront north of downtown to the Stadium Freeway, 
and several connecting routes.17   
 The City of Milwaukee initiated construction of the proposed expressway 
system, beginning with the Stadium Freeway. The blueprint for planners was the 
"Preliminary Plan for Milwaukee Expressways," originally proposed in 1952.18 The 
Plan was based on previous studies, among them a 1946 survey of Milwaukee 
motorists. The "Origin-Destination Survey" attempted to ascertain the locations from 
which drivers began their normal commutes, their destinations, and their usual routes. 
                                               
15 Gurda, 313. 
16 Richard Cutler, Greater Milwaukee’s Growing Pains, 1950-2000: An Insider’s View (Milwaukee: 
Milwaukee 
County Historical Society, 2001), 66. 
17 Cutler, 67. 
18 "Preliminary Plan for Milwaukee Expressways," Ammann and Whitney Consulting Engineers, 
September 1952, Box 1, Expressways folder, Raleigh W. Gamble Papers, Milwaukee Manuscript 
Collection, Golda Meir Library Archives, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, hereafter cited Gamble 
Papers. 
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From the results of the survey, planners determined the need for the major north-south 
and east-west expressway routes, the Stadium Freeway, and later, beltlines around the 
Milwaukee area. 
During the time expressway construction fell within the City's purview, the 
City laid a foundation for expressway planning by undertaking transportation studies 
and starting construction of the Stadium Freeway, but construction of the overall 
system did not progress quickly. Financing problems, delays in acquiring sufficient 
rights-of-way, and limited intergovernmental cooperation contributed to the slow 
progress. In 1953, city officials turned planning and construction over to Milwaukee 
County. Under this structure, an appointed Milwaukee County Expressway 
Commission held responsibility for route planning and actual construction, but state 
law granted the elected Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors final fiscal authority. 
 In 1956, Congress passed, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed, the 
Interstate Highway Act and the Highway Revenue Act. The Interstate Highway Act 
laid out a plan for construction of the 42,000-mile Interstate Highway System and 
directly involved the federal government in expressway planning and construction 
nationwide, including in major metropolitan areas.  It also established a funding 
formula that spurred local governments to participate. The federal government would 
pay for ninety percent of expressway construction costs, while individual states were 
only responsible for ten percent. The Highway Revenue Act, meanwhile, provided a 
dedicated funding source for the System—a federal gas tax.19 
The new Interstate System had several intended purposes. Its goals included 
improving existing roads, encouraging recreational travel, and linking metropolitan 
                                               
19 Henry Moon, The Interstate Highway System (Washington, D.C.: Association of American 
Geographers, 
1994), 10. 
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areas.  The Interstate System also had a national defense component. Because 
planning and construction took place during the Cold War, federal officials wanted to 
be able to evacuate major cities quickly in the event of a national emergency and to be 
able to transport troops and supplies efficiently.20 Thus, the expressways local leaders 
had planned for Milwaukee became part of a larger, grander, national network, 
controlled-access, high-speed Interstate Highway System. 
 Initially, Milwaukee residents generally supported the freeway project. 
Citizens welcomed a solution to frequent traffic gridlock, while policy makers often 
tended to support roads over mass transit options. However, to create new rights-of-
way, many homes, businesses, churches, and other buildings had to be demolished, 
dislocating numerous residents and changing the character of entire neighborhoods. 
By the 1960s, many Milwaukee residents began to object to construction, resulting in 
strong protests at public hearings, as well as legal action.   
 Much of the freeway system planned for Milwaukee was eventually built, but 
a significant portion was not. The natural question to ask, then, is "Why not?"  
Additionally, the Milwaukee freeway system had been planned to address a specific 
need, but once local efforts became linked to a massive national endeavor, some local 
preferences had to be adjusted to fit into the federal road building program. Moreover, 
the activism of residents and community groups resulted in decisions not to complete 
several planned and proposed segments of the expressway system. 
 This thesis explores the history of expressway planning and construction in 
Milwaukee. Its goal is to explain why the final routes were selected, and why some 
portions were completed, while planners and policy makers cancelled other proposed 
or planned segments. The basic research question the thesis asks is “Why were 
                                               
20 Moon, 16.  
8 
 
 
 
freeways in the city of Milwaukee and neighboring communities constructed along 
their eventual routes and not along their originally proposed routes?” That research 
question will necessarily dovetail into a discussion of who supported and opposed 
freeway construction and who used the freeways once they were built.  Additional 
questions raised by the research topic relate to engineering and highway planning.  
Those questions ask what existing rights-of-way were used for expressway 
construction, which rights-of-way had to be created, and how natural barriers such as 
the Milwaukee River and Menomonee River Valley influenced route planning and 
selection. 
 In short, certain routes were cancelled due to strong citizen opposition. 
Residents in Milwaukee neighborhoods at first welcomed the freeways as a way to 
relieve to overburdened surface streets, while Mayor Zeidler and downtown 
merchants saw the expressways as a way to draw save Downtown from the traffic 
congestion that made commuting to and from the central business district difficult. 
Yet after expressway construction in the 1950s and early 1960s displaced thousands 
of city residents, particularly on the West, North, and near South Sides, the popularity 
of the construction program diminished. West Milwaukee and Glendale raised similar 
concerns about the demolition of homes and elimination of parkland inside their 
municipal borders. Outlying communities such as Franklin, Brookfield, and 
Cedarburg objected to loss of farmland and the possible negative environmental 
impact brought by a proposed outer beltline at a time when traffic counts did not 
necessarily justify expressway construction in those areas. Business interests, 
highway engineers, and some elected officials at the city and county level supported 
the expressways well into the 1960s, but opposition from Milwaukee Common 
Council and Milwaukee County Board members, Mayor Henry Maier, community 
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organizations, and several state legislators brought an effective end to the project. 
This thesis further explores the conflict between the professional disciplines 
involved in expressway planning. This conflict is well documented in academic 
literature.21 The highway engineers and traffic consultants who studied Milwaukee's 
traffic patterns, recommended particular routes, and had the ear of many elected 
officials often had approaches to planning that were dissimilar to the urban planners, 
parks officials, and other leaders who also tried to exert influence on land use and 
local public policy. Their decisions affected thousands of homeowners, businesses, 
churches, and private organizations located along or near proposed freeway routes, 
prompting them to react positively to some expressway proposals, and negatively to 
others. Elected officials frequently found themselves caught in the middle, or in 
opposition to one another.  
Milwaukee's experience was not unique. Other cities observed a similar trend 
of initial public support, urban highway-building sponsored at first at the local and 
state level but later by the federal government, and declining support for the overall 
program after construction began. Writers in several disciplines have described the 
trend of expressway building which led to suburbanization and damage to historic 
neighborhoods. Historians Howard Chudacoff, Judith Smith, and Peter Baldwin 
suggest a pattern of considering downtown areas as hubs and building expressway 
routes radiating away from them like spokes, with beltlines encircling the city. Within 
this pattern, downtown areas were redefined primarily as commercial centers 
accessible from the suburbs.22 Journalist Ray Suarez more generally links building 
                                               
21 See Mark Rose, Interstate: Expressway Highway Politcs, 1941-1956 (Lawrence, KS: The Regents 
Press of Kansas, 1979), 56. See also Jeffrey Brown, Eric A. Morris, and Brian D. Taylor, "Planning for 
Cars in Cities: Planners, Engineers, and Freeways in the 20th Century," Journal of the American 
Planning Association 75 (2009): 170. 
22 Howard P. Chudacoff, Judith E. Smith, and Peter C. Baldwin, The Evolution of American Urban 
Society, 7th edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010), 220. 
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roads leading out of the city to suburbanization. He does not discuss the interplay 
between expressway construction and urban renewal or displacement of residents 
whose homes were located along the new rights-of-way, but he does tie public policy 
favoring suburban growth and highway construction to the decline of central city 
areas.23  
Former Milwaukee Mayor John O. Norquist shares a similar sentiment. He is 
careful to acknowledge the value of cars in American society, but he too links 
accommodation of automobiles to suburban sprawl, and decries the impact of urban 
expressways on compact and historic neighborhoods. Freeway building in Cleveland, 
Norquist asserts, displaced some 19,000 residents. In Milwaukee, expressways 
destroyed the African-American cultural district near 8th and Walnut Streets called 
Bronzeville, and Our Lady of Pompeii Catholic Church, a center of faith and 
community for ethnic Italian residents in the Third Ward.24 
Academic writers also describe very negative consequences to building such 
roadways through densely populated urban areas. Chudacoff, Smith, and Baldwin 
observe that Atlanta and Miami saw massive forced relocations of African-American 
residents as a result of expressway building. Those expressways additionally served to 
further separate black and white neighborhoods. Boston, Cleveland, and other cities 
saw jobs migrate out of the city as manufacturers, retailers, and other employers 
relocated to industrial parks, shopping malls, and other commercial areas along 
suburban beltlines and away from the city center.25 
The late historian Raymond Mohl described this trend as well. Federal 
                                               
23 Ray Suarez, The Old Neighborhood: What We Lost in the Great Suburban Migration: 1966-1999 
(New York: The Free Press, 1999), 18, 252. 
24 John O. Norquist, The Wealth of Cities: Revitalizing the Centers of American Life (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1998), 159-161. 
25 Chudacoff, Smith, and Baldwin, 221. 
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legislation advocated in the 1930s and 1940s by highway engineers, truckers, and 
road builders promoted urban expressways radiating from and encircling major cities. 
Mayors, developers, department store owners, and others backed the initiatives. Their 
intent was to clear slums and rebuild urban core areas. 26 
He goes on to detail the citizen opposition in San Francisco, Baltimore, and 
elsewhere that mounted against continued urban expressway construction after many 
residential and business districts were demolished. Mohl characterizes the trend of 
initial support followed by organized citizen opposition, often backed by local elected 
leaders, community groups, and civic elites, as a "freeway revolt" movement that 
began in San Francisco in 1959 and spread to other metropolitan areas.27 Mohl's 
framework aptly describes Milwaukee's freeway construction narrative. 
Taking into consideration the rivalry between disciplines, the evolution of both 
expressway planning and public sentiment, and the nationwide trend toward increased 
automobile use, the findings of this thesis place Milwaukee squarely into the broader 
national narrative of expressway construction. Specifically, it argues Milwaukee falls 
within the national pattern for beginning expressway construction projects at the local 
level and then shifting at least partial responsibility for both planning and funding to 
the state and federal level. It likewise fit into the national pattern of initial public 
support for expressways. Residents welcomed them as a solution to traffic congestion 
in the 1940s and 1950s, but by the mid-1960s perceived them as concrete ribbons 
tearing through residential neighborhoods and nearby commercial districts and 
dividing walkable communities. The negative view of expressways led to the 
widespread opposition that brought an end to expressway building in 1977, 31 years 
                                               
26 Raymond Mohl, "Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities," Journal of Urban History 30 
(2004): 677. 
 
27 Mohl, 675. 
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after publication of the Origin-Destination survey that laid the groundwork for the 
construction program.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the terms "expressway" and "freeway" will be 
used interchangeably. The term "interstate" will refer to highways that were part of 
the federal Interstate Highway System. Many—but not all—expressways in 
Milwaukee became a part of the System. In addition to a starting point for major 
highway planning, the Origin-Destination Survey also offered a working definition of 
the term "expressway."  According to the Survey, an expressway is "A limited access 
traffic facility, usually depressed or elevated, permitting the free flow of through 
traffic, without interference by cross traffic, traffic moving in the opposite direction, 
turning movements, parking, and pedestrians."28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
28 Origin-Destination Traffic Survey: Milwaukee Metropolitan Area, "jointly conducted by the State 
Highway Commission and Local Government Units, in cooperation with the U.S. Public Roads 
Administration, 1946, retrieved from Golda Meir Library Stacks, UW-Milwaukee. 
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Chapter 1 
By Evolution and Not Revolution: Visions for An Expressway in Milwaukee 
 To understand leaders' ideas for expressway route planning, it is necessary to 
understand the nature of Milwaukee's earlier growth and the development of its 
transportation systems.  Milwaukee's expansion from the original downtown area and 
adjacent residential neighborhoods began during the second half of the 19th century, as 
streetcars enabled workers to live farther and farther away from their employers in the 
central business district and nearby factories. The city's population had been 
concentrated on the East Side near Juneau's settlement through the 1830s, though 
within twenty years the population on the West Side grew significantly, thanks in part 
to a dam on the Milwaukee River constructed by Byron Kilbourn.1  In 1869, two 
decades after its incorporation, the city began promoting the Menomonee River 
Valley, already home to several tanneries and Milwaukee's largest industrial 
employer—the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad—as a location for new 
industry and built several canals through the valley. The efforts were successful, as 
two major employers, Miller Brewing Company and International Harvester, located 
in the Valley, along with several other companies. As Roger Simon stresses, the Valley 
tapped into several resources.2  It was not only close to downtown, but it was also 
easily accessible for a large and growing workforce.         
 A similar compactness existed in other cities. As Sam Bass Warner noted, 
walking was the primary form of transportation in most cities until the mid-1800s, 
and the majority of cities were fairly densely developed. In Boston, for example, the 
city seldom spread out beyond a two- or three-mile radius, the distance an adult could 
                                               
1 Roger Simon, "The City Building Process: Housing and Services in New Milwaukee Neighborhoods, 
1880-1910 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1996), 19. 
2 Simon, 20. 
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normally walk in an hour. Toward the end of the 1800s, though, the expansion of 
streetcar systems enabled growth along the edge of the city.3  
 Yet because Milwaukee's industrial employers were dispersed throughout the 
Valley and along the lakefront, workers could increasingly live farther from the 
central business district and still walk to work. A growing number of major streets 
also served as retail centers: Third Street and Fond du Lac Avenue west of the 
Milwaukee River, North Avenue east of the Milwaukee River, and Mitchell Street and 
Lincoln and Muskego Avenues on the South Side.4 Meanwhile, as Milwaukee's 
largely German immigrant population pushed north and west during the 1880s and 
1890s, there was increasing development along major streets such as Fond du Lac 
Avenue, North Avenue, Teutonia Avenue, and Center Street. Several of those streets, 
particularly Fond du Lac, Teutonia, and Hopkins Avenues, had been country roads 
before the farmland they passed through was subdivided into residential and 
commercial blocks.5 
 In other cities, various forms of public transportation became available during 
the early 1800s. New York City saw the horse-drawn omnibus introduced in 1829, 
and other East Coast cities had omnibus service within a decade. However, it was not 
an especially comfortable mode of travel, especially on cobblestone or muddy streets, 
and did not spur significant suburban development.6 Rail lines radiating out of urban 
centers, though, were more effective, and prompted the growth of "commuter 
villages." Those small, residential towns along the rail lines existed just outside, but 
close to, cities such as New York and Chicago. Thus, by 1900, street railways made 
                                               
3 Sam Bass Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 (Cambridge, 
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expansion of urban boundaries much more possible.7 
Prior to the 1880s, Milwaukee's mass transit system was relatively 
disorganized. Post-Civil War start-up companies operated horse-drawn rail lines and 
one coal-powered steam line. Most companies did not coordinate their efforts and 
were often linked to entrepreneurs engaged in land speculation.8 Electrification of 
Milwaukee's streetcar beginning in 1890 definitely enabled more outlying 
neighborhoods to develop.9 The early 1890s saw new lines extend west toward the 
Soldier's Home, northwest on Fond du Lac Avenue, and southeast on Kinnickinnic 
Avenue to Bay View.10 However, because Milwaukee was so compactly developed, 
many residents were able to walk to work, and streetcar fares were too expensive for 
many lower-income workers. Consequently, Milwaukee had relatively low mass 
transportation ridership compared to other cities. In fact, the majority of riders were 
white-collar workers. Even so, streetcar service was key in opening peripheral areas to 
development,11 although its routes concentrated in the downtown area.12  
 That period of rail growth propelled Milwaukee's outward expansion and 
annexation of additional territory. The industrial suburb of Bay View voted to be 
annexed into Milwaukee in 1887, while the city's municipal borders in 1900 reached 
north to Keefe Avenue, south to Cleveland Avenue, and west to approximately Thirty-
Fifth Street.13 Around the same time, industrial and residential suburbs developed. 
The industrial village of Cudahy incorporated around Patrick Cudahy's meat packing 
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plant in 1895, followed by the former North Milwaukee in 1897,14 West Allis in 1902, 
and West Milwaukee in 1906. Affluent, residential communities also grew near the 
urban edge. Whitefish Bay and East Milwaukee—which later changed its name to 
Shorewood—incorporated in 1892 and 1900, respectively, as homeowners left the city 
seeking the ability to have more control over tax rates and service levels.   
 Indeed, electrification of the streetcars significantly contributed to that 
suburban growth,15 and by the 1896 streetcar workers' strike, they were "lifelines" to 
outlying neighborhoods and developing suburbs.16 The first electrified streetcar line, 
owned by businessman Washington Becker, offered service along Grand Avenue (now 
Wisconsin Avenue) and Wells Street beginning in April 1890. Becker's route 
connected downtown to established businesses and neighborhoods west of the 
Milwaukee River, and prompted other lines to either electrify or sell franchises to 
investors.17 In 1891, brewery executive Frederick Pabst organized a successful 
suburban rapid transit line and leased it to a newly reorganized firm, The Milwaukee 
Electric Railway & Light Company, also known as TMER&L Co. Pabst's line offered 
ten cent fares and service to downtown without transfer.18 In 1918, TMER&L 
operated 180 miles of intra-city track in Milwaukee.19 A sister company of TMER&L 
called the Milwaukee Light Heat & Traction Co., meanwhile, offered interurban rail 
service to more distant communities, including New Berlin, East Troy, Waukesha, 
Racine, Kenosha, and later, Port Washington and Sheboygan.20 
 After 1918, however, use of electric streetcars began to decline. By 1938, track 
                                               
14 The Village of North Milwaukee was annexed into the City of Milwaukee in 1929. 
15 Gurda, 183. 
16 Gurda, 198. 
17 Moore, 49. 
18 Moore, 56. 
19 Moore, 6. 
20 Moore, 61. 
17 
 
 
 
length decreased to 105 miles, although TMER&L also operated a number of 
trackless trolley and bus routes.21  Automobile use had increased significantly during 
the early decades of the 20th century, reducing streetcar ridership.  Cars first 
outnumbered horses in Milwaukee in 1916, and by 1926, there were 100,000 personal 
automobiles in the city. Even with the shift from streetcars and interurban lines to 
autos, Milwaukee continued to expand outward.22   
 Additionally, Milwaukee's leaders did not always agree in the area of 
transportation policy. Socialist Mayor Daniel Webster Hoan remained committed to 
maintaining an affordable mass transit system, and campaigned in favor of city 
control of the transit company. A critic of rubber-tired vehicles, Hoan complained that 
the automobile forced the city to spend heavily on street widening and traffic control 
officers, while children could no longer play safely in local streets.23 Likewise, Hoan 
did not believe streets and highways were the best suited means of transportation to 
facilitate trucking and shipping.  He noted that pavements for passenger cars and light 
trucks cost one-half as much as pavements for heavy trucks, and last longer. He also 
expressed concern over legislation at the state level establishing a highway system 
that would compete with railroads for freight transportation.  If freight transportation 
shifted from railroads to highways, Hoan foresaw, the public would have to cover the 
cost.24 
   Meanwhile, his fellow Socialist, park planner Charles Whitnall, encouraged 
automobile use and decentralization. As early as 1911, Whitnall wrote that the 
personal automobile would better facilitate decentralization and later promoted it as a 
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superior form of transportation. In 1923, he proposed a major parkway plan, which 
entailed creation of both parks and through roads along Milwaukee's waterways. The 
city and county park boards—on both of which Whitnall served—wanted to create a 
network of local highways to accommodate anticipated future increases in auto traffic, 
as well as link park areas. Whitnall further envisioned a system of arterial streets and 
centralized parking areas, eventually proposing, in 1938, an arterial network with 
Capitol Drive and Oklahoma Avenue as the approximate northern and southern 
boundaries, respectively.25  
 
Early Traffic Relief Efforts 
 While he was certainly a proponent of mass transit, Mayor Hoan did not 
completely oppose automobile-based transportation solutions, as city planners and 
elected officials discussed options for relieving downtown congestion well before any 
expressway system was proposed.  As far back as the mid-1920s, Hoan observed 
Milwaukee's "critical traffic and parking problem becoming more acute."26 His 
solution was to create a "great wide artery" from the South Side to a point north of 
downtown to relieve present and growing traffic needs. If the city did not take action, 
Hoan wrote, concerned businesses in the central business district would suffer greatly, 
and 6th Street was best suited to serve as that artery. He argued that no other route 
was as desirable, because 6th Street was the only street in the immediate vicinity with 
a viaduct to the South Side.27 Thus, Hoan's proposal in May 1927 was to widen North 
6th Street from its viaduct over the Menomonee Valley north to Chestnut Street.28   
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 However, the city moved slowly on the project, delaying significant progress. 
The Mayor's Office, Common Council, and city departments took a careful, deliberate 
approach, attempting to balance cost, practicality, and longer term plans for the 
surrounding commercial district. This slow pace indicates not indecisiveness, but a 
general lack of urgency and a belief in the value of careful planning on the part of 
elected officials and bureaucrats to create an improved roadway through or near the 
central district. Socialist leaders such as Hoan tended to be cautious, especially in 
regard to spending, and the narrative of the 6th Street project offers an indication of 
the city's later approach to planning controlled-access express highways twenty years 
later. 
 Mayor Hoan himself had a reputation for integrity and frugality, and during 
the World War I era he took a more moderate anti-war position than many Socialists 
in Milwaukee and other states. His fellow Socialists did not always hold Common 
Council majorities but often proved able to form alliances with  aother aldermen. 
Hoan's own political priorities included professional administration, planning, and 
zoning; strong police and fire protection; public health; and city beautification. He 
also supported public ownership of the local electric utility and aligned himself 
closely with organized labor. On fiscal issues, he favored centralized purchasing and 
pay-as-you-go financing.29 Debt reduction, the Socialists felt, reduced the hold of 
banks on city government and reduced the property tax burden for homeowners.30 
Socialists in eastern states derisively labeled Hoan's politics as "Sewer Socialism."31 
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 Although Hoan desired an artery, he did not move forward until completion of 
a study by the city's real estate department.32  The report the Mayor received indicated 
the widening project could cost under $2.5 million, with property owners along the 
widened stretch of Sixth Street paying fifty percent of the cost. Hoan worried that 
without the street improvements, downtown businesses would suffer greatly from 
congestion. The report cited a cost of $8,000 per foot of street frontage for right-of-
way acquisition. Hoan considered the figure excessive, but noted that a property at 
North 5th Street and West Wisconsin Avenue had sold to a hotel company for $10,000 
per foot and implied his support.33   
 In February 1928, the Milwaukee Common Council passed a resolution 
directing the City Engineer to survey and plan for widening North 6th Street from 
West Saint Paul Avenue to West Juneau Avenue.  The resolution likewise directed the 
Commissioner of Public Works to prepare a cost estimate for the planned expansion 
and determined that property acquisition would take place on the west side of the 
street.34 The project was to be paid for by a bond issue, as would the planned viaduct 
over the Menomonee Valley at 35th Street. However, the bond issue would be subject 
to voter approval, and Mayor Hoan indicated concern that without proper publicity, 
city residents may oppose construction because they were also being asked to support 
a school bond. Hoan therefore asked for support from local organizations and civic 
clubs.35 
 The Common Council adopted another resolution,36 in May 1928, in support 
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of a widening plan for 6th Street. As of October 1929, the bond issue, passed, funds 
were available, and some properties had already been purchased or were donated to 
the city. Even so, additional complications delayed the project. The city had not yet 
decided whether to condemn additional properties along the strip in question. In 
addition, the city was still considering a setback line for building construction along 
the affected part of 6th Street.37 Such a line established a minimum distance from the 
property line for any new building or building expansion. By spring of the following 
year, the 6th Street project was delayed by technical questions. Numerous other street 
and alley opening and widening projects were planned citywide, and the City 
Comptroller questioned whether special assessments on Sixth Street properties could 
be collected under current laws.38 
 Additionally, the local business community had for several years generally 
supported widening 6th Street to 100 feet,39 but a disputed property further delayed 
the project. Businessman George Uihlein had proposed to construct an office tower 
and theater at the corner of Sixth and Wisconsin, but a disagreement with the city over 
acquisition of a thirty foot strip delayed both its construction and street widening.40 
Uihlein, meanwhile, refused to sell the strip at a price of $440,000, which delayed 
construction of the building. He believed his request to receive $600,000 for the strip, 
while paying a $120,000 special assessment for a nearby property, was reasonable, 
but he was willing to compromise.41 As one frustrated businessman in the area wrote 
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of the situation, the uncertainty of both projects made attracting tenants to the 
proposed office tower difficult.42 Uihlein and other property owners finally entered 
into an agreement with the city in late 1930, and the city put the Sixth Street widening 
plan on the 1931 building program.43 
 
Origin-Destination Survey  
 The Great Depression and World War II effectively halted the population 
growth of earlier decades. The city's population grew just 1.6 percent between 1930 
and 1940, while the number of weddings dropped nearly 40 percent between 1929 and 
1932. The birthrate from 1929-1933 likewise dropped. John Gurda attributes a decline 
in building construction to the decrease in the number of new families. Fewer families 
resulted in fewer new homes and businesses. That drop meant significantly curtailed 
new construction.44 Municipal government, meanwhile, curbed spending significantly. 
With the exception of a few parkways and other county- and state-sponsored projects, 
very few locally-funded public improvements took place during the Depression era, 
impeding the city's growth and discouraging businesses from locating in the city.45 
Overall, Milwaukee remained financially stable, unlike some cities in Iowa, Indiana, 
and the East Coast; in 1932, the city carried a budget surplus of $2.3 million, and a 
cash balance of $4 million in the bank.46 Even so, it paid a portion of its public 
employee wages in a municipal scrip called baby bonds, debt certificates issued in 
small denominations and backed by the city's ownership of tax delinquent property.47 
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Traffic problems did not grow as significantly during the Depression and 
World War II, but by the 1940s, there was again a need to address the city's 
congestion. In July 1943, Alderman Milton McGuire sponsored a resolution to apply 
for federal aid through the State Highway Commission to fund an expressway project 
survey. Approved by the State Highway Commission chairman in September 1944, 
Milwaukee's Bureau of Electrical Services conducted a large scale Origin-Destination 
Survey, completing it in 1946 at a cost of $100,000, with assistance from both the 
state and federal governments. Milwaukee County officials and local officials in 
neighboring Glendale and Fox Point also supported the survey, which took 43,000 
interviews and a scientific sample of 10,000 residential units.48 
 The 1946 Origin-Destination Survey served as the basis for most future 
expressway planning in Milwaukee. By tracking the beginning and end points of 
vehicular traffic in Milwaukee, the survey clearly indicated the primary routes and 
distances of commuters traveling intra-city to or from employers, schools, shopping 
districts, and other locations. The Survey further identified the areas of highest traffic 
density, and recommended a local express highway system as a solution. 
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Figure 1: As of 1944, Milwaukee's borders extended north to Silver Spring Drive and 
south to Howard Avenue. West Allis and Wauwatosa were also significantly smaller.49 
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To understand the extent to which the Survey served as a statistical and 
practical basis for future expressway planning in Milwaukee, it is important to 
understand the nature of the Survey. Methodologically, the Origin-Destination Survey 
took a comprehensive approach, interviewing a representative sample of drivers both 
along public streets and highways, as well as at their homes. The Survey referred to 
interviews taken from interview stations at major intersections throughout Milwaukee 
County as the External Study, and interviews conducted at businesses and private 
homes as the Internal Survey.50 For the External Survey, interviewers stopped as many 
drivers as reasonably possible; all drivers were stopped during non-rush periods, and 
approximately one-half of trucks and passenger cars during rush periods were 
stopped. The survey area covered 99.3 square miles, or forty-two percent of 
Milwaukee County's land area, and included the corporate limits of the City of 
Milwaukee and nearby suburbs and rural areas in which residential growth resembled 
light urban development.51 Thus, the Survey gathered information on the commutes 
and other trips of not only Milwaukee residents, but also residents of West Allis, 
Wauwatosa, Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, and the South Shore suburbs. The Village of 
Greendale and unincorporated rural townships in northwestern and southwestern 
Milwaukee County were not included.52 Overall, the Survey established a total of 
thirty-eight interview stations, at points where main highways crossed the survey area 
boundary. For the Internal Survey, interviewers visited 10,000 homes. That number 
was consistent with the five percent sample size in similar Public Roads 
Administration surveys. In the Milwaukee survey, interviewers visited one in twenty 
homes in the survey area, except in Cudahy, South Milwaukee, the Town of Oak 
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Creek, and the Town of Lake.53 In those four areas, they visited one in ten homes, 
because a larger sample size was found to be more useful in smaller communities.54   
The Survey further researched commercial traffic in Milwaukee and 
surrounding areas. Researchers sought a twenty percent representative sample for the 
truck study, and accordingly, used state motor vehicle registrations for Milwaukee 
County to find truck operators. Those persons were interviewed at their homes or 
places of business. The survey of taxi traffic relied on a twenty-five percent sample 
based on records obtained from taxicab companies.55 
 The time invested in the Origin-Destination Survey was significant. Interviews 
for the External Survey took place between October 16, 1944 and December 8, 1944, 
eventually resulting in the figure of approximately 43,000 total interviews 
representing eighty-two percent of vehicles passing the interview stations during that 
time period. Interviews conducted at private homes took place between December 
1944 and April 1945. Householders were notified by mail that they would soon be 
visited and asked to provide the requested information, while newspaper publicity 
drew attention to the residential visits more generally.56 Participants in the External 
Study were asked general questions, such as "Where did the trip begin?," "Where did 
the trip end?," "How did you travel?," and related questions about the purpose of the 
trip and parking facilities used. The Internal Study was conducted from Tuesday 
through Saturday, and asked even more detailed questions about the previous day's 
travel to and from home. Interviewers, who were specifically trained for tact and 
diplomacy, sought separate data for each household member over age five. 
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Additionally, the Survey implemented a statistical control variable tracking whether 
participants crossed any of three well-known bridges: the Wisconsin Avenue viaduct, 
the 16th Street viaduct, and the Holton Street viaduct.57 
 Researchers sought information on what type of transportation respondents 
used, and controlled for what type of transportation they would have used under 
prewar conditions. Therefore, they were able to add potential automobile drivers to 
actual automobile drivers and subtract that number from public transit drivers, taking 
into consideration drivers who carpooled. This massive amount of data was then 
translated into numeric codes to enable use of machine tabulating equipment; in all 
115,000 individual punch cards were used to compile the survey data.58 
 The Survey suggested several possible expressway routes, based on survey 
results. The area with the greatest concentration of origins and destinations was the 
portion of the downtown area bordered by Clybourn Street, Juneau Avenue, North 12th 
Street, and Lake Michigan. Heavy traffic was most evenly distributed between Center 
Street on the north, Mitchell Street on the South, 1st Street on the east, and 35th Street 
on the west, with much of the vehicle flow moving west, north, northwest, and 
northeast from the city’s central area. According to the statistical data, the geographic 
center of all traffic origins and destinations for auto, taxi, and truck trips was the 
intersection of North 16th Street and West Kilbourn Avenue. After accounting for 
public transit, the center shifted two blocks to North 18th Street and West Kilbourn 
Avenue, but in any case, the near West Side was in the mid-1940s the center of 
Milwaukee’s traffic. Additionally, the Survey stated that the transportation problem 
could only be addressed from a metropolitan standpoint.59 
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 As a result of this information, the Survey suggested several possible routes 
for new expressways. One was an east-west route along West Highland Avenue from a 
connection with West Kilbourn Avenue near North 10th Street west to its intersection 
with the Menomonee River Valley, then farther west along the south bank of the River 
to near the county line. The Survey noted that this route was closest to the center of 
origins and destinations, that Kilbourn Avenue served as the main arterial street in the 
downtown area, and that it served the Milwaukee County Courthouse. The Survey's 
alternate east-west route was to follow the electric rapid transit line west of a railroad 
depot downtown, and east of the depot along Clybourn Street and over the Chicago 
and Northwestern Railway to a connection with Lincoln Memorial Drive.  
 The Survey likewise proposed a variety of north-south express highway 
routes: along the lakefront, along North and South 6th Street, and along North and 
South 16th and South 20th Streets. The potential lakeshore routes—an inner and outer 
harbor drive—followed plans already under consideration for a southerly extension of 
Lincoln Memorial Drive over the Port of Milwaukee to a connection with the Near 
South Side and Bay View neighborhood. The 16th Street route would have more 
closely served the center of trip origins and destinations, the Survey stated, while the 
6th Street route would have followed South Chase and Howell Avenues and terminated 
at what it referred to as Milwaukee County Airport.60 Nevertheless, the Survey did not 
make a specific route recommendation.61 
 Upon completion of the Origin-Destination Survey in 1946, Milwaukee's 
elected officials, engineering and planning professionals, and other leaders began the 
task of responding to the survey. Their response was to consider not only the 
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construction of an expressway in principle, but to identify funding sources, determine 
potential routes, and gain support from the public and business community for 
creating a massive transportation infrastructure. However, the expressway 
construction program began slowly, under the jurisdiction of the City of Milwaukee, 
and due to the deliberate nature of the bureaucratic process, years passed before any 
construction work began. 
 
Expressway Planning 
 Elected officials, planners, and bureaucrats spent the majority of 1947 
planning the expressway system in Milwaukee, based on the Survey’s results. On 
March 13, Milwaukee's Long Term Improvement Technical Committee asked the 
Board of Public Land Commissioners to make a recommendation concerning the 
Origin-Destination Survey. Specifically, it was interested in the role of expressways in 
the city's "Major Street System" master plan. The Commission unanimously approved 
the report, and the Milwaukee Common Council resolved that the Survey should 
serve as the basis for future development of Milwaukee's "Major Street System."62 
 The Survey made a series of route recommendations tentatively accepted by 
the Land Commission report. They included a major north-south route in the vicinity 
of North and South Sixteenth Street, a major east-west route in the vicinity of West 
Highland Avenue, and a second east-west route along Clybourn Street from North 16th 
Street to the lakefront and up to East Kilbourn Avenue. The Survey only indicated one 
plan along each of the proposed routes, but that was sufficient to obtain an 
approximate cost estimate.63 The overall plan proposed in the Origin-Destination 
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Survey was 10.73 miles of expressways, and a total of 14.82 miles of expressways 
when surface connections within city limits were included. 
 This early plan also called for razing over 2,000 buildings and entailed a 
significant cost. Specifically, 2,469 structures would need to be torn down, including 
399 commercial or industrial buildings, and a total of 4,069 residential units would be 
lost. Property acquisition cost alone was expected in late 1947 to be about 
$24,330,000, while construction would cost $79,214,000. Local financial 
responsibility equaled $31,093,000, while the state was anticipated to contribute 
$19,815,000 and the federal contribution was to be $28,306,000. The federal 
government's contribution at that time was seen as insufficient; however, planners and 
officials at the local level believed that additional federal aid might become available 
at a later time.64 
 Preparations and ideas for expressway construction made their way through 
the city’s bureaucracy during the spring, summer, and autumn of 1947. In April, 
twenty city officials and business representatives traveled to Detroit to see the new 
Industrial and Davison Expressways and returned to Milwaukee in strong support. On 
June 4th, the Land Commission approved a report calling the expressways 
“desirable.”65 Later that month, as already noted, the Common Council’s joint 
committee on Streets and Alleys and Finance voted unanimously to adopt the 
expressways plan “as the basis for the development of the Milwaukee major street 
system.”66 By autumn, Mayor Bohn asked the Common Council to make a "policy 
decision" on expressways, and advocated a referendum on a bond issue for the 
expressways. On November 5th, the Finance Committee and Streets and Alleys 
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Committee approved the bond issue at a joint meeting. The committees further 
instructed the Milwaukee Public Works Commissioner Walter Swietlik to draw 
preconstruction plans and arrange with the State Highway Commission and federal 
Public Roads Administration for highway planning aids. Five days later, the full 
Common Council approved a Milwaukee expressway, almost a full year after it was 
first recommended, by a 22-4 vote.67 
 It is important to understand that local leaders initially expected to include 
expressways as part of a larger initiative for transportation and post-war infrastructure 
improvements in the broader urban area. Planners Elmer Krieger and Robert Filtzer 
believed that discussion of expressways had been oversimplified in the public's mind, 
and that instead of asking if expressways were desirable, the question should have 
been how expressways fit into the city's larger plan. Further, the city already planned 
a number of street improvement projects, funded by federal aid, intended to improve 
traffic problems in those specific areas. This federal aid for street improvements was 
possible because the 1944 Federal Highway Act specifically set aside funds for 
improvements to connecting streets within the Federal Aid Highway System, with 
state and local matching requirements. The 1945 Wisconsin Legislature set aside 
$2,000,000 to help with matching funds.68 Under the Act, the U.S. government 
recognized the need for an urban transportation solution, and established, a decade 
before the Interstate Highway Act, a funding formula for urban transportation 
infrastructure improvements. Under the formula, the federal government would pay 
50% of construction costs and one-third of right-of-way acquisition costs, the state 
would pay about 70% of the federal amount, and the city would cover the rest.69 As of 
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late 1947, Milwaukee planned to: 
  Widen Green Bay Avenue from Capitol Drive to city limits or the urban boundary.  
  Widen and improve North and South 44th Streets from Lisbon Avenue to the 
southern urban boundary.70 
  Widen Clybourn Street from North 8th Street to North Van Buren Street. 
  Connect West Blue Mound Road to West Clybourn Street between North 34th 
Street and Story Parkway and improve Clybourn from North 27th Street to North 
35th Street. 
  Connect South Superior Street to East Greenfield Avenue with an extension over the 
south harbor tract and the Kinnickinnic River Basin. 
  Connect North 27th Street to North Teutonia Avenue north of West Ruby Avenue. 
  Extend South 1st Street from West Lincoln Avenue to South Chase Avenue. 
  Eliminate street-grade rail crossings on South Clement Avenue at East Ohio Avenue 
and on South 35th Street between West Lincoln and West Forest Home Avenues.71 
Leaders and planners intended such street improvement projects to alleviate 
traffic congestion in many neighborhoods. Simultaneously, they debated the need for 
expressways, weighing the need for a traffic solution against the fact that so many 
homes and businesses would be demolished. Mayor Bohn, meanwhile, criticized the 
slow progress of expressway planning and construction. The Milwaukee Sentinel 
concurred, stating on December 7th that a full month after the Common Council 
endorsed construction, there was no significant accomplishment with regard to the 
expressways. Even so, the winter of 1947-1948 proved significant in the timetable of 
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expressway planning. 
On December 10, 1947, Krieger submitted a report to the city Land 
Commission that rejected expressway plans under consideration in favor of street 
widening and improvements. The Land Commission subsequently adopted the report 
by a 4-3 vote. The same day, Mayor John Bohn directed a statement to the planning 
staff of the Land Commission saying that the staff had been "remiss in its duties to 
inform the Mayor and the Council on matters of technical consequence."72 A few days 
later, however, at a meeting between Walter Swietlik, state transportation officials, 
and representatives from the federal Public Roads Administration, federal Division 
Engineer S.L. Taylor stated unambiguously that a traffic congestion relief plan for the 
city that did not include freeways would not be looked upon "as favorably" as one that 
did.  
Other elected leaders also supported construction and wanted faster progress. 
Pursuant to orders from the Common Council, Swietlik appointed Raleigh Gamble 
“expediter of expressways" on December 26, 1947. In early January 1948, the 
Council voted 25-1 to authorize Swietlik to proceed with plans to locate and acquire 
land for expressway construction, then build the proposed East-West route near West 
Highland Avenue from North 35th Street to North 60th Street. Then, on January 19, 
1948, the Council approved a referendum question for the spring election, seeking 
permission from voters for a $5,000,000 bond issue to cover the expressway project.  
In April 1948, Milwaukee residents approved the bond issue with 88,510 of 
165,657 votes, or approximately 53% of voters, supporting it.  Voters likewise 
approved bond issues to fund off-street parking projects, blight elimination, and 
veterans' housing, but rejected other bond proposals for street improvements and 
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widening on South 1st and 2nd Streets and North and South 44th Streets.73 In the same 
election voters chose 35-year old Frank Zeidler, a local Socialist Party leader, over 
attorney Henry Reuss for mayor. Zeidler previously gained public service experience 
serving on the Milwaukee School Board and working as a community activist. He 
defeated Reuss convincingly, receiving nearly 56% of the vote.  
In regard to bonds, Zeidler did not actually support the expressway bonds, but 
said that he would be "bound to observe the will of the voters."74 He pledged not to 
continue his personal objection to the use of bonds for expressway financing, but 
clearly stated that he wanted to obtain the best possible terms for any bond issues. 
Zeidler further expressed an interest in identifying less costly alternative expressway 
routes which would still serve the same number of vehicles.75 
 
Route Selection 
 With official support from city government and Mayor Zeidler, expressway 
construction continued at a slow but measurable pace. However, as stated previously, 
while the Origin-Destination Survey considered a set of possible routes it did not 
make a specific recommendation for a North-South route north or south of downtown. 
Additionally, as one professional observer noted, expressways in other cities generally 
followed rivers, valleys, or other natural topography. The suggested Highland Avenue 
route could potentially eliminate over 3,000 residential and business units, while the 
North-South expressway along 16th Street would serve as a crosstown artery but 
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would be less effective as a route radiating from the central business district. 
Moreover, a viable alternative existed to the Highland Avenue route, along St. Paul 
Avenue. Such a route would better serve truck traffic in the industrialized Menomonee 
River Valley, require the elimination or relocation of far fewer buildings, and could be 
integrated with the Rapid Transit line already in place along a parallel East-West 
route.76 
The city and state jointly retained the De Leuw, Cather & Co. of Chicago, a 
traffic engineering consulting firm, to identify appropriate routes for the planned 
expressways. The De Leuw and Cather report predicted a 23% increase in vehicle 
traffic from late 1948 through 1960 and proposed an extensive, five-armed 
expressway network. The firm criticized as futile the city's stopgap traffic congestion 
improvement measures, calling the proposed series of underpasses, street widening, 
and bypasses useless and expensive. Instead, the firm stated flatly that in Milwaukee, 
as in other cities, only limited access expressways would solve the problem.77 
 De Leuw and Cather recommended an expressway system that differed greatly 
from the system suggested by the Origin-Destination survey. Instead of running east 
to west along Highland Avenue, the firm strongly recommended a route along or close 
to Clybourn Street west of North 8th Street, to pass north of the Soldier's Home and 
link to West Blue Mound Road near the Waukesha County line. The proposal further 
included a plan for a North-South route crossing the Menomonee Valley at 8th Street, 
continuing south nearly to Oklahoma Avenue, and then turning south to meet 
Highway 41 near Loomis Road. There would also be another east-west leg, running 
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from approximately the intersection of South 8th Street and West Virginia Street to the 
lakefront, where it was to have connected with Lincoln Memorial Drive near East 
Clybourn Street. North of the valley, that same route would branch into two arms just 
south of North Avenue. One arm would swing east and follow the Milwaukee River 
north and northwest to connect with Port Washington Road and Green Bay Avenue 
near the city of Milwaukee's northern municipal boundary. The second arm was to 
have run west along North Avenue to approximately North 35th Street before 
branching northwest to a connection with Appleton Avenue near either West Capitol 
Drive or West Hampton Avenue.78  
The firm went on to predict that the radiating arms of the expressway would 
serve 40,000-50,000 vehicles per day, while the central leg serving the downtown area 
could serve about 60,000. In addition, said Charles De Leuw, President of the firm, 
Milwaukee had a higher percentage of truck traffic than many other cities, and as 
many as one-third of the vehicles using the expressways would be trucks. Therefore, 
he argued, the expressways would be particularly valuable in removing a significant 
amount of truck traffic from city streets.79 
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              Figure 2: A version of the route De Leuw and Cather proposed in 1949.80 
 
The De Leuw and Cather proposal was intended to offer an alternative to 
constructing a depressed expressway through densely populated residential areas. By 
constructing the east-west route along the Menomonee Valley rather than along 
Highland Avenue, the expressway would keep truck traffic out of residential 
neighborhoods on the West Side. Furthermore, this plan would follow Milwaukee's 
natural geography and utilize the Milwaukee and Menomonee River Valleys, as well 
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as the "valley" of lower cost land in blighted areas, as a means to reduce costs.81 
Mayor Zeidler, in particular, was pleased with the opportunity to reduce costs. The 
following year, 1949, De Leuw and Cather updated their recommendation to include 
an expressway feeder route, running along North and South 44th Streets from National 
Avenue to Lisbon Avenue. 
Originally intended to pass under the Wisconsin Avenue viaduct, the city Land 
Commission adjusted the plan to pass through an open cut just west of the viaduct.82 
As plans progressed to begin construction of the overall system, the 44th Street 
Expressway quickly became a priority for planners and elected leaders. Mayor Zeidler 
believed the route should be given the first priority for construction and wanted "the 
plans pushed as fast as possible."83 His reasoning was that because the Milwaukee 
County Board had already approved construction of a new Milwaukee County 
Stadium on the nearby site of an old quarry, the Expressway would be indispensable 
in serving the crowds attending events there. Additionally, the route would improve 
crosstown traffic conditions, allowing motorists to travel more freely between the 
West Side and Southwest Side. Moreover, upon its completion, the 44th Street 
Expressway would relieve overcrowded 35th Street.84 
As of mid-1949, the city planned to move forward several major projects. 
Taking into consideration the De Leuw and Cather report, the Milwaukee Board of 
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Land Commissioners officially recommended making the 44th Street project part of 
the first phase of road improvements, in addition to construction of the East-West 
Expressway along Clybourn and Canal Streets from North 6th Street to North 44th 
Street. By selecting the east-west route along the northern slope of the valley, Elmer 
Krieger noted, there would be less disruption to surrounding residential and industrial 
areas, at a lower cost. The new freeway also provided a much needed additional east-
to-west alternative, thereby relieving Wisconsin Avenue and Clybourn Street of traffic 
congestion. The Commission also recognized the overcrowding on both 35th Street 
and Hawley Road and supported the 44th Street freeway as a means of improving 
those conditions, in addition to granting greater access to the new stadium site.85 
Leaders did not follow all of the statements and recommendations from De 
Leuw and Cather, and local officials such as the Mayor, Common Council, and Land 
Commission remained decision-makers into the early 1950s. It is important to note, 
though, that city officials and planners were not unified in their views. For example, 
in 1947, the Common Council had endorsed expressway routes along Highland 
Avenue and 16th Street, as suggested in the Origin-Destination Survey, but the De 
Leuw and Cather study did not contain those routes. The result was possible 
confusion among property owners in potentially affected neighborhoods. Moreover, 
the Land Commission itself had endorsed the Clybourn Street route for the East-West 
Expressway. 
In addition to recommending routes for the East-West and 44th Street 
Expressways, the Land Commission recommended several important street 
improvements, despite the fact that the consulting engineers saw street improvements 
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as useless to relieve traffic congestion. Some of those projects had been under 
consideration for several years. Among the projects recommended by the Land 
Commission in May 1949 were improving the intersection of North 35th and West 
Burleigh Streets at West Fond du Lac Avenue, extending North 27th Street, improving 
South 1st Street from Mitchell Street to Lincoln Avenue, and extending 1st Street from 
Lincoln to Chase Avenue.86 Subsequently, the Department of Public Works moved 
forward with the 1st and 35th Street plans and began to work with the State Highway 
Commission on some projects.87  
Other constituencies expressed concern over the expressway route selection 
process, as well. The Line Material Company, for example, had already been 
dislocated to make room for the Civic Center, and purchased the Campbell Laundry 
Building at 714 West Michigan Street. With conflicting expressway plans, the 
Company was unsure of whether to begin remodeling that building or move to a 
different site. In 1949, the president of the company wrote to Mayor Zeidler, 
demanding a quick answer.88 The Line Material Company was not the only firm with 
such fears. The Wisconsin Telephone Company, which had constructed a new 
building near 35th and Kilbourn, shared those concerns, prompting the possible 
expressway route through that area to be modified.89 Still others objected to the 
placement of the northeast arm along the Milwaukee River. Although that route would 
have low land acquisition costs, it would potentially draw a significant amount of 
traffic, including truck traffic, off Teutonia and Green Bay Avenues and Port 
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Washington and Mill Roads and into a scenic area. If constructed, it would have also 
destroyed a bird sanctuary and traveled through Gordon, Kern, and Estabrook Parks, 
seen as valuable public assets because the west bank of the Milwaukee River was one 
of the only riverfront areas not to be developed. Additionally, the route was not seen 
as practical, because it would take drivers headed downtown farther east than they 
needed to go.90 
 
Planning and Funding 
As the 1950s began, Milwaukee still lacked an expressway system, nearly four 
years after the Origin-Destination Survey identified the city's major traffic patterns, 
endorsed a system of expressways, and considered possible expressway routes. 
Constructing a system of controlled access, divided highways in a developed urban 
area was a massive undertaking, while funding questions and administrative delays 
further hindered progress. The De Leuw and Cather study recommended that the 
central interchange be located at approximately 6th and Clybourn. The Land 
Commission, on the other hand, favored placing it closer to 11th Street.91 Up to that 
point, government agencies also had not communicated effectively with one another. 
Before the federal government could fund any construction projects, it required that 
planning and programming for a number of projects be coordinated between 
transportation departments at the local, state, and federal level. This was particularly 
important because the city would have difficulty funding the 44th Street and East-West 
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Expressways on its own, but the project could progress faster, several planners felt, 
with state matching funds.92 
To that end, the city accepted a $7,500,000 offer from the State Highway 
Commission. The combination of state funding and revenue from the bond issue put 
the project on a "sound financial basis," allowing Raleigh Gamble, Superintendent of 
Street Construction and Repair,93 to recommend directing a consultant to prepare 
location plans for the East-West Expressway between the 44th Street Expressway and 
Hawley Road, to extend the construction contract east to North 25th Street, and to 
enable negotiations with the Department of Veterans Affairs and one cemetery for 
land acquisition.94 However, by mid-1952, that strong financial position weakened. 
The Swietlik-Gamble program for expressway development at that time included both 
the East-West Expressway east of 44th Street and the 44th Street Expressway from 
National Avenue to Wells Street. It now faced a $19,000,000 shortfall, even though its 
funding included the entirety of the bond issue and state and federal funds. Disturbed 
by his news, Zeidler stated that he wanted expressway expenditures closely 
monitored, and that he did not want any large expenditures without results, given that 
not even one mile of the proposed system had been completed.95 In response, the 
city's budget director proposed a series of solutions to expedite the project. Noting 
that Milwaukee was among the first large cities to address traffic problems with 
expressways, he recommended that the head of the Expressway Division be relieved 
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of other duties so that he could focus his efforts on the project. He further 
recommended that because negotiations with utility companies were generally with 
their executives, city representatives should have the authority to make prompt and 
final decisions.96 However, those recommendations did not address the fiscal issue of 
construction. In 1952, the city requested $17,400,000 over two years in highway aid 
from the state, but received only $5 million.97     
 
Right-of-way Acquisition 
In addition to financing concerns, the city encountered questions about land 
acquisition, leading to further delays. Intended to relieve Hawley Road and 35th Street 
of congestion, the 44th Street Expressway was among the first routes planned. 
Planners considered the right-of-way for the 44th Street Expressway, also called the 
Stadium Freeway, to be easy to acquire. There were few parcels of land along the 
route, and the area was "relatively unimproved."98 Up to that point, no suburbs had 
participated in expressway planning, although because officials planned at that time to 
terminate the route at National Avenue, the Village of West Milwaukee was to 
eventually be involved.99 
However, discussion of the precise route for the East-West Expressway 
consumed significant time and resources in the early 1950s. The De Leuw and Cather 
study had recommended that the east-west freeway follow Clybourn Street and Blue 
                                               
96 "A Review of Milwaukee's Expressway Organization," LRB. 
97 William Norris, "We Can Lick Expressway Problem with Bond Issue," 8 August 1952, Milwaukee 
Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19520808&id=yAUkAAAAIBAJ&sjid=a 
xAEAAAAIBAJ&pg=1290,3725643, accessed 16 April 2014. 
98 "Report on progress on expressways to date and interim program for planning and design, right-of-
way acquisition, construction and financing of expressways during the next two years," Milwaukee 
Bureau of Street Construction and Repairs, September 1953, LRB. 
99 Letter from Raleigh Gamble to Milton College Wildcat Executive Editor Lawrence Bursten, 29 May 
1952, Box 164, Folder 2, Zeidler Papers. 
44 
 
 
 
Mound Road. However, in the same way that the Highland Avenue route previously 
favored by Gamble would contribute to the housing shortage, the East-West 
Expressway along the Menomonee Valley also created problems. Many potentially 
displaced residents along the Clybourn-Blue Mound route could not afford to buy 
their own houses, nor could they be placed in public housing projects, contributing to 
both the ongoing housing shortage and higher costs.100 
Nevertheless, the city of Milwaukee continued forward with its expressway 
planning program but was able to take advantage of an unexpected opportunity to 
reduce expenditures significantly. In June 1951, federal judge Robert Tehan ordered 
the rapid transit line operated by the Transport Co. to cease operations.101 Already in 
debt, the Transport Co., which served interurban transit lines connecting Milwaukee 
to Waukesha and Hales Corners, had been operating at a loss of $5,000-$7,000 per 
month and did not anticipate any increases of revenue or significant cost saving 
measures.102 Yet despite efforts to keep the Transport Co. alive—the state legislature 
passed legislation enabling a metropolitan transit authority, while a high profile 
creditor argued that fare increases and greater efficiencies could return the interurban 
to profitability—it could not remain open. The Transport Co. had not paid the Electric 
Co. for over five months of electric service and rent on the right-of-way the Electric 
Co. owned and was potentially liable for several personal injury claims.  
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The value of the rapid transit line to the expressway program cannot be over 
emphasized. Originally created in the late 1920s by the Electric Co. for use by its 
rapid transit division, the route along the north bluff of the Menomonee Valley offered 
convenient access to downtown. To create the right-of-way initially, a row of homes 
from 16th Street to 42nd Street had been razed during the 1920s,103 but in the 1950s, it 
enabled expressway engineers and local officials to plan a route along a direct east-
west path, with little additional demolition work involved. This greatly minimized the 
number of displaced individuals in the 1950s. Additionally, the line had no grade 
crossings, and followed a route over and under crossing streets.104 
Closure of the line and changing the route from a transit to a traffic route did 
not draw unanimous support from the community. West Allis Mayor Arnold Klentz 
proposed using the line as a "streetcar expressway," linking West Allis to downtown 
Milwaukee. He wrote to the president of the Transport Co., arguing that his proposal 
would benefit residents and if carried out "many hundreds of commuters could leave 
their automobiles in their garages."105 Some Waukesha County land owners opposed 
closure due to concerns that property along the transit line would be devalued after 
operations ceased. Additionally, an attorney for the company advocated a municipal 
takeover of the line, while transportation official Albert Kalmbach noted Los Angeles 
and several Midwestern cities, including Toronto, Chicago, and Detroit, had either 
established rapid transit systems already or incorporated them into their expressway 
plans. He further noted that it was the only high-speed, off-street transportation 
                                               
103 "Electric Co. Rushes Work on Rapid Transit Line," 2 June 1929, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19290602&id=P5dQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=rSEEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=5439,561959, accessed 21 April 2014. 
104 "Four Mile Section of Old Rapid Transit Right of Way Offered for Sale for Expressway Use," 9 July 
1953, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19530709&id=kvkjAAAAIBAJ&sjid=9yMEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=4760,2649955, accessed 21 June 2014. 
105 "Expressway Rail Plan Rejected," 18 July 1951, Milwaukee Journal, Box 1, "Newspaper Clippings 
June 1951-August 1961 folder," Gamble Papers. 
46 
 
 
 
system in the city and predicted that the city would someday have to spend millions of 
dollars to replace it. Douglas Adair, a rapid transit motorman and one of about 60 
Transport Co. employees to lose his job with the closure of the line, likewise foresaw 
that in the future, residents of both Milwaukee and Waukesha would recognize that 
they needed such a mass transit line.106  
Even so, the line was not financially solvent, despite serving 2,000 regular 
commuters daily, and could not remain open. A U.S. attorney supported liquidation of 
the company due to federal taxes owed, while Judge Tehan ruled running the line until 
establishment of a transit authority to be infeasible. At that time, establishment of the 
transit authority still required Governor Walter Kohler to sign the bill, followed by 
public approval in a referendum in affected communities.107 Attorneys representing 
personal injury claimants also supported closure of the line. 
The line's suspension and liquidation were directly tied to the shift in the 
postwar era toward greater use of the personal automobile. Although the line served 
2,000 regular commuters and approximately 1,600 occasional riders, it faced 
declining ridership. As Milwaukee Alderman Walter A. Koepke noted, if it had been a 
profitable operation, another company would have purchased the line. Transport Co. 
official Bruno Bitker said although the company would utilize buses to provide 
alternate transportation for riders, he predicted that many riders would turn to private 
autos. Likewise, Koepke stated that the city would have difficulty justifying an 
investment in the line, or assuming management of it, when it projected spending 
$200 million over ten years on expressways. He also felt that it would be 
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"impractical" for Milwaukee to acquire the right-of-way for the expressway system, 
citing the "prohibitive" cost of putting high tension power lines along the right-of-way 
underground.108  
City traffic engineer Howard Ilgner, meanwhile, recommended using a portion 
of collected motorist taxes to save transit, an idea supported by Perry Anderson, a 
representative of the Downtown Association. Klentz was also open to a greater local 
government role in preserving the line, suggesting a commission of city, county, and 
suburban representatives look into the matter. However, the idea of municipal 
involvement drew opposition from other officials, such as Alderman Patrick Fass, 
who said public or quasi-public ownership would require taxpayers to cover the costs 
of any potential operating cost shortages.109 At the same time, although it fell outside 
his jurisdiction, Waukesha Mayor Bruce Beaty lobbied the Wisconsin Highway 
Commission to make the rapid transit line a highway.110 
It is important to take a moment to consider the context of the closure. A 
combination of factors had contributed to the decline in ridership and weaker financial 
position of the line. Karen W. Moore attributes the demise of the rapid transit 
interurban line largely to a decline in city-suburban relations. Although a trend toward 
greater use of the personal automobile had been underway for years, she argues a 
power shift from city to county government dating back to the 1930s hastened its 
demise.  Disputes between the city and its suburbs over boundaries, funding, and 
responsibilities, as well as public improvement projects delayed by the Great 
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Depression, further contributed.111 Then, two accidents undermined the status of the 
interurban company. The first accident, along the route that is today I-94, injured 
seventeen people in August 1949. The second, a "ghastly" collision in September 
1950 between a small rail car headed back to Milwaukee from Hales Corners and a 
larger car headed south, killed ten. Afterward, the line slid into bankruptcy.112 The 
Milwaukee Journal in 1951 made observations similar to those of Moore. It did not 
specifically mention the accidents as reasons for the line's demise but attributed it to 
the Depression, a workers' strike in 1934, and competition with buses and private 
autos.113 Russell Schultz also describes the Great Depression, the worker's strike, and 
pressure from the Securities and Exchange Commission for the electric utility to 
separate itself from transit as factors in a broader shift from rail-based to rubber tire-
based public transportation.114 
In any case, after the rapid transit line ceased operations, the city almost 
immediately sought the right-of-way for expressway use. On July 31, 1951, the 
Milwaukee Common Council authorized city expressway director Raleigh Gamble to 
represent the city in negotiations to obtain part of the right-of-way. Not all Council 
members supported the action. Aldermen Michael Jendusa and James H. Collers 
opposed it because they did not want to hamper efforts by rapid transit riders to raise 
capital to resurrect the line. However, Gamble projected that Milwaukee could save 
$500,000 in construction costs and eliminate the need for underpasses under the rapid 
transit tracks if it built a portion of the interchange of the 44th Street and East-West 
Expressways along the right-of-way. Ultimately, the Council voted 14-7 in favor of 
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authorizing Gamble to negotiate.115 
 Members of the public also saw the value of using the abandoned rapid transit 
right-of-way for expressway use, as fewer properties, if any, would have to be 
condemned.116 The Wisconsin Electric Power Company, meanwhile, was very 
cooperative and submitted a contract proposal for the right-of-way between 6th and 
Clybourn and North 25th Street. Acquisition of an expressway route on the West Side 
was more difficult, though. Some sections of the rapid transit line were too narrow for 
the new road, while other parts had sharp curves, for which reason the expressway in 
some areas needed to go outside the existing right-of-way boundaries.117 Indeed, the 
original width of the rapid transit right-of-way varied, from 90 feet to 200 feet. The 
expressway required a width of 112 feet between outer curbs, with additional space 
for sloping, prompting the need for additional land to be acquired. 
 One such area was along the western leg of the expressway, west of the 
Stadium Freeway, where the right-of-way bordered three cemeteries. The city quickly 
entered negotiations to purchase a section of Spring Hill Cemetery, just east of 
Hawley Road along the southern border of the expressway route. By fall 1952, the 
trustees of Gilead Lodge, which owned the cemetery, agreed to sell a 90 foot by 635 
foot tract for $70,000.118 The tract had no graves and only one dwelling unit on it, but 
trustees still wanted to retain an independent attorney to confirm their right to convey 
the property, and the right of the state to condemn it.119 By January 1953, the Lodge 
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had agreed to sell the property for a price of $70,625.120  
The city attorney's office hoped to use the Spring Hill acquisition as a pattern 
for negotiations with Beth Hamedrosh Cemetery. Closure of the Spring Hill 
transaction thus allowed the city to be independent in its negotiations with nearby 
Beth Hamedrosh Cemetery.121 This cemetery tract, 30 feet wide by 835 feet long, 
bordered the rapid transit right-of-way along its northern edge. The city actually 
began condemnation proceedings against the cemetery owners, after a year of 
unsuccessful negotiations, but in September 1953, the two sides reached an 
agreement. Ultimately, the city purchased the tract for $36,500.122 
The same year, Milwaukee received further approval from the federal Bureau 
of Public Roads and the Veterans' Administration to locate a portion of the 
expressway route on Soldiers' Home land. However, unlike with Spring Hill 
Cemetery, expressway construction required removal of 44 graves in the veterans' 
cemetery. The project also required filling Lake Huston, a small body of water in the 
area. Despite the presence of three cemeteries clustered together, as well as the need 
to move graves, there appeared to be no alternative to constructing the route through 
that area. Engineers regarded this east-west corridor as the logical route for the 
expressway. No other point existed nearby in which the expressway could continue to 
the west.  
Delays in acquiring a sufficient right-of-way already hampered progress on 
planning a definite route west of Hawley Road. With completion of the land 
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purchases, the traffic consulting engineering firm Ammann & Whitney could begin 
plotting a route to the western city limits and a connection with Blue Mound Road 
near the Waukesha County line. Upon completion of the right-of-way acquisition, the 
city of Milwaukee owned a strip of land for the western leg of the Clybourn-Blue 
Mound expressway route that was 120 feet wide, sufficient for three twelve-foot lanes 
in each direction, as well as a median.123 
 
Shift to County Oversight 
During the discussion of purchasing the rapid transit right-of-way, another change 
occurred in the expressway planning process. In 1952, the city retained a different 
consulting firm, Ammann & Whitney, for expressway planning. Although two 
previous studies—the Origin-Destination Survey in 1946 and the De Leuw and Cather 
study in 1949—investigated the city's traffic problems and made recommendations 
accordingly, neither plan was actually implemented, partly because some members of 
the Land Commission disagreed with aspects of the De Leuw and Cather report.124  
Despite that, Ammann and Whitney's "Preliminary Plan for Milwaukee 
Expressways," presented in September 1952, incorporated a number of the earlier 
recommendations. In other ways, though, it differed greatly. The larger and more 
comprehensive Preliminary Plan eliminated the idea of a north-south route splitting 
into two directions north of downtown, instead favoring a route starting at North Port 
Washington Road near the northern city limits, passing along the western edge of 
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downtown between North 10th and 11th Streets, and continuing on to the South Side, 
with a southern terminus west of Wilson Park. Ammann and Whitney further 
recommended the East-West Expressway extend all the way east to the lakefront, 
rather than terminating near 6th or 11th and Clybourn. Total construction cost over 
fifteen years was estimated at $172 million.  
On December 16, 1952, the Milwaukee Common Council, by an 18-7 vote, 
adopted the Preliminary Plan. The Plan drew support from Alderman Fass, Streets and 
Expressways Committee chairman, who favored an increase in annual expressway 
spending, and an auto tax, more state and federal aid, and additional municipal bond 
issues to fund that spending. Alderman Matt Schimenz called the Preliminary Plan a 
"culmination of studies made in the last six years."125  
Yet although a new plan was in place and the rapid transit line had officially 
been offered for sale at a price of $1,000,800, plus the $300,000 cost of removing 
transmission lines from the right-of-way,126 the city could still only proceed at a slow 
pace in regard to construction. In fact, Milwaukee's ability to actually complete the 
city wide interstate project on its own was limited. As expressway engineer Walter 
Tacke noted, the project progressed nicely, but much of that progress was unseen and 
included planning, design, and right-of-way acquisition, not actual building. As of 
August 1953, the sale of the rapid transit right-of-way from North 8th Street to the 
Veterans' Administration grounds was still under negotiation. Milwaukee County also 
insisted that the city furnish land for 3,000-4,000 parking places near the new 
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Milwaukee County Stadium site before a deed transfer of land for the 44th Street 
Expressway.127  
In its December 1952 report, the city Land Commission stated that the 
expressway system should be considered on a metropolitan basis, and that the 
Common Council should refer its report to the Milwaukee County Board of 
Supervisors and officials in West Allis, West Milwaukee, Wauwatosa, River Hills, 
Glendale, and St. Francis. The earlier expressway surveys, the Commission noted, 
indicated that the system would have to extend to other areas in Milwaukee County to 
be effective. It also noted the routes proposed by Ammann and Whitney traveled 
through Milwaukee County Parks land and some unincorporated areas outside city 
limits. Under state laws in effect at the time, each municipality had sole responsibility 
over its own section of the expressway, and could in effect veto any extension. The 
Citizens Governmental Research Bureau agreed, and called for comprehensive 
agreement between city, county, and state officials. Although the city and county were 
already cooperating on some projects, such as expressway approaches to County 
Stadium and an extension of Lincoln Memorial Drive, only a comprehensive 
agreement would assure joint planning, construction, and operation of the new 
expressway system. The project, it said, "profoundly affects the planning, the 
financing, and the future growth of the entire metropolitan community."128  
Alderman Fred Meyers, who voted against adoption of the Preliminary Plan, 
held a similar sentiment. In his view, the city had to confer with suburban 
communities, because the suburbs had a direct interest in any plan the city adopted. 
Meyers also advocated greater cooperation with all levels of government in order to 
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improve the funding situation. Initially, he argued, the city was expected to pay 15% 
of the costs, but so far, it had incurred 42% of the costs, and could end up paying as 
much as 60%. Thus, he asked City Comptroller Virgil Hurless and City Attorney 
Walter Mattison to research whether Milwaukee could shift costs to the state, as had 
been done in other cities.129 
Mayor Frank Zeidler himself expressed a belief that downtown industry could 
only be saved by public transportation, whether by bus or rapid transit, but not by 
private auto. He lamented that the "fantastic costs involved with expressways" were 
difficult to meet with present systems of taxation but was reluctant to shift to any 
other system.130 As far back as 1948, he expressed concern over the cost of 
expressway construction for the city and county, and supported state financing similar 
to a funding model in California. He also believed in general the city should receive a 
greater percentage of gas, inheritance, gift, and estate taxes paid to the state.131 He 
was also careful in his use of the city's credit. Like fellow Socialist Mayor Daniel 
Hoan before him, Zeidler preferred pay-as-you-go financing.132 He further remarked 
that the financing question could be easier if more federal funds became available, 
and stated that he would try to impress upon the federal government the value of 
freeways for civil defense.133  
The Zeidler administration was promptly criticized for his handling of the 
expressway funding issue. The primary reason was because the Mayor vetoed a new, 
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long-term bond issue, stating a preference for short-term bonds, although the 
Common Council overrode his veto. Milwaukee Sentinel columnist William Norris 
subsequently complained that even though the public fully supported expressways and 
use of bonds to pay for them, Zeidler was too cautious with the city's credit. Norris 
criticized the Mayor for wanting to return to a cash basis for funding larger projects, 
even if it meant slower expressway progress.134 
Throughout 1953, calls mounted for a change in administration. In February 
1953, the Citizen's Governmental Research Bureau convened a "committee of 21," 
consisting of representatives from Milwaukee, the County, and the suburbs. It 
recommended a plan to shift expressway control to Milwaukee County. Under its 
proposal, oversight fell to a five-member County Expressway Commission. The bill 
was introduced in the state legislature but for several reasons did not initially pass. 
No precedent existed for such a commission. Most other cities with 
expressway projects underway left their programs under the oversight of the local city 
or county public works department. Among large cities, only Milwaukee, Detroit, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles even had separate divisions within the street construction 
department. Additionally, the Milwaukee Common Council did not support the plan at 
first, and several suburban and Milwaukee County officials raised concerns.135 Mayor 
Zeidler also opposed it.136  
The chief objection the Common Council raised was that a corresponding bill 
in the state legislature proposed increasing the size of the Milwaukee County Board of 
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Supervisors to give suburban residents a disproportionately large number of 
representatives. Alderman Patrick Fass expressed a concern that a County Board 
"packed" with suburban members might try to "soak" property taxpayers in 
Milwaukee.137 
The County Board also failed to support the transfer bill when it was first 
introduced. The heart of the debate was over who within County government should 
control the expressway program under such a transfer. Also at issue was whether the 
County or suburban governments would build expressway links outside the city 
proper. The expressway transfer bill proposed giving control to an expressway 
commission appointed by the governor, but County Board Chairman Lawrence 
Timmerman wanted authority vested in the Board itself. He argued if county 
government were to join in planning and financing expressways on a county-wide 
scale, the costs to city taxpayers could increase, and cited a $50 million figure. 
Supervisor Bert Busby countered that the city saved money by shifting authority to 
the County. The Common Council and a committee of the County Board persuaded 
the legislature to delay a final vote on the measure until it reconvened after its 
summer recess.138 In October, the legislature reconsidered it. By then, it had support 
from the Council and Mayor Zeidler.139 
In November 1953, the Wisconsin Legislature passed, and Governor Walter 
Kohler signed, legislation to establish a five-member Milwaukee County Expressway 
Commission. The bill attempted to accommodate several of the concerns raised. City, 
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county, and suburban officials favored the legislation. Commission members were to 
be appointed by the governor, for staggered terms, and the Commission was granted 
authority to plan and build an expressway system, and acquire land on which to do so.  
The new expressways law further directed the Commission to elect a chairman 
from its members, to keep all meetings open to the public, and to develop a general 
expressway plan. As part of that planning, the Commission was to provide reasonably 
detailed budget estimates, including figures on state and federal aid. The County 
Board retained authority for final approval of all proposed and planned routes, as well 
as annual budgets. Additionally, the new law provided for Milwaukee to be 
reimbursed for some of its expressway costs, over a period of ten years, because it 
was the only city to have incurred costs up to that point.140 
As already noted, several factors contributed to the transfer for expressway 
planning, construction, and oversight. The primary reason for transferring the 
expressway to County control was cost excess. The Ammann and Whitney plan 
simply exceeded the resources of Milwaukee property taxpayers. The Zeidler 
administration considered other revenue sources, such as a gas tax and $10 wheel tax, 
but both options put the cost back upon the taxpayer. Thus, he saw a change in 
administration as a solution.  
Zeidler reiterated his position from 1948 that the expressway plan should be 
integrated into Milwaukee's overall traffic plan and not be rushed. He also agreed that 
expressway construction affected suburban communities. The Village of West 
Milwaukee was the most affected, due to the fact the Stadium Freeway terminated at 
National Avenue, its municipal boundary. The Village, Zeidler believed, was ill 
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prepared to deal with the corresponding traffic increase. West Allis and Wauwatosa, 
he reasoned, were less involved, but traffic relief on Hawley Road affected both. 
Moreover, having a five-member, appointed commission was expected to reduce 
distrust between city, county, and suburban officials.141  
His cautious style mirrored Hoan's. At first, Zeidler opposed shifting the city's 
oversight over expressway planning and construction to the County.142 But by October 
1953, he supported it.143 He recognized Milwaukee could not afford to build the 
expressway system on its own, and it needed cooperation from suburban governments 
to construct an integrated highway network serving residents and businesses 
throughout the county. At least some federal and state aid was available for 
construction, but Milwaukee risked losing it if it could not demonstrate progress or 
proceed according to a defined plan.144 
As 1953 ended, planning for Milwaukee's expressway system was well 
underway, but nothing had been constructed.145 As one observer wrote, expressway 
planning and construction under city government took place "by evolution not 
revolution."146 The city of Milwaukee undertook a massive public improvement 
project, sought funding for it, and began to acquire land for the rights-of-way. It 
sponsored multiple professional studies, received public input, and made definite 
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progress toward construction. Lack of funding, exacerbated by limited collaboration 
between city and suburban officials, prevented faster progress.  
As a result, authority shifted to Milwaukee County. At first, it continued most 
of the city's routes and initiatives, but later, tied the local expressway network into the 
Interstate Highway System. Subsequent chapters of this thesis continue that narrative. 
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Chapter 2 
Bit by Bit: Expressway Planning Moves Forward 
  
 This chapter narrates the planning for Milwaukee's expressways after 
Milwaukee County assumed oversight. It attempts to describe the planning process 
and to link several national trends to Milwaukee. After the Wisconsin Legislature 
passed the bill that relieved Milwaukee of its expressway-related responsibilities, 
planning and construction began to take place on a more metropolitan basis. The 
legislation gave municipal governments the ability to raise concerns about routes 
running through their jurisdictions and recommend solutions. Milwaukee, four 
suburban governments, and the Milwaukee County Park Commission did just that. 
They did not necessarily oppose the expressways in principle, but wanted the routes 
modified. Often, neighborhood residents, businesses, or other interests encouraged 
their elected leaders to speak out.  
 In Milwaukee and West Milwaukee, the objectors opposed demolition of 
homes and businesses in densely populated, older neighborhoods. In the rapidly 
expanding western suburbs of West Allis and Wauwatosa, officials actually wanted 
more expressway miles to accommodate increasing traffic and projected additional 
development. Meanwhile, Milwaukee Mayor Frank Zeidler's vision for a 
decentralized metropolitan area included the city's annexation of new territory to 
insure that even though future industrial and residential growth took place away from 
the city center, it would still technically remain within city limits. He saw 
expressways as an important element of that model, particularly in light of the 
national trend toward suburbanization after World War II, although he did not believe 
Milwaukee's property taxpayers alone should shoulder the cost of construction.   
61 
 
 
 
Thus, Milwaukee County pursued expressway planning on a metropolitan 
basis. It attempted to balance several goals in its planning: more convenient 
commutes for suburban residents coming into the city for work, traffic relief 
downtown and near the new Milwaukee County Stadium, and adequate transportation 
facilities in anticipation of future urban growth. As a result, expressway construction 
moved forward bit by bit and with a great deal of  
debate.  
 
Formal Transfer 
 The year 1954 saw Milwaukee County government accept responsibility for 
planning and constructing an expressway system started by the city of Milwaukee, but 
which benefited the entire Milwaukee area. Yet transferring authority to Milwaukee 
did not immediately  
hasten progress. In fact, the Milwaukee County Expressway Commission, lacking 
time and manpower to insure a smooth transition, got off to a slow start. 
 Mayor Frank Zeidler, City Comptroller Virgil Hurless, and the City Attorney's 
office wanted to transfer oversight to the County soon after the expressway law was 
passed in late 1953, with Assistant City Attorney Clyde Sheets using the analogy that 
the jurisdictional shift was like a relay race. The City had already started the process, 
and now it was the County's turn to take over. The City wanted work on the system to 
continue uninterrupted, and according to the City Comptroller, had enough funds on 
hand to complete work already planned. However, Zeidler observed that the city's 
work could not go on, because there was no guarantee that the County Board would 
accept it as part of the overall expressway plan the Board was required to create.  
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Zeidler insisted on turning over maps, studies, and other documents quickly, 
and that doing so was the correct legal procedure, given the recent state expressway 
law. County Public Works Director Eugene A. Howard did not want to accept them 
immediately, though. He said accepting the documents was not practical, given that 
the county did not have sufficient staff, and accepting the transfer required approval 
from the County Board. He felt it would take the Commission four to six weeks to 
prepare. Sheets responded by reminding Howard that the Milwaukee Common 
Council held special meetings to address expressway-related problems, and that if the 
County Board wanted to expedite the process, it could do the same. Milwaukee 
County Assistant Corporation Counsel C. Stanley Perry agreed with Zeidler that 
transferring expressway oversight was indeed the correct legal procedure but argued 
the law did not call for any particular haste. Hurless warned, however, that the State 
Highway Commission chairman had already indicated Milwaukee would lose $7 
million of state and federal expressway aids unless the County acted without delay.1 
 On March 26, 1954, the city officially relinquished expressway oversight to 
Milwaukee County. It was a formal ceremony, with Mayor Zeidler and other officials 
participating, while a truck with plans, reports, contracts, and soil test samples was 
loaded and ready to deliver the documents.2 Immediately, the question of staffing and 
compensation became an issue. Initially, officials anticipated that expressway staff 
would transfer to the county. City expressway director Raleigh W. Gamble soon 
raised concerns, questioning how the city could pay the staff if it no longer had 
jurisdiction over the project and describing as "unrealistic" a plan by the Milwaukee 
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County highway commissioner for thirteen of fifteen expressway staff members to 
accept a pay cut upon their transfer.3 He went on to state that he was unsure of how 
many staff members actually wanted to accept employment with the County. City 
government temporarily solved that problem. Deputy Public Works Commissioner 
John Tanghe said that those staff members could be transferred to other departments, 
while Hurless agreed to sign their paychecks as long as the city attorney's office 
issued a written opinion stating that such an arrangement was legal. Assistant City 
Attorney Clyde Sheets said he was confident of the legality.4 After the formal 
expressway transfer took place, Milwaukee's chief right-of-way acquisition agent, 
Edward A. Bielefeld, and five other staff, including three civil engineers, transferred 
to County employment and accepted civil service status. City expressways director 
Raleigh Gamble did not make the change, remaining in his position as superintendent 
of street construction and repair. Eight other staff members, including Gamble's 
assistant, Walter Tacke, also declined to make the transfer, citing the pay cut as a 
chief reason.5 
 Even so, other legal problems remained. Hurless insisted that the city meet all 
of the commitments already pledged to the freeway program, pursuant to the new 
state expressways law, while Sheets believed the county could not continue 
expressway progress until after the formal transfer of documents had been made. 
Ultimately, a special committee of expressway officials, meeting in the Mayor's 
office, voted to submit a resolution to the Common Council authorizing the City 
                                               
3 "County to Get Freeway Role," 20 March 1954, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19540320&id=nAQkAAAAIBAJ&sjid=9iMEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=7040,1694606, accessed 28 April 2014. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Lloyd Gladfelter, "Okays Hiring of Consultants," 27 March 1954, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=jvrRlaHg2sAC&dat=19540327&printsec=frontpage&hl=en, 
accessed 14 December 2014. 
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expressway division to retain engineers, right-of-way agents, and other staff until the 
transfer to the county was completed. They also voted to ask the County Board and 
Expressway Commission to accept or reject within 30 days the city's contract with 
consultants Ammann & Whitney, the engineering firm which had prepared an overall 
expressway plan.6 
 In April, the city formally prepared to transfer documents and files. However, 
with Milwaukee County unprepared to receive the transfer, the Milwaukee Journal 
sharply criticized the County's situation, noting that Wisconsin Legislature passed the 
expressways bill providing for the transfer five months earlier, and that the 
Milwaukee County Expressway Commission had been appointed three months earlier. 
It editorialized that Milwaukee Aldermen and County Supervisors often represented 
the same people and that supervisors should start acting as though they realized they 
were running a metropolitan government. The reason the County needed to act more 
quickly, the paper argued, was because the spring construction season had arrived. 
Furthermore, if work did not begin promptly, the expressway program would have 
risked losing the $7 million dollars in highway funds from state government.7  By 
May, the Milwaukee County Corporation Counsel ruled that where construction work 
was already underway, it had to be completed. Consequently, the City of Milwaukee 
began the process of extending two Ammann & Whitney contracts under its 
jurisdiction, on a reimbursement basis.8 
                                               
6 "County to Get Freeway Role," 20 March 1954, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19540320&id=nAQkAAAAIBAJ&sjid=9iMEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=7040,1694606, accessed 28 April 2014. 
7 "County Must Speed Up Expressway Action or Lose Money," 6 April 1954, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19540406&id=_b5QAAAAIBAJ&sjid=niMEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=3440,2738447, accessed 21 July 2014. 
8 "Transcript of Joint Meeting of City Board of Land Commissioners and Milwaukee County Parks 
Commission with representatives of other Townships, Villages, and Cities Present," 25 May 1954, Box 
6, Folder 4, Walter Bender Papers, Milwaukee Manuscript Collection, Golda Meir Library Archives, 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, hereafter cited Bender Papers. 
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County Jurisdiction  
 As Milwaukee County assumed oversight of the expressway system, it debated 
whether to hire a consulting firm to survey community needs and initiate planning, or 
form a team of planning engineers, who could submit a county-wide report. 
Supervisor George Herrman argued in favor of the County developing its own team of 
engineers, believing their suggestions would be more practical than those of an 
outside firm. County Highway Commissioner E.A. Howard disagreed, stating that the 
county lacked the trained engineers needed to make traffic counts and complicated 
analyses necessary to receive state and federal aid. Commissioner Robert C. Johnson 
stressed the need for getting the study done quickly, and observed that it might take as 
long as 18-24 months to hire and train such an engineering staff. Thus, the County 
retained another engineering consulting firm, Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Hall and 
MacDonald of New York, to work with Ammann and Whitney to create an 
expressways report, for a fee of $150,000.9 Working together, they completed their 
own expressway plan in early 1955.10 This fourth plan was substantially similar to the 
1952 plan submitted by Ammann and Whitney, when it was under contract with the 
City. Responsibility to study and approve the newly proposed routes thus fell on the 
Milwaukee County Expressway Commission and affected municipalities.11  
Under the expressway law passed by the Wisconsin Legislature the previous 
year, any city, village, or town through which the expressway was proposed to run 
                                               
9 Lloyd Gladfelter, "Okays Hiring of Consultants," 27 March 1954, Milwaukee Journal, 
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had the right to object within 60 days after plans had been submitted to them. The 
procedure to resolve such concerns was to hold conferences, and if those conferences 
could not yield a mutually agreeable solution, the question would be submitted to the 
state highway commission for a decision, and the County Board would vote on the 
overall plan.12 This structure, with an independent expressway commission within 
county government, made Milwaukee somewhat unusual among large cities 
undertaking similar projects. Such a structure later allowed Milwaukee, Glendale, and 
West Milwaukee's municipal governments to object to some routes and push for 
adjustments. 
Although leaders in three other metropolitan areas—Cleveland, Los Angeles, 
and the Twin Cities—recommended to Milwaukee that the county, rather than the 
city, administer the expressway program, most other cities had arrangements different 
from Milwaukee's. In Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit, separate expressway 
divisions existed within the municipal department of public works, but they did not 
oversee and fund the programs. In Los Angeles, all expressways were considered state 
highways and were maintained by the state, although the city was responsible for 
funding alterations to streets, sewers, and storm drains. Under Detroit's organizational 
system, the municipal highway and expressway division held responsibility for 
planning, but like in Los Angeles, the actual expressways were the responsibility of 
the Michigan highway department. The approach in Boston was the exact opposite. 
There, no local control existed whatsoever, and the state handled all expressway 
matters.  
                                               
12 "North-South Freeway Route Draws Protests," 14 April 1955, Milwaukee Journal, 
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In most cities, right-of-way acquisitions fell to the city or county, with the state 
paying a portion of the costs. A few exceptions existed, however. In California, the 
state paid for acquisitions in Los Angeles and San Francisco. Texas, conversely, did 
not contribute for right-of-way acquisitions, allowing Dallas, Houston, and San 
Antonio to cover acquisition costs on their own.13 
In any case, in Milwaukee, the County Expressway Commission was 
responsible for planning, with funding secured by the County Board. The actual 
process for moving the expressway system forward after the County took over led to a 
series of hearings, public meetings, proposals, revised proposals, and collaboration 
between units of government, which continued on for much of 1955 and into the 
following year. The process, while perhaps cumbersome and time consuming, enabled 
multiple units of government, as well as businesses and private citizens represented 
by their mayors and city council members, to communicate and voice concerns. 
Planners at the local level—in this case, Milwaukee County—listened and took those 
concerns seriously. And while they usually defended their own position and initial 
proposals, they showed a willingness to collaborate with other governments and 
consider modifications to the most recent expressway plan. 
 
General Plan 
 In February 1955, the Expressway Commission approved the new 40-mile 
General Plan of seven separate but linked expressways in Milwaukee County. It was 
generally consistent with the 1952 recommendation approved by the City, but added 
additional routes. The Commission further endorsed a 22-mile system extension to be 
                                               
13 Citizens Governmental Research Bureau Bulletin, Volume 41, 22 August 1953, Box 1, Folder 12, 
Walter F. Hintz Papers, Anderson Research Library, Milwaukee County Historical Society, hereafter 
cited Hintz Papers. 
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completed after 1980 and ordered copies of the approved route plans be sent to the 
municipalities whose boundaries the 40-mile network crossed. Those municipalities 
needed to approve the section of the expressway passing through their borders before 
actual construction could begin.14  
Some of the routes the Expressway Commission approved were already planned or 
under construction. The East-West Expressway, also known as the Clybourn-Blue 
Mound route, had been planned by the City of Milwaukee, and the city began to 
acquire the right-of-way for it. As discussed earlier in this thesis, principal right-of-
way acquisition began with negotiations to purchase the former Rapid Transit Line 
but also included acquisition of land owned by cemeteries adjoining the right-of-way 
to the west of the County Stadium site and Veterans' Administration grounds. By 
1955, the Expressway Commission had completed negotiations to acquire the right-
of-way from the Wisconsin Electric Power Co.15 The County plan also extended the 
East-West Expressway from the City's planned terminus at Hawley Road west to near 
the Waukesha County line.16 The 44th Street Expressway, meanwhile, had already 
been completed from West National Avenue to a point about 3400 feet north of 
National Avenue, in the Stadium Interchange area.17 
However, the General Plan was a large and comprehensive network, with 
numerous interconnecting routes and interchanges. It further included likely future 
extensions. The map below provides a visual representation of the General Plan. The 
seven routes were the: 
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16 "General Plan," Milwaukee County Highway Commission, undated, Box 1, Folder 12, Hintz Papers. 
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  East-West Expressway, 9.7 miles: The route was proposed to start at Lake 
Michigan and run along a line just south of Clybourn Street, follow the north slope of 
the Menomonee Valley and pass north of County Stadium to connect with Blue 
Mound Road near the Waukesha County line. 
  North-South Expressway, 11.1 miles: Starting slightly south of Silver 
Spring Drive west of Port Washington Road, the Expressway Commission proposed a 
north-south artery which crossing the Menomonee Valley at 11th Street on a low level 
bridge and terminating at West Layton Avenue east of South 20th Street. The 
Expressway was to have three lanes in each direction between Capitol Drive and 
Lincoln Avenue. 
  44th Street Expressway, 5.1 miles: The General Plan extended the 44th Street 
Expressway south from National Avenue, through the Village of West Milwaukee and 
part of Milwaukee's Southwest Side, to a point south of Howard Avenue. There, it 
would connect to State Highway 36, also known as Loomis Road. 
  Northwest Expressway, 4.7 miles: Under the Commission's plan, the 
Commission would extend the northern half of the 44th Street Expressway from the 
Stadium Interchange to West Appleton Avenue/Highway 41 and then northwest to 
Capitol Drive. At a later time, the expressway could continue beyond Capitol Drive to 
connect with Highway 145 north of West Mill Road. 
  North Avenue Expressway, 2.6 miles: Running along a line north of North 
Avenue, the Expressway Commission intended this route to connect the North-South 
and Northwest Expressways. It was also expected to create an inner loop around part 
of the city's central business and commercial district. 
  Howard Avenue Expressway, 1.5 miles: Planned to run along another 
abandoned railroad right-of-way, the Lakeside belt line, the Howard Avenue 
70 
 
 
 
Expressway would connect the southern points of the 44th Street Expressway and 
North-South Expressway. 
  West Expressway: To accommodate rapid industrial and residential 
development in western Milwaukee County, the Expressway Commission intended 
this route to run east of 100th Street and South Barkenow Avenue from West National 
Avenue to a point south of North Avenue. It would thus pass through both West Allis 
and Wauwatosa, enter the Milwaukee County Grounds north of Blue Mound Road, 
and initially intersect with Highway 100.  
The Plan left room for future expansions of the expressway system, suggesting 
an extension of the Howard Avenue Expressway to continue along the Lakeside Belt 
Line westward from South 20th Street to connect with Highway 100. Likewise, a later 
extension of the West Expressway might travel farther north to intersect with 
Highway 100 at West Hampton Avenue. To supplement the 40-mile expressway 
network, the Commission also proposed several improvements to arterial streets, 
particularly on the South Side. Among the recommended improvements were: 
  Extension of Lincoln Memorial Drive over the harbor on a high level 
bridge, to connect with South Clement, Whitnall, Pennsylvania, and Nicholson 
Avenues and continue south to Ryan Road. 
  A short arterial between the proposed northern terminus of the North-South 
Expressway and Port Washington Road south of West Silver Spring Drive. 
  A new arterial connecting South Superior Street to Burnham Street, 
continuing west to into West Allis, where it would swing south and connect with 
Lincoln Avenue. 
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Figure 3: The 1955 General Plan for Expressways in Milwaukee County, proposing 
expressways to be built before 1980.18 
                                               
18 "General Plan for Milwaukee County Expressway System in 1980," Milwaukee County Expressway 
System, February 1955, Box 164, Folder 4, Zeidler Papers. 
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Expressway Commission Chairman Eliot G. Fitch listed the already-underway 
East-West Expressway as the top priority, followed by the North-South and 
Northwest routes, and noted construction of the 44th Street Expressway had also 
started. He believed the Commission and Milwaukee County could tackle several of 
the projects at once, and stated that prioritization of one project did not necessarily 
mean it would be completed first. Fitch also emphasized the need to complete the 
Stadium Interchange, saying Milwaukee had to be "big league" in handling not only 
its stadium and parking, but also its traffic.19 Less than two years earlier, the Boston 
Braves major-league baseball team had relocated to Milwaukee.20 
In addition to the approved system, earlier drafts of the General Plan suggested 
other freeway routes, but they were not included in the final, official version. 
Ammann and Whitney, for example, recommended another east-west route, along 
Good Hope Road from Port Washington Road to a connection with Highway 41, but 
ultimately omitted it. Likewise, they recommended a route along Layton Avenue east 
from South 20th Street to Pennsylvania Avenue, but that route also did not make it 
into the approved draft. Meanwhile, the Wisconsin Highway Commission, rather than 
the Milwaukee County Expressway Commission, assumed responsibility for 
developing a connecting north-south route through the North Shore suburbs, from 
Silver Spring Drive along North Port Washington Road to the county line.21 
In regard to its physical footprint, the majority of the expressway system was to be 
depressed or below ground, except in industrial areas, with landscaped slopes, 12-foot 
traffic lanes, and wide shoulders for snow removal and disabled vehicles. Speed limits 
                                               
19 "Commission Approves 40 Mile Freeway Plan," 25 February 1955, Milwaukee Journal, 
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were to be 50 miles per hour on the expressways themselves, and 35 miles per hour at 
interchanges. There were to be no cross streets and no parking allowed, while 
intersecting streets would pass over or under the expressways. The Commission 
anticipated interruptions in traffic flow only at two select locations: lift bridges 
crossing the Milwaukee River and North Menomonee Canal.22 
Several parties immediately expressed support for the system the Expressway 
Commission approved, while other groups objected. County Supervisor Bert Busby, 
frequently a spokesman for the suburban point of view on the County Board, 
indicated little objection would come from suburban governments. F.J. Sawyer, the 
project engineer for both consulting firms, promoted the system as a means to 
improve mass transit by relieving congestion and allowing freer movement of buses 
on city streets and as a way to tie scattered industrial areas together. Additionally, 
Sawyer advocated the expressways as a means of eliminating blight by acquiring wide 
rights-of-way through deteriorated neighborhoods, facilitating mass evacuation of the 
city in the event of an enemy attack, and serving as firebreaks in case of bombing.23  
Local newspaper columnist William Norris, writing in the Milwaukee Sentinel, 
also supported the proposal. He felt that the system, along with planned improvements 
to Highway 36/Loomis Road, would better link Greendale and Hales Corners, as well 
as northwestern Racine County, southeastern Waukesha County, and more even 
distant northeast Walworth County, to Downtown Milwaukee by eliminating traffic 
bottlenecks in southwestern Milwaukee County. Likewise, he praised the newly-
added West Expressway recommendation as an alternative to the increasingly 
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congested Highway 100.24 Several South Side businessmen, on the other hand, raised 
concerns about the North-South Expressway at the Commission meeting, immediately 
after the initial expressway presentation. Proposed to follow North 7th and 8th Streets 
on the North Side,25 cross the Valley at 11th Street, and run along South 16th and 20th 
Streets on the South Side, they opposed the southern leg's trajectory and wanted it 
moved eastward.26 
 
Funding 
In approving the General Plan, the Expressway Commission did not offer a 
cost estimate. During the February 24, 1955 Expressway Commission meeting at 
which the General Plan was approved, Chairman Fitch assured officials and the public 
that cost estimates would come later for each project, and that the Commission was 
committed to using available state and federal funds to pay for as much of the project 
as possible. He went on to state that the project might benefit from the "101 billion 
dollar, 10 year national road program which President Eisenhower has submitted to 
congress [sic]."27 
 It is noteworthy that Fitch referenced President Dwight D. Eisenhower's road 
program. Destined to pass as the Interstate Highway Act, which provided federal 
funding and oversight for both inter-urban and intra-urban freeways, the bill before 
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Congress would create the national system of controlled access, divided highways not 
only linking distant cities, but also cutting through existing urban areas. The freeway 
system planned at this time by Milwaukee County, in collaboration with the City of 
Milwaukee, suburban communities, and the State of Wisconsin, would eventually 
become a part of the Interstate System. However, the bill would not pass in the U.S. 
Congress until June 29, 1956, for which reason the expressways remained under local 
jurisdiction for more than another year.  
 In the meantime, the Milwaukee County Board passed a bond issue to serve as 
the County's contribution. The $4,850,000 issue, approved in June 1955, combined 
with a $2 million sum placed in the 1956 budget, was intended to meet the County's 
funding responsibilities through December 1956. The State of Wisconsin contributed 
$5,748,450 for that same period, while the federal government contributed 
$6,207,500.28 
 
Decentralization and the Suburbs 
This version of the expressway system fit well into the Socialists' vision for 
urban decentralization, the postwar trend of suburbanization and metropolitan growth, 
and the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the downtown area and elsewhere. 
The General Plan, which included additional routes such as the North Avenue and 
Northwest Expressways, still intended to provide relief to congested streets downtown 
and surrounding neighborhoods. However, routes on the edge of Milwaukee, such the 
West and Howard Avenue Expressways were to accommodate growth and growing 
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congestion along the urban boundary. The Plan linked those routes—and the distinct 
yet overlapping needs they addressed—into a single, integrated highway network. 
The General Plan further reflected the extent to which the priorities of 
planners, engineers, elected officials, and community members had shifted. In the 
1920s, Mayor Daniel Hoan envisioned a "great wide artery" from north to south, to 
alleviate traffic congestion. The traffic problem grew worse by the 1940s, prompting 
Milwaukee under Mayor Bohn to undertake a study of the problem. His successor, 
Frank Zeidler—like Hoan, a Socialist—continued the expressway construction 
program, despite reservations about the costs the city incurred. Yet by the mid-1950s, 
relieving congestion in the city was not the only goal of planners or policymakers; 
they wanted to facilitate longer commutes and other intra-urban travel from 
increasingly distant areas of the metropolitan area. 
It is also necessary to consider the expressway system in light of Zeidler's 
other priorities, such as improved public housing, elimination of blight, and 
annexation of surrounding townships. The Socialists' vision was not necessarily the 
suburbanization, per se, that followed World War II, but the postwar growth at the 
edge of the metropolitan area was also not entirely dissimilar from the 
decentralization of the metropolitan area desired by Hoan and Whitnall in the 1920s, 
Zeidler in the 1950s, and other Socialists. Whitnall in particular had always disliked 
the urban form of industrial cities and believed congestion was ruining urban 
America.  
Congestion, Whitnall said, was Milwaukee's most pressing problem, and he 
wanted to use planning and zoning to remedy it. Consequently, he supported a zoning 
ordinance promoting single-family homes, and pushed for planned decentralization. 
Decentralization of the urban area, Whitnall argued, brought urban residents closer to 
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nature and improved the quality of life for city residents.29 Thus Whitnall, his political 
ally, Mayor Hoan, and other Socialists after World War I implemented a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance to enable decentralization, while a major system of 
parks and parkways was to link those newly decentralized areas together. 
Additionally, Hoan began annexing open land surrounding city limits, intending his 
annexation campaign to be a means for the city to keep pace with metropolitan 
growth.30 Meanwhile, he also promoted a cooperative housing project, Garden 
Homes, as a means to alleviate housing congestion and slum conditions.31 
Zeidler's political priorities aligned with those of Milwaukee's previous 
Socialist leaders. After his election in 1948, his top priorities were addressing the 
post-World War II housing shortage and slum clearance, followed closely by urban 
growth.32 His campaign committee's platform did not contain any references to 
downtown redevelopment.33 Believing urban growth was essential to the city's long-
term health, Milwaukee under Zeidler annexed land rapidly, annexing an average of 
1,338 acres annually from 1948-1956. The program was as expensive as it was 
expansive, as annexation meant the city would need to extend services to developing 
or newly-developed areas; services such as police and fire protection, streets and 
sidewalks, schools, branch libraries, sewers, and especially water enticed surrounding 
townships to join Milwaukee rather than merge into another municipality or 
incorporate independently.34  
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Annexation was also one of Mayor Zeidler's priorities because he shared the 
views of earlier Socialists about decentralization. As more prosperous Milwaukee 
residents moved outward, by acquiring new lands, Milwaukee insured that at least 
some of them would remain in city limits. Moreover, during the Cold War era, he felt 
"planned decentralization" was important to civil defense, as the atomic bomb greatly 
threatened metropolitan areas.35 Political leaders elsewhere, encouraged by 
academics, shared his concern. As early as 1947, the National Security Council listed 
industrial dispersal as an important component to national defense. In 1951, a 
prominent physicist and two social scientists warned that in the event of an atomic or 
nuclear conflict, high-density urban areas "would become deathtraps."36 Urban 
planners agreed, with one professional planning journal publishing an article in 1950 
which similarly warned of the threat of atomic attack. Planners likewise argued before 
Congress in favor of housing dispersal. By the mid-1950s, federal housing and 
transportation policies, including the Interstate Highway Act, promoted 
decentralization.37 
The land acquisition Zeidler pursued also enabled Milwaukee to retain 
manufacturing jobs. The newly acquired vacant land increased Milwaukee's supply of 
property desirable for factories and other industrial plants seeking to locate, relocate, 
or expand in the city. From 1950-1960, Milwaukee gained 2,500 manufacturing jobs, 
while Chicago, in contrast, lost 90,000.38  
The decentralization Zeidler and other Socialists envisioned is not necessarily 
synonymous with postwar suburbanization. They are separate but overlapping 
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historical concepts, with the suburbanization of metropolitan Milwaukee and other 
cities falling with the broader movement toward deconcentration of jobs, 
manufacturing, and residential areas after World War II. A detailed discussion of 
suburbanization, its causes, and whether suburbanization preceded or followed 
expressway construction is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, to understand 
the place of the expressway in Milwaukee and other urban areas, it is necessary to 
understand the national trend of expressway construction in metropolitan areas at the 
same time those metropolises expanded exponentially. 
Mayor Zeidler favored comprehensive decentralization, including residential,  
industrial, and recreational development outside the city's inner core. Historian 
Kenneth Jackson places postwar suburbanization within that decentralization. 
Describing massive and sustained population growth as a condition, but not 
necessarily a cause, of suburbanization, he characterizes 20th century metropolitan 
growth as horizontal rather than vertical. He also describes the "suburban ideal," in 
which the American people seek the seemingly near-universal aspiration of a private 
dwelling and a proper balance between country and city, as another condition of 
suburbanization.39 He attributes the actual causes of suburbanization to racial 
prejudice and inexpensive housing. An influx of African-Americans into northern 
cities from southern states after World War I, followed by the desegregation of public 
schools ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Public Education 
decision in 1954, served as a major cause of suburbanization. Far more diverse than 
most cities in England, Germany, Japan, and other countries, American cities long had 
large minority populations, and the court-ordered busing and overall racial change in 
                                               
39 Jackson, 289. 
80 
 
 
 
American cities—especially northern cities—accelerated the process of middle class 
white Americans, driven by racial fears, fleeing the inner city.  
Perhaps even more so than race, economics also prompted suburbanization. As 
one of the most prosperous nations in history, with inexpensive land, affordable 
residential lots, and a vast middle class in the post-World War II era, the United States 
could afford the low density housing that England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Japan, and other industrial nations could not. In other words, as forests, 
farms, and open land have always been plentiful in the United States, unlike in Europe 
or Japan, abundant land has resulted in comparatively cheap land, enabling growth on 
the metropolitan fringe.40   
Kathleen Tobin agrees. Like Jackson, she attributes the causes of 
suburbanization to the postwar population boom, economic growth, and plentiful land 
and notes federal subsidies for suburban development, tax deductions for mortgage 
interest and property taxes, and federal spending on highway projects contributed to 
suburbanization, as well. Additionally, American cities encountered a set of 
challenges different from European and Asian cities in the years after World War II. 
While Europe and Japan experienced population growth too, the nations whose cities 
had been devastated by wartime bombing concentrated on rebuilding their urban 
centers. In contrast, the United States, untouched by air raids, initiated some urban 
renewal projects during and after the Great Depression, but was better positioned to 
concentrate on development outside the traditional urban centers, and did so.41 
Whatever the cause of suburbanization at the national level, Zeidler essentially 
sought to pursue a form of the suburban ideal but simultaneously keep people, jobs, 
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and industry within city limits. He wanted the city to grow in such a way that its 
newly developed areas would be largely suburban in character, but not in name, and 
include a significant amount of industry. The expressways were a component of that, 
and facilitated automobile transportation both within the city and between more 
distant areas of Milwaukee County and beyond. 
 
North-South Expressway 
Even so, several municipalities expressed concerns about the freeway routes to 
run through their jurisdictions. They did not necessarily oppose the freeways in 
principle, but objected to the proposed placements. Route selection for the North-
South Expressway in Milwaukee proved especially problematic, and its city 
government raised objections. Glendale and the Milwaukee County Park Commission 
also challenged sections of its route. On the opposite side of the county, Wauwatosa 
and West Allis voiced concerns about the West Expressway. Perhaps because it 
received the first priority, route placement for the North-South Expressway drew the 
most immediate and widespread concern. This thesis has thus far discussed in some 
depth the planning of the East-West Expressway and the history and need for the 
expressway system as a whole, so at this juncture, it is necessary to understand the 
planning of the North-South route and its effects. 
On the South Side, planners and elected leaders eventually decided to realign 
the Expressway route along South 6th Street, but only after considerable discussion 
and debate. Both sides, that is, those in favor of a 6th Street alignment and those in 
favor of a route near 16th Street, presented numerous pros and cons for each option, 
and seemingly did so with the best interests of the city as a whole in mind. Even so, 
the lengthy disagreement and the number of parties involved reflect the difficulty in 
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planning a major civic improvement such as constructing an expressway system in an 
urban area. 
The Expressway Commission's proposal to run the southern leg of the North-
South Expressway along 16th and 20th Streets was not new. The Origin-Destination 
Survey first proposed such a trajectory,42 and as far back as 1948, Raleigh Gamble 
envisioned the North-South route running close to the commercial areas near the 
intersections of 13th Street & Lincoln Avenue and 13th & Mitchell Streets on the South 
Side, 12th & Vliet Streets just north of downtown, and 20th Street & North Avenue a 
bit farther northwest.43 Subsequently, the 1949 De Leuw and Cather study proposed 
moving the route about ten blocks eastward, parallel to South 6th Street. Three years 
later, the Ammann and Whitney study revisited the original route, favoring an 
expressway similar to the one the Origin-Destination Survey suggested and 
considered by city planners: close to 16th Street but running gradually southwestward 
toward South 20th Street. After jurisdiction for expressway planning shifted from City 
to County government, the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors consulted 
another national firm, Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Hall, and MacDonald, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter. The firm also endorsed the 16th-20th Street route and estimated 
it to be $7,800,000 less expensive than an expressway along 6th Street.44 
The Milwaukee Board of Public Land Commissioners disagreed with the 
endorsement. They argued the 16th-20th Street route would be disruptive to existing 
zoning and could stimulate industrial development in areas intended for residential 
                                               
42 William Norris, "Land Commission Sets Up Old Road-Block on X-Way," 15 April 1955, Milwaukee 
Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19550415&id=a3BQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ww8EAA
AAIBAJ&pg=6763,7769777, accessed 12 October 2014. 
43 Letter from R.W. Gamble to Mayor Frank Zeidler, 1 June 1948, Box 164, Folder 1, Zeidler Papers. 
44 William Norris, "Land Commission Sets Up Old Road-Block on X-Way," 15 April 1955, Milwaukee 
Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19550415&id=a3BQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ww8EAA
AAIBAJ&pg=6763,7769777, accessed 12 October 2014. 
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use. Sixth Street, wrote Elmer Krieger, offered a more natural buffer between present 
and future industrial areas to the east and the residential neighborhoods and small 
businesses to the west. A freeway along 6th Street had the advantage of running 
adjacent to the Chicago, North Shore, and Milwaukee Railway right-of-way, which 
already separated existing neighborhoods and street communications.45 
 The Board cited a number of practical reasons for favoring the 6th Street route, 
as well. One important reason is that the concentration of trucking firms southeast of 
13th & Clybourn would be better served by the 6th Street alignment.46 More than ten 
percent of Milwaukee County's labor force or approximately 38,500 people, the Board 
noted, were employed at that time in the general area east of 6th Street and south of 
Florida Street, generating significant traffic. A 6th Street route would enable drivers to 
use the 6th Street viaduct as a feeder into downtown, making traffic more efficient, 
given that the central interchange would be nearby.  
Moreover, a freeway along 6th Street would not cut the commercial area 
around 11th and Mitchell Streets off from the customer base to its west the same way a 
route along 16th and 20th Streets would. A route along 16th and 20th Streets, 
meanwhile, was too close to the proposed 43rd Street route south of National Avenue 
to be economically justifiable. Lastly, the Milwaukee Board of Land Commissioners 
argued that a 6th Street route would take less park land than the 16th Street plan.47 
The opinion of the Board of Public Land Commissioners was an important 
part of the city's role in expressway route selection, even after Milwaukee County 
assumed responsibility for planning and construction. Initially known as the 
                                               
45 Some sources refer to the Chicago, North Shore, and Milwaukee Railway simply as the "North Shore 
Railroad." 
46 Letter from Milwaukee Board of Public Land Commissioners Executive Secretary Elmer Krieger to 
State Highway Commission, 22 June 1955, Box 5, Folder 8, Bender Papers. 
47 Ibid. The 16th-20th Street route would have run through the western section of Wilson Park, on the 
Far South Side. 
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Metropolitan Parks Commission, the Board of Land Commissioners, or Land 
Commission, formed in 1907 during the brief administration of Republican Mayor 
Sherburn Becker. State legislation in 1915 enabled it to become Milwaukee's official 
planning arm.48  
Milwaukee Sentinel columnist William Norris criticized the Land 
Commission's objections, however. He believed the uncertainty about the 
expressway's route was due to "stubborn opposition" by members of the 
Commission's technical staff, although he generally favored giving the Commission 
greater powers, and attributed the reason for the number of transportation studies 
undertaken to "confusion" on the part of the Milwaukee Common Council over the 
numerous conflicting opinions.49 Norris supported the 16th Street plan, favored by 
County government, stating that while the South 6th Street would serve the downtown 
and Mitchell Street business districts, the 16th Street plan would serve those same 
areas, as well as businesses on South 16th Street itself and the Southgate shopping 
center. He further argued that the 6th Street route would eliminate a larger total 
number of houses and residential units and speculated it would eliminate more stores 
and commercial properties than the 16th Street route. Even so, he conceded an 
expressway along 6th Street had the advantage of better serving the airport and Port of 
Milwaukee and would not take part of Wilson Park.50 
Likewise, Mayor Zeidler did not share the Land Commission's view. In June 
1955, he vetoed a Common Council resolution directing the Board of Land 
                                               
48 John McCarthy, "Dreaming of a Decentralized Metropolis," 44-45. 
49 William Norris, "Land Commission Sets Up Old Road-Block on X-Way," 15 April 1955, Milwaukee 
Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19550415&id=a3BQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ww8EAA
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Commissioners to represent the City of Milwaukee at State Highway Commission 
hearings. That same resolution prevented the Commissioner of Public Works and City 
Engineer from being heard at Highway Commission hearings, and while Zeidler did 
not object to members of the Board of Land Commissioners being heard at meetings, 
he did not agree with their position. Zeidler believed a route along 16th-20th Streets to 
be less expensive than along 6th Street. He further argued it would displace fewer 
residents and disrupt the South Side less than the 6th Street route.51  
Nevertheless, members of the Mitchell Street Association feared the 16th Street 
proposal.52 The route, they believed, gave better access to competitors at Southgate.53 
Conversely, Mayor Zeidler felt the 16th Street route would bring more business to the 
West Mitchell Street commercial corridor, rather than block it.54 The Association's 
concern was that an expressway along South 16th Street would block access to 
Mitchell Street from side streets, which at the time was the second largest shopping 
area in the city. Association member Henry Wojick also expressed concern that the 
route could adversely affect the business district on Lincoln Avenue. He favored the 
6th Street proposal, and like the Land Commission, felt it would better serve the 
industrial areas in the southeastern section of Milwaukee. 
Those concerns were aired officially at a meeting of the Milwaukee Common 
Council's Streets and Zoning Committee in April 1955, the first of several meetings 
on the matter. The Board of Land Commissioners raised several of its concerns, 
including that the expressway would run through Kosciuszko, Pulaski, and Wilson 
                                               
51 Veto message from Zeidler to Milwaukee Common Council, 20 June 1955, Box 164, Folder 4, 
Zeidler Papers. 
52 Letter from South Side resident Melvin Kwass to Traffic Engineer E.G. Plautz, 23 June 1955, Box 
164, Folder 4, Zeidler Papers. 
53 Developed in the 1950s, the Southgate shopping center near South 27th Street and West Morgan 
Avenue was one of the first shopping malls in the Milwaukee area. 
54  Letter from Zeidler to Melvin Kwass, 7 July 1955, Box 164, Folder 4, Zeidler Papers. 
86 
 
 
 
Parks. Alderman Patrick H. Fass, committee chairman, responded by calling another 
meeting with expressway officials to give them a chance to defend their preferred 
routes.55  
That meeting proved critical insofar as it offered planners, local leaders, and 
business groups the initial opportunity to publically air their concerns and present 
their views, while giving elected leaders the opportunity to vote on a particular aspect 
of expressway planning. Numerous stakeholders spoke, and from news accounts, it 
appears both sides took advantage of ample opportunities to express their views. Prior 
to the meeting, William Norris countered the Mitchell Street Association's objections 
in his Sentinel column. Agreeing that as a group, Mitchell Street merchants were 
generally civic-minded and reasonable, with far-sighted ideas, he disputed their 
assertion that the 16th Street expressway would serve as a sort of Chinese wall, 
forming a barrier between residents west of 16th Street and the businesses they were 
trying to reach. Sixteenth Street itself, he argued, was a barrier, carrying a high 
volume of vehicles, including truck traffic, and often delaying with heavy congestion 
eastbound or westbound motorists trying to get across 16th Street. A depressed 
expressway parallel to it, he believed, would allow traffic on most east-west streets to 
pass through without much interference from north-south traffic, enabling potential 
customers to better reach their destinations along Mitchell Street.56 
At the April 25, 1955 meeting, Milwaukee County Expressway Engineer 
Henry Wildschut, along with Fred Sawyer, the project engineer for Parsons, 
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Brinckerhoff, Hall & MacDonald and Ammann & Whitney, defended the 16th Street 
plan. Sawyer argued that the 16th Street route would preserve the arterial capacity of 
other major traffic-carrying streets, most notably South 6th Street, which would be 
disrupted if an expressway was built near it. Constructing along 16th Street would also 
save approximately $10 million. Moreover, he argued the 16th Street route better 
provided "balanced spacing" of major traffic arteries, given that it would be situated 
about halfway between the planned south extension of Lincoln Memorial Drive and 
the proposed 44th Street expressway. Sawyer went on to concede that the consultants 
had given the 6th Street route intensive, detailed study, and that it had merits, but that 
the consultants still believed a route near 16th Street was a superior choice.58 
Board of Land Commissioners Secretary Elmer Krieger rebutted their argument, 
clearly indicating several of the Board's key objections. They included: 
  The 16th Street would actually be too close to the 44th Street Freeway, 
creating a duplication of facilities. 
  A freeway along 6th Street would serve as a buffer between industry to the 
east and residential and business areas to the west. 
  Industry and trucking would be better served by the 6th Street route, which 
would be closer to the harbor and adjacent industrial areas. 
  Truck traffic from those areas would have to travel farther to get to a 16th 
Street expressway. 
  The 6th Street route eliminated a need for allowing truck traffic on the 
proposed outer harbor drive, regarded by the Board of Land Commissioners as a 
parkway. 
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  An expressway near South 6th Street better served Mitchell Field, Cudahy, 
and South Milwaukee. 
  That same route would better serve valuable but under-developed industrial 
areas in the former Town of Lake.   
Other representatives of the planning commission raised their own concerns. 
Planning engineer Robert Filtzer maintained that the proposed 6th Street route would 
actually cross the Menomonee Valley in the same place as if it were aligned along 
16th Street. Under the adjusted route, it would cross at about 11th Street but then swing 
eastward between West Bruce and West Virginia Streets and continue southward 
between South 5th and 6th Streets. Doing so would also allow the North Shore 
Railroad to relocate to the center of the freeway, Filtzer said. City planning director 
Alvin Bromm, meanwhile, argued the $10 million savings of the 16th Street route 
would be consumed by surface street construction nearby. Under the County plan, the 
16th Street project necessitated improvements to roads between 16th Street and Lake 
Michigan.59 
However, Sawyer defended the County's reasoning on those issues.  He stated 
the engineering consultants he represented already considered relocating the North 
Shore line, but rejected the idea because the future of the railroad was uncertain. He 
also disagreed with the argument that building along 16th Street would not actually 
save money because of the corresponding street improvements was not correct. 
Sawyer said that the freeway serves a specific function and not a solution for all 
traffic ills, stating, "Wherever the expressway goes, surface streets will have to 
supplement it."60 
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Local business leaders did not accept the County's argument. Mitchell Street 
Association members, joined by business owners from South 16th Street, South 
Muskego Avenue, and West Lincoln Avenue, supported the Land Commission's 
position. Realtor Herbert Engel downplayed the additional $10 million cost of the 6th 
Street plan, saying that in the overall picture of a $200 million program, $10 million 
was negligible. Robert Irwin of the Mitchell Street Advancement Association, 
meanwhile, argued that a 16th Street route would lead to an overconcentration of 
arterial routes in the central part of the South Side and may encourage trucking on 
surface streets. 
Community residents themselves were not unified, although a great many also 
preferred the 6th Street route. At the April 25, 1955 meeting, Chairman Fass asked for 
a show of hands to indicate support for the routes. A majority of the 40-50 people 
attending the meeting supported building the expressway along 6th Street, but 7-8 
individuals in attendance favored 16th Street.61 Another South Side resident argued for 
a route east of 6th Street, along 2nd and 3rd Streets for perhaps less business-minded 
reasons than the Land Commission and Mitchell Street Association. In her April 1955 
letter to the Mayor, she stated that the area east of 6th Street was becoming blighted, 
populated by "Mexicans and D. P.'s who have little care or finances to maintain 
property," and further complained that the only bank in the area was at 4th & 
National.62  
In contrast, resident L.J. Rugalski, of 1554 West Forest Home Avenue, 
objected to the 6th Street proposal. Constructing along 6th Street, he feared, could 
obstruct a school and two churches, including a local landmark, St. Josephat's 
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61 Ibid. 
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Basilica. In his opinion, businesses along Mitchell Street should not have had so much 
influence because they did not in fact own many of the buildings they occupied.63 He 
likewise criticized the higher cost of the 6th Street expressway, stating that the people 
who support should have to pay for it.64 
Ultimately, at their April 25, 1955 meeting, the Streets and Zoning Committee 
voted 5-1 to disapprove of the general expressway plan as submitted by the 
Milwaukee County Expressway Commission. Only Chairman Fass voted against the 
resolution. He felt the committee should approve the general expressway plan and 
dispute the South Side leg in question. Fass stated he recognized the reason the 
committee voted against the General Plan was due to residents' objections to the 
expressway leg, but he cautioned that by opposing the Plan as a whole, Council 
members would potentially send the wrong message to outsiders.  
The next day, the full Common Council passed, by a vote of 21-2, a resolution 
that rejected some portions of the expressway plan. The resolution did not specify 
which routes the Council opposed, but the vote was based on the objections to the 
southern leg of the North-South Expressway. The same resolution approved other 
expressway segments already under construction or planned for construction, 
including the East-West Expressway between North 6th Street and Hawley Road, and 
the 44th Street Expressway between National Avenue and Wisconsin Avenue.65 
 The Milwaukee County Expressway Commission's two consulting firms, 
Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Hall, and MacDonald and Amman and Whitney, responded by 
discussing the routes, as well as expressway costs, in their report in June of that year. 
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Overall, they anticipated a cost of $221,084,603 over a period of 25 years, from 1955-
1980, to build the Milwaukee County expressway network and envisioned a total of 
38.47 miles of four- and six-lane highways. The consultants also predicted a need for 
an expanded West Expressway before 1980.  
They directly criticized the 6th Street route, for several reasons. The consultants 
argued that by building the route further east, it would lengthen the proposed beltline 
connection along Howard Avenue between the 44th Street Expressway and the North-
South Expressway from 1.5 miles to 2.5 miles and require grade crossings at the 
North Shore and Milwaukee Road railroad crossings. The extra cost alone for that 
would be, in their estimate, $3 million. 
Additionally, the consultants countered the argument by the Land Commission 
and Mitchell Street Association that an expressway closer to 6th Street could better 
serve the Port of Milwaukee. They believed the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway 
might encourage growth of the Port and nearby industrial areas and that a more 
easterly expressway location could in fact inhibit westward expansion of the area and 
increase the traffic burden on nearby arteries by introducing tributary traffic on local 
streets. Even more traffic delays could result, they feared, as they anticipated the 
choice of 6th Street to entail two bascule bridges over the Menomonee River Valley 
rather than one. Other projects, they felt, provided adequate service to the port area. 
Those projects included the proposed southern extension of Lincoln Memorial Drive 
and a high level bridge over the harbor. Furthermore, they noted that the 6th Street 
viaduct was still to be widened, and there were proposed improvements for South 
Clement Avenue.66 
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Both sides—those for constructing the southern leg of the North-South 
Expressway along 16th Street and those believing it should be moved closer to 6th 
Street—ultimately had the opportunity to present their views to the Wisconsin 
Highway Commission. The Highway Commission held formal hearings on 
expressway route placement in June 1955, attended by Commission Chairman Harold 
Plummer and other state transportation officials, at the Milwaukee County 
Courthouse. Like the Common Council meetings, the hearings demonstrated the 
extent to which local highway planners and elected officials were divided on specific 
questions related to expressway construction.  
Although City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee County officials agreed generally 
that the area needed the higher speed, controlled access highways proposed and 
planned, they did not agree on specifics such as placement. As noted, the County had 
jurisdiction over the project and planned its routes based on the recommendations of 
the private consultants, but individual municipalities could dissent. Yet city 
government was divided, with the Land Commission and a majority of the Common 
Council in favor of a 6th Street route, while Mayor Zeidler, Acting Traffic Engineer 
Martin E. Bruening, and Commissioner of Public Works Walter Swietlik favored 16th 
Street. The hearing, which followed other meetings, consultants' reports, and a series 
of letters and statements by area residents and representatives of the business 
community, is also representative of the wider process of how Milwaukee County's 
freeway system was planned and constructed by leaders at the local level: bit by bit, 
with significant deliberation. It also reflects on the willingness of City, County, and 
State officials to consider the needs of the larger metropolitan area and its future 
growth, demonstrate some concern for constituents and neighborhood businesses, and 
if not compromise, than at least consider each side's view. 
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At the Commission hearing on June 22, 1955, South Side business leaders 
Robert Irwin of the Mitchell Street Advancement Association, Herbert Engel of the 
16th Street and Muskego Avenue Business Men's Association, and realtor Henry Irwin 
all spoke, indicating their objections to the route along 16th Street. Perry G. Anderson, 
Executive Secretary of the Downtown Association, contended that expressway plans 
needed to be revised to enable motorists to better enter and exit the downtown area. 
He stressed that his organization supported the East-West Expressway and the North-
South Expressway north of the Menomonee River, but complained that the issue of 
downtown access had not received sufficient attention up to that point. 
Milwaukee Board of Land Commissioners Executive Secretary Elmer Krieger 
spoke for the City and presented its already-established argument, but also added 
another view. He stated his belief that a 6th Street route would reduce truck traffic on 
the planned outer harbor drive outside the actual harbor area, given that the 
expressway could serve as an "all-purpose traffic carrier."67 Alderman Fred Meyers, a 
supporter of the 6th Street route, likewise spoke. He told the Wisconsin Highway 
Commission that it was a mistake to place one freeway along South 44th Street and 
another nearby, along South 20th Street. He even ventured the highway commissioners 
were missing the point of the broader expressway project by planning the two routes 
so close together, asking, perhaps sarcastically, "Is it for the purpose of selling real 
estate in the Village of Greendale?"68 
In response to the objections, Milwaukee County Expressway Commission 
Chairman Elliot Fitch stated that the southern half of the North-South Expressway had 
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received intensive study, more than any other section of the system. He said 16th 
Street had been found preferable and noted "You can't build an expressway without 
hurting somebody."69 Mayor Zeidler, meanwhile, complained that other City planning 
staff were not able to testify. The Common Council, he alleged, decided that the staff 
could attend the meeting to sit and listen, but not answer fundamental questions. 
Alderman Fred Meyers, who supported the 6th Street route, rejected Zeidler's 
assertion. He stated that the majority of the Council believed they should appear at the 
hearing and answer all questions, but not as official representatives of the City.70 
In order to accommodate both sides and give each argument consideration, 
Harold Plummer promised several weeks of study by State Highway Commission 
members and the Commission's engineers. They also requested written reports from 
Swietlik and Bruening. After that time, Plummer pledged the Highway Commission 
would make a recommendation on the expressway route.71 
 
Objections to Other Routes 
The location of southern leg of the North-South Expressway was not the only 
route about which Milwaukee-area residents and elected officials were concerned. 
Four suburban communities—West Milwaukee, West Allis, Wauwatosa, and 
Glendale—also raised questions about route placements and planning the system as a 
whole. Additionally, the Milwaukee County Parks Commission objected to the loss of 
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park land and lobbied to relocate some of the routes to preserve as much open space 
in the city as possible. 
The Village of West Milwaukee's primary objection was that the 44th Street 
Expressway, bisecting the Village on a north-south trajectory, would have a highly 
negative effect on the small community. Like the City of Milwaukee, suburban 
communities had the opportunity to present their concerns to the Expressway 
Commission at the June 1955 hearings, and they did so. West Milwaukee Village 
President Charles J. Becker stated that he supported the plan as a whole, but he 
contended that the 44th Street Expressway did not need to extend south of National 
Avenue through the Village at that time. By rebuilding National Avenue, removing 
streetcars from it, and completing other street improvement projects, he felt traffic 
needs in the village would be addressed for several years. In 1953, the Village had 
retained its own consulting firm, Klug and Smith, whose study indicated the Village 
could improve and widen existing streets into connections with the Expressway, 
addressing traffic needs as far into the future as 1980.72  
  With a population of less than 6,000 at that time,73 Becker was concerned 
about the impact on Village residents and businesses, as well. As it was proposed, 
creation of the 44th Expressway right-of-way entailed demolishing a number of 
residential homes in the Village. Citing a study in 1953 by Joseph Schwel, principal 
of West Milwaukee High School, Becker contended that 23 businesses and 159 
homes would have to be removed, displacing 820 people in 219 families, a number 
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equal to about 15% of the Village's population. Many of the displaced, he said, were 
elderly persons living on fixed incomes, who had no means to purchase or build new 
homes. Additionally, a number of residents preferred to remain in the Village but 
would not be able to because of a shortage of available lots. He said he had already 
been told by Expressway Commission personnel that a freeway through West 
Milwaukee would not be needed for 15 years, and he believed it should be subject to 
review before then. Consequently, his solution to the issue was to place the route 
through the Village on "a tentative basis" and not take any private property.74 Overall, 
he supported the General Plan for the expressway system, but objected to the timing 
of construction through West Milwaukee. 
Becker was not alone in his views. The Village Board concurred with his 
position, as did Milwaukee County Supervisor Bert Busby. Busby, a Village resident, 
also generally supported the expressway system but believed the metropolitan area 
needed the East-West and North-South Expressways first and that they should receive 
top priority. Consequently, Busby objected to shifting the North-South Expressway 
along 16th and 20th Streets eastward to parallel, South 6th Street, fearing the shift 
would accelerate construction of the 44th Street Expressway.75 His views were already 
widely known. While the City of Milwaukee was still planning the expressway 
system, he opposed the Stadium Interchange, and in early 1954 encouraged the City 
to focus on the East-West Expressway. His argument at that time was that by 
completing the Stadium Interchange, the City would commit Milwaukee County, after 
the transfer of expressway jurisdiction, to completing a Milwaukee-sponsored system 
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cutting through West Milwaukee. At that time, Milwaukee County Assistant 
Corporation Counsel C. Stanley Perry stated that the Expressway Commission was 
bound to complete work already started, while Mayor Zeidler urged cooperation 
between the municipalities, and indicated a willingness to adjust routes entering West 
Milwaukee.76 
In any case, the Milwaukee Journal criticized West Milwaukee's reluctance at 
the Expressway Commission hearings to allow the 44th Street Expressway to pass 
through its borders. The impact on approximately 218 families was small compared to 
the needs of the metropolitan area as a whole. The issue should be considered on a 
metropolitan basis, and "tiny minority desires" should not be allowed to hold up the 
entire expressway program, the paper argued.77 After the hearing, the Highway 
Commission did not take any immediate action, given that the 44th Street route was 
not immediately needed, and the North-South Expressway was the route receiving the 
most study at that time.78 
The Village of West Milwaukee was not the only suburban community in 
Milwaukee County to object to the General Plan. Glendale expressed concerns about 
the General Plan, as well. Its leaders' and residents' objections concerned the 
placement of the North-South Expressway through residential areas and the effect on 
the parks in Glendale. 
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Like Milwaukee, Glendale held a local-level public hearing in April 1955 to 
address residents' concerns. More than 250 residents attended. The process was 
similar: the Glendale Common Council had 60 days to approve or reject the proposal, 
and if it rejected the tentative expressway plans, the matter would be sent to the state 
highway commission for a determination. At the April 11, 1955 meeting, Peter Day, 
president of the expressways committee of the Glendale Advancement Association, 
presented a petition signed by 241 area residents objecting to the North-South 
Expressway's trajectory through the municipality. 
Under the proposed plan, the North-South Expressway was to enter Glendale 
west of North Port Washington Road near North 6th and 7th Streets, pass over the 
Milwaukee River, through the east side of Lincoln Park, and under the North Western 
Railroad to connect with the proposed Highway 141 near Lexington Boulevard. 
Residents objected strongly, particularly to the effect on Lincoln Park. Calling the 
plan an "invasion" of Lincoln Park, Day lamented that it would disrupt the Lincoln 
Park Golf Course, one of the few public golf courses in Milwaukee County, and 
charged that the expressway system was being planned with a "very casual attitude 
toward parks," in general.79 Day further stated that the route would destroy a beautiful 
and valuable residential area and inhibit the growth of industrial areas by curving 
around them. Glendale Alderman Lloyd A. Sweeny, meanwhile, suggested running 
the North-South Expressway above Port Washington Road as an elevated, but 
Wildschut explained that the cost would be prohibitive. To create adequate 
foundations for an elevated structure, sewers, water mains, and utility lines would 
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have to be moved, he said. He further downplayed the impact on the City of Glendale, 
noting that it would be four to five years before any major construction would begin.80 
The City of Glendale's counter proposal was relatively simple: shift the route 
eastward. The Glendale Common Council voted unanimously in June of that year to 
amend the North-South Expressway's trajectory to parallel Port Washington Road on 
the east side of the street, and run partly below grade and partly at surface level. Near 
the north end of Glendale, it would curve closer to the eastern edge of Lincoln Park, 
in order to preserve as much green space as possible. Glendale's Common Council did 
not stand alone in advocating for the change. Mayor Gerald J. Kenehan concurred 
with the Common Council, and spoke for the city at the expressway commission 
hearings. Like his counterpart in West Milwaukee, he did not oppose the expressway 
system as a whole, but a segment of the section that ran through Glendale.81 
In contrast to Milwaukee, West Milwaukee, and Glendale, two suburban 
communities in western Milwaukee County offered objections to the General Plan 
that concerned not where the routes were to run, but where they did not run. At that 
time, western Milwaukee County was experiencing significant population and 
business growth, meaning higher traffic counts. As a result, both West Allis and 
Wauwatosa felt that the proposal for the West Expressway was insufficient, and 
wanted it extended farther through their communities. 
From a population of 13,745 in 1920 and 34,671 in 1930,82 West Allis had 
grown to 42,959 residents by 1950, making it the seventh-largest city in Wisconsin.83 
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It was also home to Allis-Chalmers, a major manufacturer and employer. Like 
Milwaukee under Mayor Zeidler, West Allis sought to annex new land as it grew. 
When two large manufacturers announced in 1950 their intention to locate plants in 
the Town of Greenfield, West Allis attempted—unsuccessfully—to annex the land on 
which they were to build. The Village of West Milwaukee ultimately extended its 
municipal borders southwest to include the future General Electric and Hotpoint 
properties, but West Allis subsequently sought 13.5 square miles elsewhere in the 
Town of Greenfield, just to keep Milwaukee from acquiring it during the metropolitan 
area's city-suburb annexation war in the 1950s.84 
Wauwatosa, meanwhile, was also emerging. Initially settled in 1837, 
Wauwatosa incorporated as a village in 1882 and as a city in 1897, beginning as an 
industrial community along the Menomonee River, with water from the river 
supplying power to local businesses The Watertown Plank Road and Milwaukee and 
Mississippi Railroad encouraged additional growth.85 By the 1920s, it gained a 
reputation as a bedroom community of Milwaukee.86 As Milwaukee expanded 
westward during the 1920s, Wauwatosa also expanded, annexing land near Blue 
Mound Road, south of the original village.87 
It grew substantially in the first half of the 20th century, from a population of 
3,346 in 1910 to 21,194 in 1930.88 Feeling threatened by Milwaukee during the larger 
city's postwar annexation campaign, many Town of Wauwatosa residents felt inclined 
to join the city of Wauwatosa. In 1953, Wauwatosa successfully annexed 8.5 square 
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miles of the Town, including the site for what is now Mayfair Mall.89 Partly due to the 
annexation, Wauwatosa's population increased by 60% from 1950-1954, from 33,324 
to 53,200.90  
Wauwatosa disagreed not with the route selection for the West Expressway, 
but with the fact the route did not extend farther north. Under the County's initial 
proposal, the West Expressway was to enter Wauwatosa near Blue Mound Road and 
run generally northwest toward Highway 100, terminating south of West North 
Avenue. Mayor William B. Knuese believed the route was too short and should 
continue to a point beyond West Hampton Avenue.91 Predicting increased traffic on 
and near Highway 100, Wauwatosa traffic consultant George Barton stated the 
extended West Expressway would be necessary between 1968 and 1975. Mayor 
Knuese agreed and urged the Expressway Commission to extend the route based on 
his concern that in the future, higher costs of right-of-way acquisition might make 
costs prohibitive. To justify his argument, he cited the large residential, industrial, and 
commercial developments north of North Avenue. 
West Allis had similar reasoning for wanting the West Expressway to continue 
farther through its territory. Under the General Plan, the West Expressway was to 
terminate near National Avenue, 92 but the West Allis Common Council favored 
extending it as far as West Oklahoma Avenue, the southern boundary of the suburb. 
Fred Sawyer defended the County's proposal, contending that traffic counts did not 
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warrant building the route so far south. Instead, it was to be built in such a way as to 
allow future extensions. Mayor Arnold Klentz and City Attorney George Schmus 
asserted, however, that Highway 100 was already overloaded in that area, and police 
encountered difficulty managing weekend traffic along the thoroughfare.93 
The Milwaukee County Parks Commission objected to aspects of the General 
Plan as well, due to the fact that it would have an adverse impact on several parks 
within the Milwaukee County Parks System. It was Parks Commission President 
Walter Bender’s opinion that the Parks Commission and the Milwaukee County 
Expressway Commission should cooperate but interfere as little as possible in each 
other's business.94 He also agreed with the Wisconsin Highway Commission's 
position that more could be accomplished through informal conferences between the 
Parks and Expressway Commissions than through formal hearings,95 although like 
local governments, the Parks Commission did hold a joint meeting with the County 
Highway Commission in June 1955. 
The Parks Commission's concerns centered around the potential loss of parks 
land at numerous sites: Lincoln Park, which as already discussed would be affected by 
the North-South Expressway; Washington and Jackson Parks, which were to be 
affected by extensions of the 44th Street Expressway; Wilson Park, a portion which 
would have been affected by the debated South 16th-20th Street segment of the North-
South Expressway; Red Arrow Park,96 which was to be entirely consumed by the 
North-South Expressway; Currie Park and the Menomonee River Parkway, which 
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were endangered by potential extensions of the West Expressway; and the new 
Milwaukee County Zoo site, affected by the East-West and West Expressways. The 
Commission lobbied strongly for adjustments to the proposed routes in an effort to 
preserve as much parkland as possible. Furthermore, the Parks Commission 
demanded reimbursement for lost land and insisted that it receive compensatory land, 
in order to replace land lost to the new freeways with parks elsewhere within its 
jurisdiction. 
Along with the City of Glendale, the Parks Commission disagreed with the 
placement of the North-South Expressway through Lincoln Park. Although Glendale 
residents were somewhat divided on the expressway routing issue, Glendale's 
government opposed it, partly because it would take about 400 feet at the northwest 
corner of the park, including the tip of the lagoon,97 as well as four holes at the 
Lincoln Park Golf Course. In total, Lincoln Park was to lose over 20 of 309.3 acres, 
an area equal to about 7% of the park's total land. The effect on Wilson Park was to be 
even greater, with the Expressway consuming 14.80 acres, or 19%, of the 78.5-acre 
park. 
At the same time, the Parks Commission anticipated significant damages to 
Washington and Lincoln Parks from the 44th Street/Northwest Expressway. Under the 
General Plan, the expressway was to take 27.65 acres, or 13%, of Washington Park's 
land area. Jackson Park, on the South Side, was to lose a similar proportion, 14.76 or 
about 12% of its land area.98 The land the expressway was to take at Jackson Park 
included part of a wooded area near South 43rd Street, along with land adjoining a 
school in the southwestern corner of the park, at 43rd Street and West Forest Home 
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Avenue. Taking that land, wrote Parks Commission landscape architect Howard 
Gregg, might require giving that school other land in compensation. There were 
limited alternatives to the route, though. Construction on the west side of South 43rd 
Street was an option; however, Gregg implied a reluctance to do so, noting the west 
side of the street had some "nice homes."99  
Expressway placement near the new Milwaukee County Zoo site, on 
Milwaukee's Far West Side, also concerned commission members. The North-South 
and East-West Expressways had the potential to create more traffic in that area, wrote 
Parks Commission General Manager Alfred Boerner.100 Traffic layouts along the 
West Expressway, including exits at either Blue Mound Road or Wisconsin Avenue, 
were likely to make pedestrian and auto access to the Zoo more difficult. Boerner also 
opposed taking Zoo land for the Expressway because it was needed for parking.101 
At the June 1955 Expressway Commission hearing on damage to the park 
system, Commission President Walter Bender presented his concerns and detailed the 
parks and property to be lost. He also emphasized his point that the park system 
should receive compensatory land for acres lost to expressway construction. Bender 
and the Parks Commission members further pledged to work together to minimize 
damage to the parks. Speaking for the Expressway Commission, Elliot Fitch said his 
agency's objective was to do the least amount of damage possible to the parks. 
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Concerned about the possible post-1980 extension of the West Expressway 
through Wauwatosa, Bender advocated for a modification of the potential future route 
to preserve the Currie Park Golf Course and Menomonee River Parkway. 
Recognizing that some land might be lost to the West Expressway, Bender stated he 
supported acquiring new land to offset those losses. He specifically recommended 
purchasing undeveloped land south of Currie Park. Expressway Commission member 
Robert Stevenson countered that post-1980 extensions fell outside of the Expressway 
Commission's purview, because it was charged with the specific task of planning an 
expressway system to be built before 1980. Thus, he said there was no need to 
consider extensions or modifications to them yet.   
 Yet Bender was not just concerned about expressways to be built or extended 
after 1980. He was equally concerned about more immediate damage to other parks in 
the system. Jackson, Lincoln, and Washington Parks, in particular, were top priorities. 
Land losses at Wilson Park and a yet-undeveloped park on the Northwest Side also 
concerned him. In regard to the southern segment of the 44th Street Expressway, 
Bender supported a slight westward shift to preserve a wooded area in Jackson Park 
and reduce the impact on a school in the southwest corner of the park. His solution at 
Wilson Park was similar: move the southern terminus of the North-South Expressway 
slightly west, to preserve the vista of the lagoon.  
Two of his other recommendations for preserving park properties included not only 
route modifications, but new land acquisitions as well. He directly addressed Alfred 
Boerner's concerns about taking land at the new zoo site at the meeting by suggesting 
the purchase of additional property. Bender further recommended adjusting one lane 
of the nearby freeway interchange.102 For Lincoln Park, Bender's supported Glendale's 
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position that the North-South Expressway needed to be moved eastward. He noted the 
loss of the nine-hole golf course at the park but proposed buying land north of the 
Northwest Railroad for a golf course expansion.103  
His goal of replacing lost land fit into the Park Commission's overall plans. As 
the metropolitan area's population grew, the Commission sought to expand the 
amount of public green space and intended to acquire additional park land in several 
areas elsewhere in County. However, growth in Milwaukee County was already so 
rapid that Bender was concerned that even if the Parks Commission received 
compensation for lost land, gaining new land might be difficult. Thus, expressway 
construction and the land that the parks were to potentially lose set back the Park 
Commission's long-term plans. For that reason, he argued the Commission should be 
given new land right away. In particular, the undeveloped land south of Currie Park 
interested him because it was available "at a reasonable price."104 Meanwhile, the 
County Board allocated $65,000 to the Parks Commission for additional land 
purchases: four acres on the west bank of the Milwaukee River between West Green 
Tree and Good Hope Roads, 36 acres along the Root River east of Highway 100 and 
north of West Coldspring Road, and several lots along Lincoln Creek.105 
 Even with the additional funds for land acquisition, the Park Commission had 
reservations about expressway program's impact on the park system. After the County 
Board finalized the routes proposed in the General Plan, the Commission still lobbied 
to minimize losses. Bender disagreed with one of the Expressway Commission 
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members, Robert Stevenson, who stated that some of the expressway routes were 
tentative and not to be constructed for a long time, thereby downplaying the need for 
immediate compensation to the Park Commission. Bender simply felt there should be 
a greater sense of urgency.106 Later that year, the Park Commission formally asked the 
County Board to compensate the Park Commission in its planned budget for the 
expressway system and argued that the money should come from expressway 
funds.107 After the Board approved the final routes, the Parks Commission maintained 
its position and assured the Board it did not want to obstruct expressway construction 
by delaying budget decisions. The Commission pledged not to bring modification 
requests directly to the Board as long as the Board did not foreclose on the Park 
Commission's ability to hold informal conferences with the Expressway Commission 
to discuss modifications, as the two commissions pledged to do at the time of the June 
1955 hearings. In other words, the Park Commission wanted continued flexibility.108 
 
Continued Planning 
After the June hearings, the State Highway Commission studied the 
recommendations made by the units of local government which had presented 
concerns about the General Plan and the freeway routes it proposed. Ultimately, it 
accepted the arguments against the 16th Street plan and recommended a freeway route 
along South 6th Street. County Supervisor Bert Busby objected to changes, as did 
Mayor Zeidler. However, Zeidler expressed a view that the County Board's Highways 
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Committee should accept the changes as long as the right to amend was guaranteed 
through the Expressway Commission.  
In the opinion of Corporation Counsel C. Stanley Perry, the Milwaukee 
County Expressway Commission actually did have authority to make minor changes 
to accommodate engineering problems but could not make large-scale changes or 
alter the selected routes independently. Major changes needed to originate with the 
Expressway Commission, but required County Board approval. Additionally, because 
the Milwaukee County Board had jurisdiction over funding the expressway system, it 
had final control of the construction program. The only route the County Board did 
not have jurisdiction to change, stated Perry, was the East-West Expressway, because 
its construction was already underway when the County assumed planning 
responsibility from the City of Milwaukee.109 
The State Highway Commission proposed a series of other modifications, and 
the County Board ultimately incorporated those modifications into its revised plan for 
the expressway system. The Board approved that plan unanimously on November 16, 
1955. Even Supervisor Busby, who objected to shifting the 16th Street route of the 
North-South Expressway eastward because he feared doing so might hasten the need 
for constructing the 44th Street Expressway through his native Village of West 
Milwaukee, voted for the plan, stating his confidence that the State Expressway 
Commission would revisit the issue.110  
As noted, one of the most significant changes was to the southern leg of the 
North-South Expressway. The Board did not fix the Expressway's exact alignment, 
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but in keeping with the State Highway Commission's recommendation, established its 
placement closer to South 6th Street, with the intention of hiring another consulting 
firm to determine a precise alignment. The Board's action did fix the other freeway 
routes. In western Milwaukee County, the Board extended the West Expressway in 
both directions. Under the revision, it would continue southward to West Beloit Road 
and north to an interchange in Granville, near the intersection of West Appleton 
Avenue and West Mill Road. On the South Side, the Board extended the Howard 
Avenue Expressway, as well.  
In regard to funding, the State Highway Commission indicated that $10 
million more could be spent on expressway construction in 1956 and was to include 
an additional $2 million in the county budget for right-of-way acquisition for routes to 
be built two to five years into the future. The rationale for making those purchases so 
far in advance was similar the Park Commissioners' reasoning for wanting immediate 
compensation for lost park land: vacant lots were relatively inexpensive, but after they 
were built on, acquiring land for a right-of-way would be much more expensive. The 
County was also to receive an increased share of federal funds. 
The County Board made other decisions related to expressway construction at 
that time. One important decision was a significant increase in the number of 
expressway engineering and technical staff. The County already had ten expressway 
staff members, but the Board approved hiring an additional 16 individuals. In regard 
to funding, the Board approved a resolution to pay the City of Milwaukee 
$241,143.25 as the first of ten equal installments payments to reimburse it for costs it 
incurred in expressway construction. 
The decision to approve the revised expressway plan was very much a turning 
point in the construction of the County-wide system. By doing so, local government 
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positioned itself to undertake, in a far more comprehensive way and with the full 
support of state government, the massive infrastructure improvement project that the 
City of Milwaukee had begun to plan nearly a decade earlier. As County Supervisor 
Richard J. White Jr. observed, "I think the board has made history."111 Expressway 
Commission Chairman Elliot Fitch also expressed relief that the action had been 
passed and indicated that he was happy about unanimous approval.  
With the final routes established, the County could move forward with right-
of-way acquisition, grading, and actual construction. In 1956, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Interstate Highway Act, involving the federal government in the 
construction or expressways between cities as well as within the cities which had 
already started their own construction projects. By 1957, Milwaukee's system began 
to be linked to that national program, particularly as federal highway aid increased. 
Within a few years, at the national level, public opinion also shifted, from a general 
enthusiasm toward the massive road building projects, to a skepticism and even 
opposition to them, especially in metropolitan areas. In Milwaukee, planners and 
elected officials were to face strong objections to several routes, including the North 
Avenue Expressway, and another route, along the lakefront, to be added to the 
expressway building program after the federal government became more involved. 
Yet at the end of 1955, Milwaukee could boast that it had formulated a 
comprehensive plan for relieving congestion and linking far-flung areas of the 
metropolitan area. Government bodies, specifically, the City of Milwaukee, followed 
by Milwaukee County, consulted expert engineers and planners, sought public 
opinion, collaborated with suburban governmental bodies, and when they could not 
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agree among themselves, followed the recommendations of the State Highway 
Commission. That process is important to understand.  
The engineers who proposed the General Plan were private consultants, who 
had been retained by the County to make specific recommendations that the County 
was not prepared to make. When the City of Milwaukee, the Milwaukee County Park 
Commission, and several suburbs challenged their recommendations, the consultants 
defended their assertions, which were based on months of work. The Expressway 
Commission and several elected officials, notably Mayor Zeidler, also maintained that 
the County should follow their recommendations. One can raise several questions as 
to why. Did those elected officials simply believe the consultants made the correct 
recommendations, and those objecting lacked foresight, or a comprehensive 
understanding of the matter? Or did the objectors have only self-interest in mind, with 
less concern about the construction program as a whole? Certainly, officials and 
constituents in Glendale and West Milwaukee were very concerned about the impact 
of the expressway on their relatively small communities. The Mitchell Street 
Advancement Association was concerned about the North-South Expressway's impact 
on business. The Parks Commission was concerned about the effect of construction 
on properties within its jurisdiction, but those park properties served the general 
public, offering open space, recreational opportunities, and aesthetic value. All of 
those considerations, while disparate, were important, certainly in the minds of the 
substantial number of people expressing them. Even so, the Expressway Commission 
maintained that its consultants' recommendations were superior to the proposed 
alternatives, primarily in regard to the southern leg of the North-South Expressway, 
and to an extent, the extensions of the West Expressway in Wauwatosa and West 
Allis.  
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Such disparity of thought, between the Expressway Commission and its 
consulting engineers, and planning bodies such as the Milwaukee Board of Land 
Commissioners, was not uncommon at the time. As historian Mark Rose notes, there 
was general agreement in the business and political community in favor of urban 
renewal and traffic relief, and that expressway construction served that end. However, 
leaders were effectively divided into two camps: engineers and truck operators on one 
side, and urban planners on the other.112 The engineers generally favored direct route 
placements, while planners wanted to use expressways to tie different areas together 
and serve as barriers between industrial, commercial, and residential districts. Those 
different lines of thought were especially evident in Milwaukee in the debate between 
the 6th and 16th Street routes. Rose argues that after 1950, engineers generally exerted 
greater influence on the policy makers, citing such factors as cost, efficiency, and 
traffic flow.113 
In Milwaukee, though, that was not the case. The County Board, at the urging 
of the State Highway Commission, changed plans and factored in the concerns of the 
affected municipalities. Of course, the ability of those municipalities to react, even 
negatively, to the Expressway Commission's plans had been built into the process. At 
least through 1955, local governments had the opportunity to object to planned routes 
and have their objections heard. 
After the hearings concluded and counter-proposals were evaluated, the 
County still moved forward with construction, for a relatively short time, under its 
own authority, and later with greater oversight from the state and federal 
                                               
112 Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1941-1956 (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press 
of Kansas, 1979), 56. 
113 Rose, 56. 
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governments. After that happened, there was still significant debate and discussion. 
That narrative will be explored in the concluding chapter of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A view toward downtown from a pedestrian bridge over I-43 at West 
Warnimont Avenue. Photo by Greg Dickenson, 2013. 
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Chapter 3 
Referendum and Revolt: Anti-Freeway Sentiment, Route Completion, and an 
End to Expressway Construction in Milwaukee 
The first two chapters of this thesis discussed the background of the 
expressway system in Milwaukee County, the Origin-Destination Survey and 
subsequent studies that recommended specific routes, and the planning of those 
routes. The thesis also discussed the views of Milwaukee's elected leaders, the 
perspectives of planning engineers, and concerns raised by local businesses and 
residents. The focus of those chapters has been on route selection and the reasons why 
those routes were selected.  
The third and final chapter of this thesis will shift the discussion from route 
selection to the implications of those decisions and the impact on the community. It 
will consider the large-scale impact on the Milwaukee metropolitan area, such as the 
loss of homes in areas where new rights-of-way were created and the role expressway 
construction had on encouraging suburbanization and sprawl in southeast Wisconsin. 
This discussion will necessarily entail the effect the U.S. Interstate Highway Act had 
on planners' decision making, and how some routes were modified to gain federal 
highway funding. Of particular interest are the disproportionate impact of 
displacement due to right-of-way acquisition on the African American community and 
citizen opposition to several routes, notably the North Avenue Expressway1 and a 
proposed extension of the harbor bridge that was to run north of the harbor along the 
shore of Lake Michigan.2 
                                               
1 Also known as the Park West Freeway, the land for this route was cleared but the actual project was 
abandoned. 
2 Patricia House offers a detailed study of displacement caused by expressway construction. See 
Patricia A. House, Families Displaced by Expressway Development: A Geographical Study of 
Relocation in Milwaukee (M.S. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1972). 
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Chapter Three also attempts to link together several other threads in the larger 
story of expressway construction in Milwaukee and nationwide. One of those threads 
is the "expressway revolts" that took place in numerous cities, including Milwaukee.3 
In doing so, it places the Milwaukee freeway construction narrative alongside other 
cities with similar transportation history narratives. Another thread is the suburban 
sprawl encouraged by expressway construction in metropolitan areas. As noted in 
Chapter Two, historians such as Kathleen Tobin have linked expressway construction 
to suburbanization, but other factors including sustained population growth, abundant 
land, and the desegregation of public schools in 1954 brought enabled suburban 
growth even before expressway construction began in Milwaukee and elsewhere. This 
chapter seeks to place Milwaukee within that broader national context while 
highlighting factors that differentiated it from other cities.  
 
Continued Planning 
 After the County Board approved the final routes, the Expressway 
Commission continued to tweak specific expressway locations at the behest of other 
governmental bodies and local residents. The Northwest Expressway received 
particular attention as both residents and the Milwaukee County Park Commission 
expressed objections to its trajectory. The Park Commission and Expressway 
Commission hit a particular point of concern in early 1956 over the Expressway's 
placement through Washington Park. 
 Plans to begin construction announced in the media drew the Park 
Commission's attention because the body worried about the loss of parkland and 
                                               
3 Citizen opposition to large scale housing demolition in urban areas, forced relocation of residents, and 
environmental impact beginning in the late 1950s resulted in grassroots movements, and later, political 
and legal challenges, against constructing expressways through large cities. See Raymond Mohl, "Stop 
the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities," Journal of Urban History 30 (2004): 674-706. 
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wanted a definite statement of construction plans. Routing of the expressway called 
for taking the Milwaukee County Zoo's pump and well house,4 which the Expressway 
Commission considered more economical to replace than private property. The 
original Ammann & Whitney study actually took 20.5 acres of park property and over 
six acres of playground space, at a cost of $3.5 million. Parks Commission Chairman 
Walter Bender preferred to protect as many acres of park land as possible. He argued 
Washington Park served a densely populated neighborhood, and even without plans 
for the Stadium Freeway/Northwest Expressway to be built through the park, the 
amount of public green space available in that area of Milwaukee's West Side was 
below generally accepted national standards.   
Yet Bender's priority of protecting that land came conflict with the preferences 
of the Expressway Commission. Simply stated, the Expressway Commission 
preferred to use park acres for financial reasons. It generally followed the Ammann 
and Whitney proposal and intended to use North 47th Street west of the park as a 
feeder street. Their rationale was that by using park land, the Commission could save 
money by not purchasing houses west of the park, given that many of those houses 
were "very fine homes."5  
Several alternative routes also existed to reduce the amount of park land used, 
but at least two of them increased costs measurably. One alternative was to eliminate 
the Vliet Street police station and route the expressway through its property and 
acquire a larger number of private homes, but cost estimates ranged from $2-$6.4 
million, and the plan would still take three acres of the park. Another plan to go 
                                               
4 The Milwaukee County Zoo was located in Washington Park at that time. As noted in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, the County was in the process of relocating the Zoo to its present Far West Side location, 
near the intersection of West Blue Mound Road and Mayfair Road/Hwy 100. 
5 Meeting Minutes of Milwaukee County Expressway Commission and Milwaukee County Park 
Commission, 16 February 1956, Box 5, Folder 8, Bender Papers. 
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around the Vliet Street police station6 and outside the park brought the cost of 
construction to $5.3 million.7 
Despite those alternatives, the Expressway Commission and Milwaukee 
County Board routed the Northwest Expressway along the western edge of 
Washington Park.8 The Park Commission remained frustrated by the Expressway 
Commission throughout the remaining portion of the decade, as the Expressway 
Commission continuously declined to state the Park Commission's right to receive 
reimbursement for lost land taken for expressway construction.9 Even so, the 
Expressway Commission did promise in late 1959 it was making "a real effort" to 
compensate the Park Commission.10 
The Expressway Commission did prove willing to adjust other sections of the 
Northwest Expressway as a cost saving measure. Residents and homeowners on 
Milwaukee's Northwest Side whose homes were in the general path of the route 
complained to their city- and county-level elected officials that because the definite 
location of the Expressway had not been decided, they were uncertain of the future of 
their properties. Many doubted whether they should make any home improvements, 
while others experienced difficulties selling their houses.11 
In October 1956, the Commission recommended shortening the Northwest 
Expressway by one mile, terminating the route at North 60th and West Burleigh 
                                               
6 Located at North 47th Street and West Vliet Street. 
7 Meeting Minutes of Milwaukee County Expressway Commission and Milwaukee County Park 
Commission, 16 February 1956, Box 5, Folder 8, Bender Papers. 
8 "Hearing on X-Way Shift Asked," 3 October 1956, Milwaukee Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19561003&id=zktQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=fQ8EAAA
AIBAJ&pg=5119,1089192, accessed 25 January 2015. 
9 Letter from Bender to Howard Gregg, 3 July 1957, Box 5, Folder 8, Bender Papers. 
10 Letter from Gregg to all members of the Park Commission, 5 November 1959, Box 5, Folder 8, 
Bander Papers. 
11 "Hearing on X-Way Shift Asked," 3 October 1956, Milwaukee Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19561003&id=zktQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=fQ8EAAA
AIBAJ&pg=5119,1089192, accessed 25 January 2015. 
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Streets, rather than at Capitol Drive and Appleton Avenue. The Commission cited 
traffic studies showing a northward extension of the West Expressway through 
Wauwatosa and the former Town of Granville12 and plans to improve West Fond du 
Lac Avenue provided sufficient traffic arteries for a number of years. By shortening 
the Northwest Expressway, the Commission addressed two other problems. First, it 
eliminated a route planned to run through a cemetery. Second, it prevented the razing 
of a number of new homes. County Board Chairman Lawrence Timmerman, who 
lived in the affected area, advocated a public hearing on the matter but supported the 
change.13 The City of Milwaukee, meanwhile, proposed ending the Northwest 
Expressway at Fond du Lac Avenue, which was being improved as part of a city-state 
project. In December 1956, after the hearing took place, the County Board voted 22-1 
in favor of the shortened route and recommended the City approach the Expressway 
Commission directly about its own proposal.14 
Planning and construction for other routes continued with minimal debate. By 
October 1956, the Board approved the route of the Northwest Expressway from the 
Stadium Interchange to West Lloyd Street, the North-South Expressway from West 
Keefe Avenue to West Lexington Boulevard in Glendale, and the East-West 
Expressway from North 16th Street to Hawley Road, and prepared to extend the East-
West Expressway west to the Waukesha County line. The cost for the three approved 
projects totaled $37.8 million, in 1950s figures.15 Milwaukee County also 
                                               
12 The Town of Granville consolidated into Milwaukee in 1956. 
13 "Talks Okayed on Plans to Shorten Expressway," 3 October 1956, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19561003&id=IuJQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=cCUEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=7190,966510, accessed 25 January 2015. 
14 "OK Change for Freeway: County Board Acts," 21 December 1956, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19561221&id=8E41AAAAIBAJ&sjid=ZH4EAA
AAIBAJ&pg=7338,169801, accessed 25 January 2015. 
15 Lloyd Gladfelter, "Green Light Predicted for Expressway Work," 8 October 1956, Milwaukee 
Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19561008&id=ox8aAAAAIBAJ&sjid=cCUEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=6752,4299843, accessed 31 January 2015. 
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aggressively sought more funding for the construction projects, and attempted to get 
several of Milwaukee's expressways designated as interstate highways under the 
Interstate Highway Act in order to obtain that funding.  
The County's push to include several routes in the Interstate System is notable. 
Only a few years earlier, Mayor Frank Zeidler supported turning the city's expressway 
system over to Milwaukee County partially to better facilitate regional planning, and 
in large part because of the enormous costs city government had to incur. Now, 
Milwaukee County wanted to involve not just the state, but the federal government, to 
obtain funding for the $300 million-plus project. 
 
The Interstate Highway Act 
At this juncture, it is important to briefly discuss the Interstate Highway Act 
and some of its implications. Historians have attached passage of the Act to the 
administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and indeed, he championed its 
passage. Yet the bill came about after a half century of increasing federal involvement 
in highways. The concept, a national road network connecting major metropolitan 
areas, was not new. Federal involvement began around the turn of the century and 
accelerated during the 1920s and again in the postwar era. The bill was a culmination 
federal initiatives designed to improve intercity and interstate commerce, facilitate 
freer movement of people and goods, and provide a network of superhighways that 
could be used for national defense purposes. 
The evolution of federal highway involvement paralleled the growth in usage 
of the personal automobile. In Milwaukee, horses outnumbered cars until 1916. Ten 
years later, the number of cars exceeded 100,000. That figure equaled more than 20% 
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of all cars in Wisconsin.16 At the national level, the trend was the same. In 1895, there 
were only four registered automobiles in the entire United States. Five years later, 
there were still only 8,000. By 1910, there were 458,000.17 That figure increased to 
1.25 registered passenger cars in 1913. During that same time frame, from the mid-
1890s through first decade-and-a-half of the 20th century, several major auto 
manufacturers also organized. Ransom Olds developed a system of mass production 
that produced 1,500 Oldsmobiles in 1901. They cost about $650 each, compared to a 
$500 purchase price and $180 in annual upkeep expenses for a horse and buggy. 
Henry Ford's efficiencies soon placed his company in the lead among automakers, 
with Model T sales reaching almost 15,000 in 1907. Buick and Cadillac also 
organized during that decade, in 1902.18 
Such a great increase in the number of cars prompted a push for more and 
better maintained roads. However, the drive to improve public roads actually predated 
the automobile, as bicyclists lobbied for improvements. New York City first paved 
some of its streets with asphalt in the 1870s, and Portland cement was introduced in 
1894.19 Even so, at the beginning of the 20th century, few roads in the United States 
were paved. Henry Moon places the number of paved roads in 1904 at 7%.20 Part of 
the reason is that prior to the turn of the century, many American leaders did not see 
road construction or maintenance as falling within the purview of the federal 
government, thus leaving it to state and local government, and in some cases, the 
private sector. 
                                               
16 John Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee (Milwaukee: Milwaukee County Historical Society, 1999), 
251. 
17 Henry Moon, The Interstate Highway System, (Washington, D.C.: Association of American 
Geographers,1994), 2. 
18 Thomas L. Karnes,  Asphalt and Politics: A History of the American Highway System (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 2009), 11.    
19 Karnes, 10. 
20 Moon 3. 
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During the colonial era, individual towns levied taxes to maintain their own 
streets and occasionally roads between towns. Regular mail service beginning in 1673 
established a trail to become known as the Old Boston Post Road. Pennsylvania's 
Lancaster Turnpike, opened in 1794, was an early toll road designed and operated by 
a private entity. Officials in early America with a strict constructionist view of the 
Constitution believed federal expenditures for road building were unconstitutional, 
although in 1806 Thomas Jefferson authorized federal funding for an early national 
road in Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, called the Cumberland Road. By the 
time it reached Illinois in 1835, the federal government no longer provided funding. 
For most of the rest of the 19th century, the government placed a greater emphasis on 
railroads and clearing rocks and logs from waterways in western states.21 
In the early 1900s, a "Good Roads" citizens' movement advocated for better 
highways. By 1915, 39 states had some kind of active "good roads" organization. 
Both major political parties also included better roads in their platforms. The cause 
drew particular support from Alabama Senator John Hollis Bankhead, who justified 
greater federal involvement in roadbuilding with the constitutional provision for 
postal roads. In 1916, Congress passed a version of one of his bills, known as the 
Federal Highway Act.22 Henry Moon cites the bill, officially called the Federal-Aid 
Road Act of 1916, as the beginning of congressional interest in a national highway 
network. The bill included a formula for providing matching federal funds for local 
and state highway projects. To generate funds to match the new federal aid, in 1919 
Oregon became the first state to levy a gas tax. Most other states and the District of 
Columbia followed the precedent within ten years. 
                                               
21 Karnes, 9. 
22 Karnes, 15. 
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Amendments to the bill further expanded the role of the federal government. 
An amendment in 1921 required states to designate interstate and inter-county 
highways to be deemed eligible for federal aid. Another amendment in 1928 expended 
federal aid to improve the widest streets in urban areas with populations over 2,500. 
Subsequent legislation further increased federal involvement. The Emergency Relief 
and Recovery Act of 1932 funded rural-to-urban feeder roads, while the National 
Industrial Recovery Act funded highways actually passing through cities. The 
Transportation Act of 1940 established a federal transportation policy and funded 
federal transportation research. A federal report, prompted by a meeting in 1935 
between President Franklin Roosevelt and Bureau of Public Roads23 officials and 
published in 1939, called for a national highway network for both national defense 
and to meet peacetime traffic needs. However, World War II halted most public policy 
discussion on the issue for several years.24 In Europe, major national highways had 
been underway for years; Italy began a road network in 1924, financed largely by the 
private sector. Adolf Hitler borrowed their concept of superhighways and began 
building the Autobahn in 1934.25 
 The Interstate Highway Act had its origin in this context. Another highways 
report led to the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944. Bureau of Public Roads 
Commissioner Thomas MacDonald was a strong supporter.26 The Act proposed a new 
network of controlled access highways connecting large cities and industrial centers 
but did not provide dedicated funding. Even so, several interest groups continued to 
push for highway construction. Among them were automobile manufacturers, oil 
companies, trucking companies, the Teamsters Union, highway engineers, and state 
                                               
23 Later called the Public Roads Administration. 
24 Moon, 7. 
25 Karnes, 82. 
26 Rose, 30. 
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highway departments. The Ford Motor Company went as far as publishing a book 
calling for citizen involvement in advocating better roads. Those efforts culminated in 
Congress passing the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 and the Highway Revenue 
Act.27 President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed them on June 29, 1956. These two bills 
differed from previous legislation and amendments because they both authorized a 
program and provided funding. Under the legislation, the federal government 
undertook a 90-10 formula, with the federal government paying for 90% of costs 
rather than the traditional 50% and states paying 10%. Increased gas taxes provided 
the majority of that funding.28 
The bills' passage corresponded with the ever-growing use of cars in the 
postwar era. They also had a strong national defense component, as good highways 
would be needed for population dispersal in the event of an atomic attack during the 
Cold War.29 Furthermore, President Eisenhower had been concerned about the 
inefficiency of American roads since his experience participating in an army convoy 
in 1919 and admired the German Autobahn.   
 Passage of legislation which obtained revenue from a source other than the 
general budget secured a significantly greater level of funding for state and local road 
projects. The Interstate Highway Act likewise established a set of design standards, 
such as mandatory lane widths, vehicle weight restrictions, and elimination of at-
grade highway crossings. It regulated elevation, curvature, gradient, and sight distance 
requirements, set speed limits based on topography, and provided uniform route 
numbering. For construction in urban areas, the Act mandated public hearings so that 
after planners made their initial proposals, residents gained the opportunity to 
                                               
27 The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 is popularly known as the Interstate Highway Act. 
28 Moon, 9. 
29 Tobin, 7. 
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exchange ideas on route placements. Specific planning details fell to the Bureau of 
Public Roads and state highway departments.30 
 
Interstate Designations in Milwaukee 
As construction got underway in Milwaukee, the County faced mounting costs 
for engineering work, right-of-way acquisition, bridge structures, and other expenses. 
Specifically, the county needed to acquire apartments and several business properties 
along the south side of West Clybourn Street for the East-West Expressway, as well as 
additional land for the North-South and West Expressways. The funding formula used 
at that time forced the County to spend heavily; it would underwrite the much of the 
initial cost and receive reimbursement in the form of state and federal aid later. As a 
result, Milwaukee County Auditor Robert E. Boos feared the County would reach its 
debt limit by 1958 or 1959. A $26 million grant for 1957 helped offset a large portion 
of the County's costs, but County highway commissioner Eugene Howard hoped for 
$34 million for 1957 and $30-35 million annually. State and federal aid at that point 
varied from project to project and amounted to 85-90% of the cost in most cases, but 
in some, only accounted for 50%.31 Including the Zoo Interchange, the long-term cost 
breakdown included $42.3 million for the East-West Expressway alone and another 
$7.8 million for the Northwest Expressway from the Stadium Interchange to West 
Lloyd Street.32 
A partial solution was to get a number of expressway routes included in the 
                                               
30 Moon, 16. 
31 "State and US to Help in the Financing of 26 Million Dollars of County Projects," 16 January 1957, 
Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19570116&id=w_ApAAAAIBAJ&sjid=AiYEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=6707,2562250, accessed 31 January 2015. 
32 Lloyd Gladfelter, "Green Light Predicted for Expressway Work," 8 October 1956, Milwaukee 
Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19561008&id=ox8aAAAAIBAJ&sjid=cCUEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=6752,4299843, accessed 31 January 2015. 
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Interstate Highway System. Inclusion meant 90% federal aid for that project. In 
January 1957, the state expressway commission recommended that 6.4 additional 
miles of the Milwaukee expressway commission be designated as interstates. Those 
routes were: the North-South Expressway between the North Avenue and East-
Expressways, the North Avenue between the Northwest and North-South 
Expressways, and the Northwest Expressway between North Avenue and the East-
West Expressway. Some of those routes were never built, but the effort by state 
expressway engineer E.G. Plautz and the commission reflect a recognition at the state 
and local level of the need for greater financial assistance. The North-South 
Expressway from Layton Avenue to the East-West Expressway, the Howard Avenue 
Expressway between the North-South and West Expressways, and the East-West 
Expressway from North 13th Street to the Waukesha County line were already 
included in the Interstate System.33  
By the end of the year, several of the expressway routes received their official 
designation as part of I-94. That designation is still in place as of this writing. 
Interstate 94, running along U.S. Highway 41 from the Illinois state border to the 
Milwaukee County line, included the North-South Expressway as far north as the 
East-West Expressway and the East-Expressway from Downtown to the Waukesha 
County line and Madison. The southern half of the West Expressway and all of the 
south expressway were also designated as interstates, but were numbered later. Two 
expressways elsewhere in Wisconsin also received numbered designations at the same 
time as I-94.34  
                                               
33 "Federal Bureau Asked to Add Six Miles of County Freeways to Interstate System," 16 January 
1957, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19570116&id=w_ApAAAAIBAJ&sjid=AiYEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=6707,2562250, accessed 31 January 2015. 
34 "4-and-6-Lane Expressways Get Numbers," 31 October 1957, Milwaukee Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19571031&id=zF9QAAAAIBAJ&sjid=_w8EAA
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Changing Times 
As the 1950s drew to a close, so did two important eras in Milwaukee's 
history. Citing fatigue and a recommendation from his physician that he not seek re-
election, Mayor Frank Zeidler announced on October 30, 1959 that he would not run 
for a fourth term. Physical ailments had afflicted him for throughout his tenure, as he 
endured lung surgery and more than one viral infection during his time in office. 
Zeidler also cited the heavy workload of the mayor's position as a contributing factor 
in his decision.35 With that announcement, the era of Milwaukee's Socialist 
governance ended.  
For 38 of the 50 years between 1910 and 1960, a Socialist occupied the 
mayor's office. During that time, Milwaukee's Socialists played a prominent role in 
the city's governance. They elected three mayors (of which Zeidler was the last), a 
number of aldermen, county board representatives, and judges, and the first Socialist 
congressman in American history, Victor Berger.36 Zeidler himself had to deal with a 
Common Council which did not always support his positions, but he was still re-
elected with a margin of almost 100,000 votes in 1952 and received approximately 
55% of the vote when challenged for re-election by Common Council President 
Milton McGuire in 1956.37 
Zeidler's decision not to seek re-election prompted Congressman Henry Reuss 
to run again for the mayor's office.38 His opponent in the general election, State 
                                               
AAIBAJ&pg=7196,4900895, accessed 31 January 2015. 
35 "Zeidler 'Won't Run Again' Surprises Friends, Foes," 31 October 1959, Milwaukee Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19591031&id=-
nVQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=aBAEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5335,5122588, accessed 10 February 2015. 
36 Gurda, 216. 
37 "Zeidler 'Won't Run Again' Surprises Friends, Foes," 31 October 1959, Milwaukee Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19591031&id=-
nVQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=aBAEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5335,5122588, accessed 10 February 2015. 
38 Reuss was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1954 but had run against Frank Zeidler for 
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Senator Henry Maier, was a fellow Democrat.39 Both represented North Side wards. 
Maier was generally considered the underdog, but he eventually won the 1960 
mayoral race with 57% of the vote. In that election, Maier received some of his 
strongest support on the South Side, particularly in Bay View and on the southwest 
side. Maier only narrowly defeated Reuss in two majority-African American 
aldermanic districts, even though they were in his own State Senate district. His stated 
priorities included urban renewal, downtown revitalization, industrial development, 
and traffic and mass transit.40 
The other era to come to a close was the expressway planning era. This 
transition was not necessarily tied to Mayor Zeidler's decision to leave office. Instead, 
it was the natural progression of the expressway program. The main routes were 
established in the middle part of the decade, and as the 1960s began, actual 
construction was well underway. Several routes were completed by the early and mid-
1960s, and while additional projects such as the harbor bridge, Lake Freeway, and an 
extension of the Stadium Freeway north well into Ozaukee County received 
substantial consideration, the foundation had already been laid. An expressway system 
was not only planned for Milwaukee, but was actually being built, and further 
extensions or modifications were only an outgrowth of that General Plan for 
Expressways. 
The challenges that elected leaders and planners subsequently faced were not 
initial planning issues or questions about how best to address traffic congestions, 
although debates about route placement did take place. Instead, the Milwaukee 
                                               
Mayor in 1948. 
39 The position was officially nonpartisan and remains so in 2015. 
40 John W. Kole, "Henry Maier Crushes Reuss by 34,000," 6 April 1960, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=jvrRlaHg2sAC&dat=19600406&printsec=frontpage&hl=en, 
accessed 11 February 2015. 
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County Board and Expressway Commission confronted several technical and 
construction-related problems. They also faced real social problems. In the 1960s, 
residents began to object to the loss of property taken for expressway construction. 
Thousands were displaced, and historic neighborhoods were damaged or obliterated 
by superhighways which may have linked distant parts of the metropolitan area, but 
divided the local communities through which they passed. 
 
Construction Challenges 
One of the technical challenges planners needed to address was excess earth. 
The North-South Expressway was depressed below street level, which required 
significant excavation. This generated a great deal of soil that needed to be 
transported and deposited elsewhere. In 1961, the County Board Finance Committee 
voted 5-0 to recommend that the Park Commission, Expressway Commission, and 
County Executive be asked to explore and report on placing that excess earth at the 
lakefront marina.41 Subsequently, the Park Commission submitted a report. The Board 
responded by passing a resolution that directed the Park Commission to negotiate 
with successful bidders who wanted to use the dumpsite.42  
In building the Northwest Expressway, the County had a different use for excavated 
dirt. Because that route had to be elevated over the Menomonee Valley, construction 
crews needed extra soil to achieve a 3% grade between West State and Vliet Streets. 
Three percent was the maximum grade allowed. The soil excavated from the 
depressed 250 foot-wide segment of the Northwest Expressway running through the 
                                               
41 "Notes from budget hearing," County Board Finance Committee, 31 October 1961, Box 17, "Ground 
Fill from North-South Excavation to Marina Site. Project #61-136, 1961-64 Folder," John Doyne 
Collection, Anderson Research Library, Milwaukee County Historical Society, hereafter cited Doyne 
Collection. 
42 Untitled clipping, County Board Proceeding, pages 56-57, 28 January 1964, Box 17, Folder File 63-
358, Doyne Collection.  
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western section of Washington Park was used to elevate the bridges for that section of 
the Expressway.43 
One of the other issues of planning the North-South Expressway was blending 
its footprint into the surrounding neighborhoods while taking into consideration traffic 
patterns and the geographic characteristics of each particular area. Placement of 
freeway entrances and exits, for example, challenged planners, due to the fact that the 
on- and off-ramps had to link adequately to connecting streets and integrate into the 
local street grid, without disrupting local industries. An excellent example was the 
planned Oklahoma Avenue interchange. Originally intended as an entrance-exit 
interchange at West Oklahoma Avenue near Chase Avenue, the location proved 
inaccessible for freeway access, and its location was shifted south after significant 
deliberation among planners.  
As planners mapped out the route of the North-South Expressway, they desired 
an entrance-exit interchange at or near Oklahoma Avenue.44 However, ramp studies 
found the area north of Oklahoma Avenue impractical for such a project due in large 
part to the concentration of industry in the area. A railroad crossing existed between 
what were then the Nordberg and Perfex plants, and between the crossing and the 
Kinnickinnic River just to the north, the Northwestern Railway had a freight yard and 
roundhouse. Planners thus noted that no good space was available for "proper ramp 
geometry”45 and constructing ramps north of Oklahoma would damage valuable 
industrial property. Therefore, they shifted their effort to planning an interchange 
south of Oklahoma, but the presence of several railroad lines and complications with 
                                               
43 "Ask 17 Acres for Freeway," 3 February 1958, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19580103&id=Gt5QAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ciUEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=7324,654432, accessed 13 February 2015. 
44 "Preliminary Plan on North-South Expressway Project 7 at  South 13th Street and West Oklahoma 
Avenue," report by Consoer, Townsend and Associates, 1960, retrieved from LRB.   
45 Ibid., page 7. 
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the layout of local streets made planning at Morgan Avenue, four blocks south of 
Oklahoma Avenue, equally challenging. One such complication was that West 
Morgan Avenue was not constructed under the North Shore Railroad to reach South 
6th Street.46 Additionally, the Chicago, Milwaukee, Saint Paul, & Pacific Railroad47 
crossed both Morgan Avenue and 6th Street at grade. An alternate plan suggested that 
the interchange be split into two parts, with Morgan Avenue serving to- and from-
traffic east of the Expressway, and West Howard Avenue, four blocks further south, 
serving to- and from-traffic west of the Expressway. That plan was not practical, 
either. The heavier, eastbound traffic would have been concentrated on Morgan 
Avenue, and Howard Avenue between the Expressway route and South 13th Street 
required extensive improvement. It would have also necessitated grade separation at 
the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad, and was ultimately rejected.48 
A second alternate plan called for closing Holt Avenue and developed Morgan 
Avenue from Chase Avenue under the Expressway to connect with 6th Street. The 
suggested modification passed under the North Shore Railroad, but required the 
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad to be depressed so that Morgan 
Avenue could pass over it and meet its western section at South 8th Street. 
Implementation of that plan therefore avoided any changes to Howard Avenue. 
Ultimately, planners recommended a route involving entrances and exits at 
Howard and Holt Avenues but not Morgan Avenue. Under the recommended plan, 
Holt Avenue was to be reconstructed from Chase Avenue west to the expressway, and 
                                               
46 The now-vacant North Shore Railroad right-of-way paralleled 6th Street south of the Kinnickinnic 
River. 
47 Also referred to as the CMSP & P Railroad. Its right-of-way follows an approximate southwest-to-
northeast route, running through St. Adalbert's Cemetery on the west side of South 6th Street and 
crossing 6th Street near Holt Avenue.  
48 "Preliminary Plan on North-South Expressway Proj. 7 at South 13th Street and West Oklahoma 
Avenue," page 11. 
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west of the expressway, curve slightly south, pass under both the North Shore 
Railroad and Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad near 6th Street, and 
join Morgan Avenue at South 9th Place. This recommendation, which was the plan 
eventually implemented, also called for 6th Street to be depressed, from Warnimont 
Avenue to about 200 feet south of Ohio Avenue, and like Holt Avenue, to pass under 
the CMST&P Railroad.49 The north-south trajectory of the expressway took it 
between South 4th and 5th Streets and over Holt Avenue to a point 200 feet north of 
Oklahoma Avenue, where it would curve slightly, while south of Howard, it would 
curve southwest. The grades of the ramps ranged from .05% - 4%, and utilized 
existing streets as collector-distributor roads. For the CMSP&P Railroad, grade 
crossings at Morgan and 6th Street were eliminated, while the total cost of the 
recommended plan was just under $7 million.50 
The North-South Expressway was not the only route in which construction 
proved to be an issue. A different challenge presented itself when the first section of 
the East-West Expressway opened. William Norris predicted that when the 
Expressway opened, with its initial western terminus at 68th Street, it would create a 
major bottleneck. Most of the traffic, he argued, would travel north to Blue Mound 
Road, with the majority of it westbound. Such heavy traffic would only serve to 
burden 68th Street and the 68th & Blue Mound intersection. This, he stated, should 
prompt Wauwatosa to install traffic lights at that intersection.51 
 
                                               
49 "Preliminary Plan on North-South Expressway Proj. 7 at South 13th Street and West Oklahoma 
Avenue," page 11. 
50 "Preliminary Plan on North-South Expressway Proj. 7 at South 13th Street and West Oklahoma 
Avenue," page 18. Also, the $7  million amount is in 1960 figures. 
51 William Norris, "68th and Blue Mound: X-Way Bottleneck," 16 November 1961, Milwaukee 
Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19611116&id=GoZRAAAAIBAJ&sjid=8xAEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=7376,3172786, accessed 12 February 2015. 
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Harbor Bridge 
Despite those construction related challenges, availability of federal funds 
encouraged local officials to propose new freeway routes. In 1963, the Milwaukee 
County Expressway Commission recommended to the County Board construction of 
a new lakefront expressway, with a bridge over the harbor and a freeway running 
from the East-West Expressway to a connection with the north belt freeway. Citing a 
report by engineering consulting firm Howard, Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff, the 
Commission recommended the expressway to divert industrial traffic from overloaded 
north-south streets, encourage economic development in the southeastern section of 
the county, and provide future traffic relief for the North-South Expressway. At that 
time, the consultants projected traffic on the North-South Expressway between the 
East-West Expressway to exceed 100,000 vehicles per day by 1980. The Commission 
expected the route to be the least traveled leg of the downtown loop, but to still carry 
33,000 cars per day and draw a significant amount of traffic from the North-South 
Expressway.  
Uncertainty over the Chicago & Northwestern Railroad's possible 
abandonment of its lakefront right-of-way immediately raised the question of cost. 
The report stated the expressway was possible with or without acquisition of the 
property, but its acquisition yielded advantages such as reduced right-of-way costs, 
particularly given that right-of-way acquisition and utility relocation were among the 
main expenditures in highway construction. The City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee 
County subsequently undertook an appraisal of the railroad.52 
Substantial local support existed for at least part of the proposal. Milwaukee 
                                               
52 "Lake Front Freeway Urged by Commission," 19 March 1963, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=jvrRlaHg2sAC&dat=19630319&printsec=frontpage&hl=en, 
accessed 13 February 2015. 
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aldermen also favored a harbor bridge, but plans the previous year had to be 
postponed due to lack of funds and a lack support from the state highway 
commission. The state highway commission indicated as its rationale that it had other 
highway priorities and limited funds. Alderman Erwin Zillman advocated pursuing 
federal funding as an alternative.53   
The idea of a harbor bridge was not new in 1963. City leaders entertained the 
idea of a north-south artery along Lake Michigan since before the Great Depression. 
The Harbor Commission actually led initial planning of a high bridge over the Port of 
Milwaukee, securing a right-of-way from the Sewer Commission in 1928.54 In 1934, 
the Commission ordered its harbor manager to draft plans for a viaduct over the 
harbor which would link a proposed extension of Lincoln Memorial Drive southward. 
The U.S. War Department previously rejected a bascule bridge over the harbor on the 
grounds it would obstruct navigation around the port,55 but later issued a permit to 
construct a 125-foot bridge slightly west of the site originally proposed.  
Planners at that time supported a bridge or a similar artery, as well. The Board 
of Public Land Commissioners noted as early as March 1945 that plans for an 
extension of Lincoln Memorial Drive yielded an opportunity to develop it into a 
modern freeway. Board members further noted freeway design was a new field with 
changing design standards but presented advantages of higher speed, less travel time 
required for motorists, and less gasoline burned due to the reduction in the number of 
                                               
53 "Harbor Bridge Will Be Pushed," 23 October 1962, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19621023&id=PSkjAAAAIBAJ&sjid=9SYEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=7320,1976249, accessed 2 February 2015. 
54 Report to Board of Public Land Commissioners: "The Location of Lincoln Memorial Drive and 
Connection to East and West Streets," by City Engineer J.P. Schwada, 3 March 1945, Box 6, Folder 10, 
Bender Papers. 
55 "Plans Ordered For High Level Harbor Bridge, 15 December 1934, Milwaukee Sentinel, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1368&dat=19341215&id=IbMVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=0QwEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=3400,2629723, accessed 2 February 2015. 
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traffic stops.56 The Park Commission, meanwhile, saw a southern extension of 
Lincoln Memorial Drive as essential to its parkway plan.57 That plan included 
acquiring lakefront land in the South Shore area, north of Grant Park.58 
 Local officials considered two alternatives to the harbor bridge. One option 
was a tunnel under the harbor. Eugene Howard, during the Depression era a planning 
engineer for the County, estimated construction costs for a tunnel at $11,000,000 
compared to $3,000,000 for a bridge, although no financing was immediately 
available.59 A study conducted in 1942 likewise determined a bridge was the superior 
option, in the interest of lower construction and maintenance costs and more flexible 
development of the lakefront and harbor area. At that time, the harbor area stretched 
from East Wisconsin Avenue to East Bay Street and included both Sewer 
Commission-owned property and 1,100 feet of lake frontage deeded to the U.S. 
government for a materials depot.60 
 The other option officials considered was an inner harbor drive. A 1944 report 
by the county's regional planning department recommended building an elevated or 
at-grade drive west of the harbor's outer piers as part of a longer term proposal to 
develop an inner harbor on the west side of Jones Island.61 Unlike the proposed harbor 
tunnel, the inner harbor drive drew support from several local interests. Socialist parks 
                                               
56 Report to Board of Public Land Commissioners: "The Location of Lincoln Memorial Drive and 
Connection to East and West Streets," by City Engineer J.P. Schwada, 3 March 1945, Box 6, Folder 10, 
Bender Papers. 
57 Outline of Statement by Milwaukee County Parks Commission to Milwaukee Common Council, 
undated, Box 6, Folder 2, Bender Papers. 
58 Memo from Parks Commission Executive Secretary Jerome Dretzka to Parks Commission members, 
26 October 1945, Box 6, Folder 2, Bender Papers. 
59 "Favor High Bridge Over Harbor Inlet," 16 September 1939, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19390916&id=B6xQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=UiIEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=1693,1012573, accessed 14 February 2015. 
60 City Engineer J.P. Schwada, Report to Board of Public Land Commissioners: "The Location of 
Lincoln Memorial Drive and Connection to East and West Streets," 3 March 1945, Box 6, Folder 10, 
Bender Papers. 
61 "Inner Harbor Plan Proposed," 23 April 1944, Milwaukee Journal, 
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planner Charles Whitnall actually suggested such a drive years earlier, and both the 
Milwaukee Journal and National Avenue Business Association supported it in the 
1940s. The Journal endorsed an inner harbor route cutting southwest from the 
lakefront across the Third Ward, beginning at Wisconsin Avenue, passing over 
Michigan Street, crossing the Milwaukee River southeast of the Broadway bridge and 
passing under the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad to a connection 
with a northern extension of Barclay Street. From there, the proposal linked the drive 
to East Bay Street and the southern lakeshore.62 
 Parks Commission member Walter Bender argued that any decision to build an 
inner harbor drive or a high level bridge over the harbor did not exclude the other. He 
viewed a harbor bridge as a landing hazard to planes landing at Maitland Field63 but 
stated the Park Commission did not see a small airport as the best use of lakefront 
property. An inner and outer drive served separate purposes, he said. He envisioned an 
inner drive to carry trucks and commercial vehicles, while reserving the outer drive 
for passenger vehicles and recreational purposes. Bender himself preferred to build 
both. 
Thus, the bridge fit prominently into postwar plans for Lincoln Memorial 
Drive.64 Proposals for the Drive called for its extension northward through Shorewood 
and Whitefish Bay into Fox Point, a southern connection to Bay View, and a possible 
future leg through the South Shore suburbs to the Racine County line. The Land 
Commission articulated a threefold vision for an extended Lincoln Memorial Drive: 
                                               
62 "Milwaukee Lake Front and Related Development Plans," Milwaukee Journal (suggested by 
Journal), June 1945, Box 6, Folder 1, Bender Papers. 
63 Located on the site of the current Summerfest grounds, Maitland Field was a small lakefront airport 
primarily serving small, private planes. 
64 The Drive at that time ran from Mason Street to Kenwood Boulevard. As of this writing, it still 
follows the same route, but continues slightly farther south to Clybourn Street, where it terminates at 
the Lake Interchange.  
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provide a high speed traffic artery, create a truck route to serve the harbor, and 
establish a connecting link in the County Park System. Funding for such an extension 
did concern city government, though. The City was reluctant to accept federal money 
for the project out of fear the federal government might allow trucking along the 
Drive, something city government did not envision. The City Engineer preferred to 
allow trucking on the Drive only between Clybourn Street and Greenfield Avenue. 
Numerous logistical and financial problems prevented immediate action on the 
harbor bridge, as planners in 1945 worried about how to connect the bridge to 
intersecting streets. A report by City Engineer Joseph P. Schwada deemed 
intersections with National Avenue or Mitchell Street to be impractical. Any ramp 
connecting Mitchell Street to a harbor bridge needed to begin at South 2nd or 3rd 
Street to provide a steep enough grade to reach the bridge, but piers to support such a 
ramp would have interfered with rail traffic below. A ramp crossing the Kinnickinnic 
River also reduced usable dock frontage. Schwada similarly ruled out a ramp 
connection at National Avenue, but considered a connection at Greenfield Avenue to 
be possible if car ferry activity at the Kinnickinnic River were relocated to Jones 
Island. He favored an initial southern terminus at East Conway Street in Bay View, 
with possible future extensions to Lincoln Avenue and possibly South Shore Park.65 
Schwada did not provide a cost estimate, stating that such an estimate required the 
city to first begin test borings for a foundation along the right-of-way.  The Milwaukee 
Journal cited the earlier figure of nearly $11 million, with expenditures reaching $20 
million with cross-street connections. As of 1945, a permanent improvement fund for 
lakefront development held $1.5 million. Completion of the bridge also required 
                                               
65 City Engineer J.P. Schwada, Report to Board of Public Land Commissioners: "The Location of 
Lincoln Memorial Drive and Connection to East and West Streets," 3 March 1945, Box 6, Folder 10, 
Bender Papers. 
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cooperation between five different parties: the City of Milwaukee, Milwaukee 
County, the Sewer Commission, the Harbor Commission, and the Northwestern 
Railroad.66 
By the time local officials revisited the harbor bridge nearly two decades later, 
cost estimates rose to $43 million in 1960s figures for the bridge alone. That amount 
excluded the $22 million anticipated spending on other expressway construction 
projects and a $7 million bond issue to acquire the Northwestern Railroad right-of-
way, which the Railroad did decide to abandon.67 In May 1964, the Milwaukee 
Common Council passed a resolution asking the County Board, Park Commission, 
Expressway Commission, and private and civic organizations to petition federal 
officials to fund the bridge.68 By September 1965 federal officials generally supported 
the harbor bridge, but the Bureau of Public Roads wanted adequate connections to it 
near its southern terminus. The Bureau favored a freeway-like connection to the 
bridge to handle traffic to and from the bridge in Bay View, deeming proposals to 
simply improve local streets as inadequate.69 If the County did not construct the 
southern portion of the Lake Freeway, the federal funding level fell from 90% to 50% 
of the cost. City and county officials, the Southeast Wisconsin Regional Planning 
Commission,70 and private consultants later recommended constructing a freeway 
                                               
66 "Survey Urged for Extending Lincoln Drive,"  4 March 1945, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19450304&id=bbUWAAAAIBAJ&sjid=JCMEA
AAAIBAJ&pg=6708,1111611, accessed 19 February 2015. 
67 Ray Kenney, "Ask $62 Million Projects," 16 May 1964, Milwaukee Sentinel, 
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70 The Southeast Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission, or SEWRPC, came into existence in 
August 1960 when Governor Gaylord Nelson signed an executive order establishing a seven-county 
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from East Lincoln Avenue to East Layton Avenue. The three-mile stretch was to be 
completed by 1973, and potentially link to a future freeway running through Cudahy, 
Oak Creek, and Racine and Kenosha Counties to a connection with a proposed 
freeway south of the Illinois state line. The plan drew support from a local Coast 
Guard commander, but area residents, the mayor of St. Francis, and the pastors of 
local Catholic and Lutheran congregations expressed concerns. Some residents even 
questioned the need for a freeway through the area.71  
In February 1966, the Milwaukee County Expressway Commission approved 
preliminary plans for the Lake Freeway running under East Michigan Street and along 
the lakeshore's bluffs to a connection with the Park Freeway to be called the Juneau 
Interchange. Its proposed route brought it near the Juneau Park Lagoon along its east 
side as well as the Jewish Community Center at 1400 N. Prospect Avenue. The route 
further required demolition of the Layton School of Art at 1342 N. Prospect Avenue. 
However, expressway engineer Robert W. Brennan pledged to preserve as much of 
the lakefront as possible and cited late 1971 as an estimated completion date.72  
 
Freeway Revolt 
 The concerns cited by citizens objecting to the proposed Lake Freeway 
through Bay View and the South Shore suburbs echoed the concerns of residents 
elsewhere in the Milwaukee area and indeed, nationwide. By the mid- to late 1960s, 
residents of urban areas around the country were beginning to oppose construction in 
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71 "South Siders Argue Lake Freeway Need," 27 January 1967, Milwaukee Journal 
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their cities. In Milwaukee's quiet and residential South Shore area, local residents 
expressed concerns mainly about the impact on their neighborhoods. At a hearing in 
January 1967, residents expressed apprehension that the proposed freeway divided the 
neighborhood in two and requested an adequate number of pedestrian bridges and 
tunnels. Speaking at the meeting for his constituents in Bay View and St. Francis, 
Milwaukee County Board representative Ted Wedemeyer commented "We don't want 
an east Bay View and a west Bay View, an east St. Francis and a west St. Francis."73  
St. Francis Mayor Herbert Kiehl, like West Milwaukee's Village President a 
decade earlier, expressed concerns about the loss of property in the small suburb. 
Depending on whether the freeway was located next to or on the existing rail line, the 
City of St. Francis stood to lose 90-210 properties with an assessed value of as much 
as $1.2 million. Pastor Carl Klitzke of Messiah Lutheran Church on East Fernwood 
Avenue complained that his congregation constructed the church only five years 
earlier and at that time received assurances from local officials that they were not 
considering any expressway routes through the area. Father James Brady, pastor of 
Sacred Heart of Jesus Catholic Parish on Kinnickinnic Avenue in St. Francis 
expressed concern that the proposed freeway cut some parishioners off from the 
church and school.74 
The fears Father Brady and Pastor Klitzke expressed regarding the impact on 
their congregations came true along other freeway routes. On the North Side, 
construction of the North-South Expressway in the early 1960s cut St. John Lutheran 
Church at 8th and Vliet Streets off from the neighborhood west of it. After the freeway 
was constructed, street cars were no longer able to reach that section of West Vliet 
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Street from North 12th Street. Members of the congregation living west of the 
expressway could not easily walk to church, prompting some members to join 
congregations west of I-43.75 In West Allis, plans to construct the West Expressway 
necessitated a new school and parsonage for Good Shepherd Lutheran Church.76 On 
the near South Side, the North-South Expressway created an isolated area along South 
3rd and 4th Streets between the freeway and South Chase Avenue immediately south of 
Lincoln Avenue. Residents complained that the lack of a pedestrian bridge over the 
Expressway forced them to travel farther to reach schools and the 6th Street bus line, 
and prevented parishioners from walking to Mass and activities at St. Josephat's 
Basilica on 6th and Lincoln.77 
Other congregations lost their buildings altogether. Our Lady of Pompeii Catholic 
Church, an anchor of the local Italian community,78 is one of the best known examples 
in Milwaukee.79 The Milwaukee Landmarks Commission previously designated it as 
a landmark. Parishioners successfully resisted demolition during a 1950s-era urban 
renewal project in the Third Ward, but by the 1960s, construction of the East-West 
Expressway caused its demolition. The last Mass celebrated there took place in July 
1967.80 Freeway construction likewise forced the First Methodist Church to abandon 
                                               
75 Thomas E. Schroeder, "White Flight: The Response of WELS Churches in Central City Milwaukee 
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79 Gurda, 335. 
80 "The Last Days of Pompeii Church," 19 July 1967, Milwaukee Journal, 
141 
 
 
 
its building at 1010 West Wisconsin Avenue in January 1966.81 
 
 
 
Figure 5: I-794 in the Third Ward along East St. Paul Avenue at North 
Milwaukee Street, not far from the former site of Our Lady of Pompeii Catholic 
Church. Photo by Greg Dickenson, 2012. 
 
 
The African American community similarly lost a historically significant 
church. St.Mark African Methodist Episcopal Church was the oldest African 
American congregation in Milwaukee and was known for its large choirs.82 
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Expressway construction forced the congregation to relocate after demolition of its 
building. Two other African American congregations, Mount Calvary Holy Church of 
America and the Church of the Living God, also had to relocate due to the 
expressway.83 
The cumulative impact of these and other disruptions to Milwaukee 
neighborhoods prompted widespread objection to expressway construction in 
Milwaukee. In some cases, residents and local leaders were content to re-route 
proposed freeways to more suitable locations. In other cases, the routes themselves 
were challenged. Some of those routes were eventually constructed anyway, others 
were cancelled or only partially completed. 
Part of the impetus for anti-expressway sentiment was the suggestion of 
several new routes in the 1960s. The routes were proposed by Howard, Needles, 
Tammen & Bergendoff as part of the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning 
Commission's comprehensive regional land use and transportation plan.84 SEWRPC's 
role at this time was separate from that of the Expressway Commission. While the 
Expressway Commission retained its oversight over designing, planning, and 
construction the expressway system, after SEWRPC's inception in 1960, it undertook 
an advisory planning role for the superhighway network and other regional 
transportation and land use issues. Commission member Richard Cutler called its 
1965 plan the "high point" in Milwaukee's freeway planning.85    
Those new routes included a seven and a half mile Bay Freeway running 
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roughly parallel to West Hampton Avenue from the North-South Expressway west 
into Waukesha County and a 12.5 mile extension of the Stadium Freeway northward 
from its connection from the planned Park Freeway/North Avenue Expressway to 
Ozaukee County. The proposed new routes could displace as many as 10,000 
residents if built, claimed County Supervisor William E. Meaux. He noted more than 
500 angry constituents wrote him letters objecting to expansion because of its 
negative effect on property values; Supervisor Clinton Rose expressed a similar 
concern about property values in his district along the Milwaukee-Glendale border.86 
SEWRPC also recommended a controversial Belt Freeway through Milwaukee's outer 
suburbs. That route ran from the southern extension of the Lake Freeway through Oak 
Creek and Franklin parallel to Puetz Road and into Muskego, where it curved north 
and ran through eastern Waukesha County in New Berlin, Brookfield, and 
Menomonee Falls to a connection with Highway 41 in Germantown. Planners 
expected a significant but unspecified amount of funding to come from the federal 
government. Jurisdiction over the Waukesha County freeway fell to the State 
Highway Commission.87   
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Figure 6: A map of the additional freeways proposed for the Milwaukee area in the 
1960s.88  
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The letters Supervisor Meaux's constituents wrote him were only a 
representation of public sentiment in Milwaukee and nationwide. Other cities, too, 
saw protests and citizen advocacy. A number of scholars have extensively documented 
what historian Raymond Mohl termed the "expressway revolt" movement.90 Mohl's 
narrative of the anti-freeway movement aptly describes Milwaukee's experience.  
The freeway revolts Mohl describes began as grassroots movements which 
involved neighborhood groups and homeowners. They varied from city to city, but 
followed a general pattern of bottom-up fighting against seemingly inflexible highway 
engineers and state highway bureaucrats. Their tactics included litigation, interracial 
and cross-class alliances, and involvement of newspapers and local politicians. In 
many cases, their success in stopping construction was only achieved with a court 
order or shut-down decision from a top highway official or state governor.91 He cites 
as the first success of the freeway revolt movement a decision by San Francisco 
officials in 1959 to withdraw support for any new freeway construction.92 
In the late 1950s, residents of cities whose parks, neighborhoods, and historic 
districts the freeways had penetrated began to object strenuously to further 
construction. Previous construction resulted in large scale housing demolition, 
relocation problems, loss of communities, and environmental damage. Prior to the 
mid-1950s, urban real estate and business leaders, mayors, urban planners, and civil 
engineers widely supported building urban expressways to save declining central 
business districts.93 As already noted in this chapter, a movement to create a national 
highway network already existed before Congress passed the Interstate Highway Act 
                                               
90 Raymond Mohl, "Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities," Journal of Urban History 30 
(2004): 674. 
91 Mohl, 676. 
92 Mohl, 679. 
93 Mohl, 676. 
146 
 
 
 
in 1956. Bureau of Public Roads commissioner Thomas MacDonald, his assistant 
Herbert Fairbank, and other officials envisioned superhighways connecting cities 
while speeding traffic within them. MacDonald and New York public works official 
Robert Moses also saw the new traffic arteries as an opportunity for urban renewal; 
slums could be cleared away and the inner cores of many cities rebuilt.94 In 
Milwaukee, that very concept received support from within Mayor Zeidler's 
administration. As one member of his administration wrote, construction of an 
expressway interchange and 8th and Brown Streets on the North Side would eliminate 
a "substantial" amount of slum housing that urban renewal might not reach for a good 
many years.95  
Other cities' officials and expressway planners had a similar attitude toward 
slum clearance and highway construction. In Columbus, OH, engineers working with 
the local chamber of commerce largely eliminated what one engineer described as that 
state's largest slum.96 Detroit and Charlotte, NC also saw historic African American 
neighborhoods and business districts demolished for freeway construction and urban 
renewal.97 Neither the Milwaukee urban renewal official nor the engineer in Ohio 
directly expressed views on slum clearance and race, although the 8th and Brown 
neighborhood in Milwaukee was largely African-American. Such was not the case in 
Miami. A decision by the Florida Road Department to shift a proposed expressway 
through the city westward into the Overtown business district devastated the heart of 
Miami's black community. City officials there wanted to create a new housing 
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development primarily for African-Americans well outside the central business 
district, while a local planner there specifically stated a goal of slum clearance and 
removal of every African-American from city limits. Despite ample public notice, the 
African-American community did not organize any significant opposition. Several 
black organizations did exist in Miami at that time, but they generally supported the 
expressway route as part of the city's progress. Both the Greater Miami Urban League 
and the city's black newspaper issued statements in 1957 supporting the proposed 
expressways, although they did advocate relocation housing, prompting Florida's road 
chairman to acknowledge the need. However, he argued housing was not the 
responsibility of the highway department.98  
In the 1950s and early 1960s, Mohl asserts, Miami was still a very southern 
city. White political dominance was still the norm, and interracial cooperation 
frequently proved problematic. For example, officials did not hold any public 
hearings in black neighborhoods, prompting complaints years later. Even within the 
white community, there was little opposition to expressway construction, except for a 
few people who worried that displaced African-Americans might move into mostly 
white areas. Miami's mayor and a number of white residents initially opposed freeway 
construction so close to the city's downtown area, but after 1957, with the exception 
of one activist, there was little opposition 99  
In contrast, San Francisco was more cosmopolitan and had a stronger network 
of neighborhood groups.100 There, after the aesthetically unappealing Embarcadero 
Freeway was constructed on the waterfront, city residents began to resist more 
expressways. They were particularly offended at proposals to construct a route 
                                               
98 Mohl, 685. 
99 Mohl, 686. 
100 Mohl, 685.  
148 
 
 
 
through Golden Gate Park and the Haight neighborhood, a progressive, working class, 
racially integrated area African-American, Chinese, and Filipino residents, which also 
had measurable a population of students and gay residents. Consequently, a 
neighborhood association formed in 1959 against the freeway, and opposition 
continued into the 1960s, when city officials voted down a route called the Panhandle 
Freeway.101  
Successful anti-freeway movements subsequently delayed or blocked 
construction in other cities. Protests in San Antonio delayed one route for years; it was 
only completed after being re-engineered. In Kansas City, MO, a local Polish citizens 
group campaigned to save a historic neighborhood, while block by block opposition 
in Cleveland stalled construction.102  
Milwaukee saw a mix of concerted opposition to some routes and apathy 
toward others. The timeline of strong public support shifting toward opposition 
follows the national narrative. Hints of dissent began in the late 1950s, but it was not 
until the mid-1960s that widespread opposition organized. Concerns about dislocated 
residents in poorer neighborhoods did come to the attention of Expressway 
Commission members, elected officials, and other leaders in the late 1960s, but little 
discussion of the direct impact on Milwaukee's African American neighborhoods took 
place either within or outside of the black community. Much of the opposition 
evolved out of objections to the lakefront freeway which did not run through a black 
neighborhood. In comparison, San Francisco residents objected to the proposed loss 
of an integrated neighborhood brought about by freeway construction, while 
Washington, D.C. and other cities saw the impact on the African-American 
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community prompt black militancy.103 Thus, Milwaukee actually differed from 
several other major cities with regard to expressways and race relations.  
 
Milwaukee's Bronzeville 
Home to 40,000 residents in 1960 and a number of nightclubs and music 
venues, Miami's Overland business district was called the "Harlem of the South."104 
Bronzeville in Milwaukee likewise served as the heart of Milwaukee's African 
American community. But like Overland, it saw substantial housing demolition after 
construction of the North-South Expressway in the 1960s. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Milwaukee had an African-American 
population of only 862. Five decades later, it grew to 21,772, but still accounted for 
only 3.42% of the city's population. By 1960, the city's African-American population 
reached over 62,000 but still only equaled 8.4% of the city's population.105 Residential 
segregation kept African-American housing confined to a specific area known as 
Bronzeville. Paul Geenan defines the borders of that neighborhood in 1930 as running 
between North 3rd and 12th Streets, north of West Highland Boulevard and south of 
West Walnut Street. Within a few years, the neighborhood expanded to Juneau 
Avenue, Keefe Avenue, North 23rd Street, and the Milwaukee River.106  Ivory Abena 
Black describes very similar borders as of 1930: North 3rd to North 12th Street, and 
West Juneau Avenue to West Brown Street. Later the community's borders reached 
North Avenue and State Street. In time, it became known as Bronzeville.107 As a term, 
Bronzeville refers to an area of any city in which the majority of residents are African 
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American or of African descent. In Milwaukee's Bronzeville, African Americans 
initially shared the neighborhood with Germans, Italians, Eastern Europeans, and 
Jewish residents until most of those groups moved northward. After their migration 
out of the central city, Bronzeville remained overwhelmingly African American.108 
During the 1930s and 1940s West Walnut Street between 3rd and 12th Streets 
developed into the central business district for Bronzeville. Numerous black-owned 
businesses located or opened there, including a number of hotels, night clubs, 
restaurants, and barber shops. Such noted musicians as Duke Ellington, Billie 
Holiday, and Louis Armstrong performed at some of the night clubs and 
restaurants.109 The Walnut Street area thereby grew to serve as the center of African 
American life in Milwaukee.110 As a result, when the North-South Expressway caused 
widespread demolition of homes through the heart of Bronzeville, it devastated the 
historic area.  
The purpose of this thesis has been to trace the route selection of Milwaukee 
County's expressway system and examine why their final locations were chosen. 
Placement the North-South Expressway followed a clearly defined traffic pattern 
identified by the 1946 Origin-Destination Survey. After substantial community input 
and a recommendation from the State Highway Commission, Milwaukee County 
shifted the South Side leg of that route approximately 10 blocks east. Now, it is 
important to understand the implications of expressway construction on the North 
Side. 
One of the studies commissioned to recommend a route placement, DeLeuw & 
Cather's 1949 report, recommended a route passing through a low density area along 
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the west bank of the Milwaukee River. Subsequent studies placed the expressway 
along North 7th & 8th Streets and resulted in the displacement of thousands of African 
American residents at a time when most African Americans could not easily relocate 
to other neighborhoods. The rationale for that decision might be attributed to traffic 
counts, cost, or other factors. Slum clearance, though, was indeed a major reason. 
Niles Niemuth asserts local leaders were more concerned with urban renewal 
than minimizing any negative social or economic impact expressway construction 
played. Citing a quote by Mayor Zeidler, he argues highway planners deliberately 
routed the North-South Expressway through African American neighborhoods to 
reduce or eliminate blight.111 He goes on to state city leaders say African Americans 
as a nuisance before, after, and during highway construction and proverbially 
attempted to pave over the problem. A 1970s study found direct discrimination by 
housing and relocation officials toward African Americans. Most of those African 
American residents only moved a few blocks after losing their houses or apartments. 
In addition, fear that African American residents might move in fueled white 
residents' opposition to additional public housing in other neighborhoods.112 
Benjamin Barbera cautions against tying race alone to explanations of what 
areas of the city were targeted for slum clearance and urban renewal.113 He cites a 
study from 1964 projecting 47.1% of white city residents lived in housing valued at 
less than $15,000 and 76% of whites to be relocated from 1963-1972 fell into this 
category. About 86.4% of nonwhite residents in the city but 90.8% of dislocated 
nonwhites lived in units valued under $15,000. A similar proportion of lower income 
white residents were displaced. About 38% of white Milwaukee residents at that time 
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earned under $6,000 annually but 55% of dislocatees had annual earnings under that 
figure. The percentage of nonwhite dislocates earning less than $6,000 per year 
jumped to 71.6% compared to a citywide percentage of 61.5% nonwhite residents 
with incomes below $6,000. Barbera uses these statistics to support the argument that 
race and class accounted for decisions on redevelopment project placements. Even so, 
he concedes that race played a larger role in rehousing and compensation issues given 
that 16% of nonwhite city residents were displaced compared to only 1.9% of white 
residents at a time when housing covenants still restricted nonwhites.114 
Between 1962-1968 expressway construction eliminated 8,535 housing units 
and dislocated over 13,000 people. A severe housing shortage resulted as construction 
of just under 1,200 housing units during that did not adequately replace the units lost. 
The African American community felt the loss particularly acutely because areas in 
which African Americans were allowed to live did not see a substantial replacement 
of housing stock.115 In some cases the housing stock that was available to replace lost 
homes was unsanitary or uninhabitable.116 Additionally, no one in local government 
took responsibility for relocating displaced African Americans. Mayor Henry Maier 
vocalized general concern for the issue, but did not advocate open housing or public 
housing elsewhere in the city, nor did he allocate any city funds to reduce hardships 
caused by displacement. Expressway Commission member Leonard Zubrensky did 
articulate a position that highway construction might need to be delayed until 
displaced persons found adequate new housing, but by the time he raised those 
concerns in 1968, a great many people already lost their homes.117 
While freeway revolts took place in other cities and delayed or prevented 
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expressway construction even in other Milwaukee neighborhoods, there was no 
organized objection in the African American community. Several factors account for 
this. One is a lack of political clout. Its relatively small size made it difficult for its 
members to resist the freeway that cut Bronzeville in two.118 African Americans 
accounted for only 8.4% of Milwaukee's population in 1960. That percentage was 
actually deceptive because nearly 50% of African American residents were under the 
legal voting age and registration of eligible voters only ranged from 52-54%.119 In 
comparison, Chicago's African American population in 1960 reached 22.9% while 
Cleveland and Detroit had black populations of 28.6% and 28.9%, respectively.120 
They also did not have Mayor Maier's ear. His base was among blue collar 
white residents, especially in the South Side Polish community. Maier polled poorly 
in black wards during the 1960, 1964, and 1968 elections. Bill Dahlk's observation 
that Maier only won 7% of the black vote in 1968 and that a 1965 Milwaukee Journal 
profile of the mayor said little about his relationship with African American residents 
and voters suggests he had little to gain electorally by reaching out to them or 
prioritizing their concerns.121 This supports Niemuth's argument that the African 
American community was marginalized during his administration.  
A second explanation for a lack of outcry is a lack of proper notice prior to the 
construction projects. Just as in Miami, ample notice of proposed routes was 
published well in advance of actual highway building in Milwaukee. Local 
newspapers clearly indicated the general locations of recommended routes. However, 
officials did not disclose center line locations or right-of-way widths until they held 
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public hearings.122 In African American neighborhoods many residents were unaware 
of plans until bulldozers and construction equipment appeared on their streets.123 All 
of this took place against the larger backdrop of a Civil Rights Movement in which 
leaders and organizers in Milwaukee's African American community focused on open 
housing and school desegregation. Although issues of open housing and urban 
renewal were intertwined, leaders prioritized other issues.124  
 
Protests and Route Cancellations 
 Whatever the cause of the lack of protests in the African American community, 
freeway plans sparked outrage in other parts of Milwaukee. Protests, public hearings, 
and anti-expressway campaigns in Milwaukee delayed or halted several route. 
Suburban residents' objections to proposed freeways through their communities also 
led to cancellation of routes in Ozaukee and Waukesha Counties. 
 Like the nationwide freeway revolt movement, anti-expressway sentiment in 
Milwaukee dates to the late 1950s. In early 1959, the West North Avenue 
Advancement Association sponsored a public meeting to protest the North Avenue 
Expressway planned to run about half a block north of the street. Over 100 residents 
attended. The Association opposed the expressway route and its president complained 
that 472 homes housing 3,100 families were to be lost if the expressway were built. 
Such a loss reduced the buying power of the local customer base the business 
association served.125 
 City government recognized the issue of displacement and the need for 
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adequate relocation efforts two years before that. A 1957 study by the Expressway 
Commission estimated the number or residents to be displaced by the North-South 
Expressway to be 20,000 persons in 6,000 families. Mayor Zeidler expressed concern 
for the situation at that time as he expected impending expressway construction south 
of Keefe Avenue and predicted an acute housing situation. Common Council 
President Martin Schreiber and Council members Vel Phillips and Fred P. Meyers 
likewise expressed concerns about expressway construction and recommended the 
North Avenue Expressway be relocated to a route south of North Avenue to reduce the 
impact on the North Avenue business district. Yet County expressway engineer Henry 
Wildschut downplayed the severity of the looming situation. He stated the 
Expressway Commission did not have a specific policy on relocation housing but he 
did not believe a problem existed. According to Wildschut, every family that had sold 
property to the Expressway Commission up to that point was able to find new 
housing.126 
 Five years later, the situation had not improved. Approximately 1,100 families 
had already lost their homes to the expressways, another 25,000 individuals in 7,000 
families faced dislocation before 1970, and with the exception of some federal aid, 
only limited financial assistance was available to families required to move. County 
expressway engineer Herbert Goetsch acknowledged that the Expressway 
Commission had some responsibility toward the displaced, but not to the point that it 
assisted displaced households in finding new homes.  Instead, it referred those 
families to the city redevelopment authority. Redevelopment authority officials 
responded by stating they lacked the staff to assist such a large number of dislocated 
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individuals and that their agency did not actually have legal authority to do so. The 
Milwaukee Common Council's position at the time was that the City and County 
should share responsibility.127 As late as 1968, renters without a long-term lease did 
not receive compensation for moving costs.128 Meanwhile, several majority-African 
American churches forced to relocate and construct new buildings due to expressway 
construction experienced difficulties in obtaining new loans as financial institutions 
perceived risks in lending to central city congregations.129  
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Figure 7: A concrete sound barrier separates I-43 from a residential neighborhood near 
South 5th Street and West Warnimont Avenue. Photo by Greg Dickenson, 2013. 
 
 In response to the proposed Park Freeway running through the East Side to 
connect the North-South Expressway to the northern Lake Freeway, a Layton School 
of Art board member launched a public campaign against the route. Attorney Malcolm 
Whyte engaged in a letter-writing campaign to numerous officials and boards in 1966 
to protest the route. The campaign drew the attention of both the Expressway 
Commission, which invited him to speak at a hearing, and County Executive John 
Doyne, who endorsed the route. Commission member Leonard Zubrensky expressed a 
view that the matter was best decided by the County Board, while County Park 
Commission General Manager Howard Gregg stated he preferred the freeway loop to 
go elsewhere but conceded an inland route required going through residential 
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neighborhoods with highly valued homes.130  
A citizens group, the Lakefront Preservation Committee, subsequently 
organized to resist the Park and Lake Freeway loop. Their opposition in 1967 marked 
the beginning of organized opposition to expressway construction in Milwaukee.131 
The organized, ongoing, and widely publicized protest, accompanied by Milwaukee 
residents' objections to other routes, was an excellent example of the freeway revolt in 
Milwaukee County. 
 The Committee successfully lobbied for a citywide referendum on the issue. 
The specific referendum question asked whether the City of Milwaukee should 
cooperate with Milwaukee County in street improvements or adjustments such as 
traffic signals, sewer and water lines, and street lights to accommodate the loop. The 
referendum also contained a clause specifically recognizing specific land with lake 
frontage as park land. The Expressway Commission, the Metropolitan Milwaukee 
Association of Commerce, Greater Milwaukee Committee, and Milwaukee Common 
Council all supported the route. The Expressway Commission's position argued the 
loop was needed to relieve traffic at the central interchange (now called the Marquette 
Interchange) and no other suitable routes were available, but the Lakefront 
Preservation Committee argued the freeway diminished the peace and charm of a 
prime lakefront area. Over 48,000 city residents signed the petition to place the 
referendum on the April 4, 1967 ballot.132 
 Voters defeated the referendum by a substantial margin. Approximately 66% 
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or 69,971 of 105,799 voters supported expressway construction. The strongest 
opposition came from voting wards through which the Lake and Park Expressways 
passed. Strong support came from the Near South Side and the far northwest and 
southwest sides. After the referendum, Bureau of Public Roads director wrote that the 
federal government required adequate connections to the high level bridge such as 
through the proposed routes but was willing to consider alternatives.133 
 Despite freeway advocates' overwhelming success in the 1967 referendum, 
public support for further construction diminished during the late 1960s. Opening of 
the primary freeway system with its high level bridge over the Menomonee Valley 
and the Marquette Interchange in 1968 allowed widespread movement east-west and 
north-south. Its completion and the construction of the I-894 bypass around the South 
Side led many residents to question the need for additional freeways. The Milwaukee 
Journal's publication of the Bay and Stadium Freeway routes also prompted residents 
in those corridors to react.134 Displacement of residents of freeway corridors and a 
lack of good relocation housing further cooled public enthusiasm and prompted other 
community activists such as Ted Seaver to organize coalition groups against 
additional construction.135  
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Figure 8: This is a view along West St. Paul Avenue under the Marquette Interchange. 
Photo by Greg Dickenson, 2012. 
 
Diminished public support brought several anti-freeway candidates to elected 
office in the early 1970s. State legislators John Norquist, Mordecai Lee, and Mike 
Elconin, and County Supervisor Dan Cupertino were all elected to their respective 
posts in part because of their opposition to expressways. Those candidates viewed 
freeways as negative additions to an urban area and believed they ruined 
neighborhoods by dividing them.136 Mayor Henry Maier and Aldermen Fred Schallert 
and John Kalwitz further expressed opposition, with Mayor Maier lamenting the lack 
of relocation housing.137 
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 Suburban leaders joined the opposition. SEWRPC conceded the Belt Freeway 
was not needed until 1980 or 1990 but justified purchasing land in advance for its 
right-of-way on the grounds that doing so in advance saved money and reduced 
hardship. For example, the leg of the 34-mile route running through Franklin required 
relocation of 86-129 houses, six commercial buildings, and 28 farm buildings, at an 
average of four houses per mile. The cost equaled $300,000 per mile. In contract, 
projections indicated the route closing the gap between the Fond du Lac Avenue and 
Stadium Freeways eliminated 400 homes per mile at a cost of $3.9 million per mile. 
Even so, the Belt Freeway generated opposition in several communities. The 
proposed route through Franklin took as many as 61 homes in a subdivision near 
South 76th Street and West Puetz Road and cut through environmentally sensitive 
areas: a woodland area in Franklin, a tamarack grove in Brookfield, and part of the 
nearby Fox River flood plain. Residents also asserted that the route was not needed by 
local residents but by truckers and Illinois residents seeking to bypass Milwaukee. 
SEWRPC's projections indicated a 54% majority of users would be local residents. 
Concern about route placement through a residential area in Brookfield caused a 
citizen's group to advocate a more westerly placement of the Belt Freeway. Under that 
group's proposal, the Freeway was to run west of Brookfield but east of Waukesha.138 
The Brookfield Common Council rejected any route through its borders and 
suggested a route west of Waukesha. However, like in Milwaukee County, highway 
officials did not take citizen objections in Waukesha County seriously. Brookfield's 
Common Council had initially supported the plan, but along with Mayor Franklin 
Wirth later opposed it. A state highway planning official simply dismissed the change 
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as "just hearsay."139 
 In the northern suburbs, opposition mirrored the concerns of Brookfield and 
Franklin residents. Highway planners strongly supported an extension of the Stadium 
Freeway through the growing Northwest Side to relieve local streets, while business 
interests believed the route necessary to improve commerce. They also wanted to link 
the Fond du Lac Avenue and Stadium Freeways to improve access to and from 
Downtown and better enable travel to Germantown and southern Ozaukee County. 
Like the Belt Freeway, the cost of the 15-mile leg into Ozaukee County was also 
fairly low: less than $1 million per mile compared to $11.4 million per mile through 
the Northwest Side. The Ozaukee County leg ran through western Mequon and 
Cedarburg to a northeasterly curve near Saukville, where it then intersected with I-43. 
Mequon's city council voted in favor of the Stadium Freeway extension, but both 
Milwaukee aldermen and the Cedarburg town board objected. Leaders in the 
Cedarburg area cited environmental concerns, fearing pollution and damage to the 
Cedarburg Bog, Cedar Creek, and Covered Bridge Park. Milwaukee officials objected 
to the loss of $21 million worth of housing. More than 20,000 city residents signed a 
petition calling for halt to new expressways. Citizens groups further advocated 
additional mass transit options.140 
 By the early 1970s, local officials in Milwaukee began to consider a 
moratorium on further expressway construction. Concerns over displacements, lack of 
relocation housing, the impact on neighborhoods, and environmental issues all played 
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a role. The Milwaukee County Expressway Commission dropped the Bay Freeway 
along Hampton Avenue from its plans in 1969. U.S. District Judge John Reynolds 
issued an order restraining contracts for the Park West Freeway along North Avenue 
in 1972, citing the lack of an environmental impact statement. The U.S. Department 
of Transportation ultimately rejected an environmental impact statement in January 
1977, delaying plans for that route years after the right-of-way had been cleared.  
As for a lakefront route, only a portion was built. In April 1972, circuit judge 
William R. Moser issued an order barring construction through Juneau Park. His order 
cited a deed from 1936, in which the city gave Milwaukee County land for Juneau 
Park and other park land. After his order, expressway construction on the site required 
either a Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling or an action by the City of Milwaukee 
involving a two-thirds majority of the Milwaukee Common Council and the mayor's 
signature. The Common Council did pass a resolution in favor of the Lake Freeway, 
but Mayor Maier vetoed it and only four aldermen voted to override his veto.141 In 
November 1977, the harbor bridge Milwaukee's leaders dreamed of since before the 
Great Depression finally opened. Running from South Carferry Street to East 
Clybourn Street at Lincoln Memorial Drive and connecting to the East-West 
Expressway at its north end, the high level bridge linked Bay View with downtown 
but did not contain the northern and southern extensions the federal government 
required. A plaque affixed to the bridge named it in honor of former Mayor Daniel 
Webster Hoan.142 
 
                                               
141 Michael O. Zahn, "Lake X-Way Route in Park Prohibited," 28 April 1972, Milwaukee Journal, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19720428&id=jzgdAAAAIBAJ&sjid=zCgEAAA
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Figure 9: The Lake Interchange and I-794, facing south. 
Photo by Greg Dickenson, 2013. 
 
In 1974 the Expressway Commission cancelled the extended Stadium North 
Freeway, although County Executive Doyne continued to support closing the gap 
between the Fond du Lac Avenue and Stadium Freeways. Eighteen anti-freeway 
legislators including future Mayor John O. Norquist also campaigned against more 
freeways, circulating a letter asking the governor to support their position. In January 
1977, Governor Patrick Lucey ordered a halt the Stadium South Freeway.143  
Richard Cutler referred to 1977 as the climax of the anti-freeway movement in 
Milwaukee. In December of that year SEWRPC voted 10-7 to drop the Park West 
Freeway and Fond du Lac-Stadium Freeway "gap closure," and subject other 
                                               
143 Cutler, 90.  
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incomplete projects to a 10-year referendum. Their action essentially ended 
expressway construction in Milwaukee County. With the exception of the short 
Airport Spur linking Mitchell International Airport to the North-South Expressway in 
1978, no other freeways were built until 1999.144
                                               
144 Cutler, 89-90, 94. 
166 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Over two decades after completion of the Hoan Bridge, a southern leg of the 
Lake Freeway opened to traffic. Called the John R. Plewa Memorial Lake Parkway in 
honor of the late State Senator John R. Plewa,1 the route opened in September 1999 at 
a cost of $130 million.2 The Wisconsin Department of Transportation oversaw 
construction, which began in 1991. The DOT located the route along the former 
Chicago and North Western railway, which by the late 1990s was owned by the Union 
Pacific Railroad and shared the right-of-way with the expressway. The new Lake 
Parkway differed from other Milwaukee-area expressways in that was landscaped 
with trees and shrubs and had a speed limit of only 40 miles per hour at the time it 
opened. It was similar to other expressways, though, in that it was still a divided 
highway with access controlled by entrance and exit ramps. The new route ran from 
the southern terminus of the Hoan Bridge at Carferry Drive to Milwaukee's municipal 
border with Cudahy at Layton Avenue.3 An extension completed in 2005 linked the 
Lake Parkway to Edgerton Avenue, just east of Mitchell International Airport. The 
same year, a major reconstruction of the 37 year-old Marquette Interchange got 
underway.4  
In December 2012, SEWRPC approved including another extension to its 
                                               
1 Larry Sandler, "Already, Highway Has a New Name: Plewa Memorial Lake Parkway," 8 December 
1999, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=19991208&id=jqcaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Yy8EAA
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2 "Lake Parkway Opens," 30 September 1999, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
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AAIBAJ&pg=2402,4756034&hl=en, accessed 31 March 2015. 
3 Larry Sandler, "Lake Parkway South-Side Link Fulfills a Long-Held Dream," 21 June 1999, 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=19990621&id=TKgaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Ri8EAA
AAIBAJ&pg=1533,6452&hl=en, accessed 31 March 2015. 
4 Larry Sandler, "A Glance in the Mirror, a Look Ahead," 2 January 2006, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
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long-term regional transportation plan. Including it in its long-term plan was an 
important step in qualifying for federal highway money. The proposed route continues 
from the Lake Parkway's terminus at Edgerton Avenue and runs to a point slightly 
south of Ryan Road in the City of Oak Creek. County Board member Patricia Jursik 
hailed the move as important in promoting development around the Port of 
Milwaukee, Mitchell Airport, and the South Shore suburbs.5  
As of this writing, a lack of funding constrains possible construction of a Lake 
Parkway extension south of Edgerton Avenue. No other new expressways are under 
consideration in Milwaukee County.6 Also as of this writing, the intersection of the 
East-West and West Expressways (now called the Zoo Interchange) requires 
reconstruction. That reconstruction is now underway, prompting temporary closure of 
several ramps.7 
The new construction and expressway rebuilding projects represent a vision 
for continued transportation planning in Milwaukee and its immediate suburbs that 
focuses on repair and reconstruction of existing expressway routes. An extension of a 
long-planned route through southeastern Milwaukee County and the rebuilding of two 
important interchanges indicate that expressways are still a major component of 
transportation planning in Milwaukee. Yet new freeways are not the only 
transportation goal of Milwaukee's leaders. 
In February 2015, the Milwaukee Common Council approved by a 9-6 vote a 
new streetcar route proposed for downtown Milwaukee. The streetcar received strong 
                                               
5 Sean Ryan, "Regional Planners Approve Lake Parkway Extension," 6 December 2012, Milwaukee 
Business Journal, http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2012/12/06/regional-planners-approve-
lake-parkway.html, accessed 31 March 2015. 
6 "Interim Review and Update of the Year 2015 Regional Transportation System Plan," SEWRPC, May 
2014, http://www.sewrpc.org/SEWRPCFiles/Transportation/Files/RTSP/2014-
Update/2014RTSPPlanUpdate-Newsletter.PDF, accessed 31 March 2015. 
7 Lee Bergquist, "Traffic Disrupted by Long-Term Ramp Closures in Zoo Interchange," 8 March 2015, 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, http://www.jsonline.com/news/traffic/zoo-interchange-ramps-set-for-long-
term-closures-b99458064z1-295545801.html, accessed 31 March 2015. 
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support from Mayor Tom Barrett and will be financed in part by a federal grant. Its 
opponents have questioned the city's ability to fund the project long-term, but 
advocates have argued the new line will promote economic development in the 
downtown area.8 
  Transportation planning in Milwaukee has also shifted toward elimination of 
some freeway segments and continued opposition to any new routes. Citing possible 
loss of tax base, Cudahy, Oak Creek, and Racine County officials resisted efforts to 
build the southern Lake Freeway through their borders in 1993.9 In 2001, SEWRPC 
undertook a study of a bypass running between the North-South Expressway (I-43) 
and the West Expressway (Highway 45), similar to the Good Hope Road route 
considered but dropped by the original Ammann & Whitney study in the 1950s, and 
formally proposed by SEWRPC in 1965. Possible locations for such a route were 
anywhere from Capitol Drive in Milwaukee to Pioneer Road in Ozaukee County.10 
Officials in Germantown and Menomonee Falls expressed support for the plan, but it 
drew sharp criticism from the mayors of Mequon and Cedarburg, Democratic and 
Republican state legislators representing Milwaukee's northwest side and North Shore 
suburbs, and the chairman of the state assembly's transportation committee.11 
In 2003, Mayor John O. Norquist shepherded demolition of the Park East 
Freeway, the only completed portion of the Park Freeway downtown loop debated in 
the 1960s and 1970s. It was not replaced with another expressway but instead opened 
                                               
8 Crocker Stephenson, "Milwaukee Common Council OKs Streetcar Plan," 10 February 2015, 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,  http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/milwaukee-council-set-to-
vote-on-approve-streecar-plan-b99441994z1-291390051.html, accessed 31 March 2015. 
9 "Council Opposes Freeway Extension," 4 August 1993, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
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AAAIBAJ&pg=2531,442596&hl=en, accessed 31 March 2015. 
10 Dan Benson, Larry Sandler, and Jeff Cole, " Northern Freeway Bypass Is Road to Ruin, Officials 
Say," 4 July 2001, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
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land at the edge of downtown for new development. Seattle, San Francisco, Oakland, 
Oklahoma City, Providence, Boston, and other cities have likewise initiated or 
completed expressway demolitions.13 
  That movement to remove freeways in or near city centers and replace them 
with large boulevards or other major streets, Raymond Mohl argues, grew out of the 
freeway revolts of the late 1960s and 1970s. He places its beginning in Portland, OR, 
around 1974 but notes that it has spread to numerous cities in other states, including 
Milwaukee. In Boston and Seattle, tunnels under the city replaced the freeways; in 
San Francisco, a streetcar replaced what remained of the Embarcadero Freeway.14 
Thus, just as Milwaukee fit into Mohl's model of locally-initiated expressway 
construction which enjoyed citizen support but was followed by a backlash or freeway 
revolt, Milwaukee fits into the expressway teardown movement. 
Milwaukee's expressway construction narrative is indeed that of an ongoing 
project, completed bit by bit, with significant deliberation. Elected officials initiated 
traffic engineering studies in the 1940s to plan highways to relieve congestion and 
revitalize the downtown area. The freeways they proposed received public support at 
first, but later drew so much opposition that continued planning and construction 
largely ended. In many cases, officials and planners sought to stimulate industry and 
protect existing industrial areas in their route selections but often demolished homes. 
Because the new expressways so often ran through densely populated neighborhoods, 
many residents saw them as concrete ribbons dividing communities and promoting 
suburbanization.  
Even the engineers and highway officials who planned them drew reproach. In 
                                               
13 Raymond A. Mohl, "The Expressway Teardown Movement in American Cities: Rethinking Postwar 
Highway Policy in the Post-Interstate Era," Journal of Planning History 11 (2012): 92-93. 
14 Mohl, "The Expressway Teardown Movement in American Cities: Rethinking Postwar Highway 
Policy in the Post-Interstate Era," 93-94. 
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response to criticism at public hearings, Expressway Commission member Robert 
Brennan predicted in 1969 that the public would challenge civil engineers in the years 
ahead. He recommended his colleagues become more involved in more nontechnical 
issues, even to the point of running for office.15 Criticism of engineers in regard to 
expressway planning was not unique to Milwaukee. Highway engineers based their 
recommendations on traffic flow, savings for motorists, and soil conditions and those 
concerns generally informed highway policy for years. However, the engineers' 
professional training did not prepare them to respond to visions of highway policy 
based on social issues or economics. During the 1960s, the number of interests 
wanting a say in highway planning increased, and by the early 1970s political 
pressure led governors and state legislators to reduce the road builders' autonomy.16 In 
Milwaukee, a coalition including Mayor Henry Maier, numerous aldermen and 
County Board members, and several prominent legislators blocked several of the 
Milwaukee County Expressway Commission's proposed and planned routes.  
Today, as the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission and the 
metropolitan area's elected leaders consider long-term regional transportation and land 
use planning, the narrative of expressway construction in Milwaukee both answers 
and raises questions about future transportation planning. The freeways were built 
along their eventual routes as a result of traffic planning studies, the availability of 
funding, and political debate and compromise. Yet a lack of both funding and political 
consensus delays additional construction, while leaders disagree on mass transit issues 
such as the downtown streetcar.  
                                               
15 Paul G. Hayes, "Civil Engineers Attacked for Social Ills," 22 December 1969, Milwaukee Journal, 
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16 Mark H. Rose and Bruce Seely, "Getting the Interstate System Built: Road Engineers and the 
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This thesis has traced the story of Milwaukee's expressway system since its 
inception in 1946 through the end of the freeway construction era in 1977. It has tied 
Milwaukee into a national narrative and offered an insight into the thinking of road 
builders, civil engineers, urban planners, and elected officials. Perhaps that story and 
the background to regional transportation planning it offers will be used to inform 
future research. 
 
Figure 10: A bridge spanning the harbor finally opened in 1977, nearly five decades 
after Milwaukee's leaders dreamed of linking downtown to Bay View and the  
South Shore. 
Photo by Greg Dickenson, 2012. 
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Appendix 
Names of Key Individuals Involved with Expressway Planning 
Charles J. Becker - West Milwaukee Village President 
Edward A. Bielefeld - City right-of-way acquisition agent  
John Bohn - Milwaukee Mayor, 1942-1948 
Walter Bender - Park Commission chairman 
Alfred Boerner - Park Commission chairman 
Robert W. Brennan - Expressway Engineer 
John Doyne - Milwaukee County Executive 
Patrick Fass - Milwaukee Alderman 
Elliot Fitch - Expressway Commission Chairman 
Raleigh W. Gamble - City expressway director 
Howard Gregg - Parks Commission General Manager 
Daniel Webster Hoan - Milwaukee Mayor, 1916-1940 
Eugene Howard – County Highway Commissioner 
Virgil Hurless - City Comptroller 
Howard Ilgner - City traffic engineer 
Michael Jendusa - Milwaukee Alderman 
Robert Johnson - Expressway Commission member 
Gerald J. Kenehan - Glendale Mayor 
Arnold Klentz - West Allis Mayor 
William B. Knuese - Wauwatosa Mayor 
Elmer Krieger - Land Commissioner 
Henry Maier - Milwaukee Mayor, 1960-1988 
C. Stanley Perry - Milwaukee County Corporation Consul 
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Joseph P. Schwada - Milwaukee City Engineer 
Clyde Sheets - Milwaukee Assistant City Attorney 
Robert Stevenson - Expressway Commission member                   
Walter Swietlik – City Public Works Commissioner 
Henry Wildschut - Milwaukee County Expressway Engineer 
Frank Zeidler - Milwaukee Mayor, 1948-1960 
Erwin Zillman - Milwaukee Alderman 
 
 
